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VOL. XXXI · January 1979 · No. 2

CONTENTS

Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies — *David A. Baldwin* — 161

Authority and Power in Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Administration: A Revisionist Interpretation of Weber on Bureaucracy — *Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph* — 195

The Rational Timing of Surprise — *Robert Axelrod* — 228

The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory — *Tony Smith* — 247

REVIEW ARTICLE

Deterrence Theory Revisited — *Robert Jervis* — 289

The Contributors — iv

Abstracts — v

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ABSTRACTS

Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies

By D.A. BALDWIN

Recent refinements in social science thinking about power could be used to revitalize this approach to understanding international relations. The relevance of scholarly work on the causal concept of power is explored with regard to the following topics: potential vs. actual power, interdependence, military power, positive sanctions, the zero-sum model of politics, and the distinction between deterrence and compellence. The tendency to exaggerate the fungibility of power resources, the propensity to treat military power resources as the "ultimate" power base, and the emphasis on conflict and negative sanctions at the expense of cooperation and positive sanctions, are still common in international relations scholarship. The most important need is for recognition that the absence of a common denominator of political value in terms of which different scopes of power can be compared is not so much a methodological problem to be solved as it is a real-world constraint to be lived with.

Authority and Power in Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Administration: A Revisionist Interpretation of Weber on Bureaucracy

By L.I. RUDOLPH and S.H. RUDOLPH

Weber's understanding of bureaucracy, despite substantial qualification and revision, remains the dominant paradigm for the study of administration and formal organizations. We continue the process of revision by accepting his ideal-typical concepts of bureaucratic and patrimonial administration, but subject them to theoretical and historical reinterpretation and application. Our reading of historical change as it relates to bureaucracy leads us to question Weber's interpretations. His conceptualization of bureaucracy in terms of rational-legal-authority and formal rationality fails to take account of the existence and use of power within and outside of organizations, and of the persistence of patrimonial features. The use of power produces conflict and pathologies. When these serve the legitimate values and interests of participants and actors in the organizational environment, they can have benign consequences. The persistence of patrimonial features, rather than signalling the survival of dysfunctional atavisms, can promote administrative effectiveness by mitigating conflict and promoting organizational loyalty, discipline, and efficiency.

The Rational Timing of Surprise

By R. AXELROD

National leaders are frequently surprised by the actions of other governments. This paper explores the structure common to problems involving the use of resources for achieving surprise. Such resources include deception through double agents and through sudden changes in standard operating procedures. Still other resources for surprise include cracked codes, spies, and new weapons. Since surprise is usually possible only by risking the revelation of the means of surprise, in each case the same problem arises: when should the resource be risked and when should it be maintained for a potentially more important event later? A rational-actor model is developed to provide a prescriptive answer to this question. Examining the ways in which *actual* actors are likely to differ from rational actors leads to several important policy implications. One is that leaders may tend to be overconfident in their ability to predict the actions of their potential opponents just when the stakes get large. Another implication is that, as observational technology improves, the potential for surprise and deception may actually increase.

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The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory

By T. SMITH

As a vehicle for the growing association of southern nationalists and Marxists, dependency theory is an important part of the history of our times, something much more than a school of academic writing. Whatever the varieties of analysis existing within this school (and there are many), a major historiographic shortcoming is common to most of its literature: having grasped the Hegelian insight that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, *dependencistas* exaggerate the point, making the mistake of refusing any autonomy, any specificity to the parts (southern countries) independently of their membership in the whole (the imperialist system established by the North). A better approach to the study of the place of the South in the international system is to emphasize the variety of state structures present there with their different abilities to mobilize forces internally and translate this into international rank. Southern advances are more substantial than many realize; the essay concludes that southerners should pay more attention to the real room for initiative and maneuver they have, but which dependency theory systematically overlooks. Most of the illustrative examples concern India, the Ottoman Empire, and Latin America before World War I.

Deterrence Theory Revisited

By R. JERVIS

Because of its parsimony and power, deterrence theory is the most important American theory of international relations. Yet it has many faults. The boundaries outside of which it does not apply are not clear; it does not tell how a state can change an adversary's motives; it does not deal with the use of rewards. Current scholarship of the third wave of deterrence theory, including George and Smoke's *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, has increased our knowledge by providing empirical evidence on when and how deterrence fails. Examination of the details of decision making reveals the ways in which attempts to deter can go wrong. Recent work stresses the role of each side's intrinsic interest in an issue, and argues that earlier formulations of the theory exaggerated the importance of commitment. The third wave also introduces a larger political element by focusing attention on states' goals and the context of their behavior.

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POWER ANALYSIS AND WORLD POLITICS: New Trends versus Old Tendencies

By DAVID A. BALDWIN*

FROM Niccolò Machiavelli and David Hume to E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, power has been an important (some would say too important) variable in international political theorizing. Although some may regard power analysis as old-fashioned and outdated, recent refinements in social science thinking about power suggest the possibility of revitalizing this approach to understanding international relations.

Exact turning points in intellectual history are difficult to identify, but many would regard the publication of *Power and Society* by Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan as the watershed between the older, intuitive and ambiguous treatments of power and the clarity and precision of more recent discussions.[1] Since then, Herbert Simon, James March, Robert Dahl, Jack Nagel, and others have developed the idea of power as a type of causation.[2] This causal conception of power, according to Nagel, has proved attractive for three reasons: First, there are compelling similarities between intuitive notions of power and

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Fourth Annual Conference of the British International Studies Association, University of Durham, December 15-17, 1977. The author would like to express his appreciation for the helpful comments provided by Conference participants and by Jeffrey Hart, Robert O. Keohane, and James P. Sewell.

[1] Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1950). In an early and influential article, Herbert A. Simon described his discussion as "a series of footnotes on the analysis of influence and power by Lasswell and Kaplan." "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power," *Journal of Politics*, XV (November 1953), 501. See also Jack H. Nagel, "Some Questions About the Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, XIII (March 1968), 129.

[2] Simon (fn. 1), and *Models of Man* (New York: Wiley 1957); James G. March, "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence," *American Political Science Review*, XLIX (June 1955), 431-51; Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, II (July 1957), 201-15, and "Power," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XII (New York: Free Press 1968), 405-15; Jack H. Nagel, *The Descriptive Analysis of Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1975); and Felix E. Oppenheim, "Power and Causation," in Brian Barry, ed., *Power and Political Theory: Some European Perspectives* (London: John Wiley 1976), 103-16.

Excellent reviews of the literature on power, reflecting both consensus and healthy intellectual dispute, are the following: Dorwin Cartwright, "Influence, Leadership, Control," in James March, ed., *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1965), 1-47; Dahl, "Power"; James T. Tedeschi and Thomas V. Bonoma, "Power and Influence: An Introduction," in Tedeschi, ed., *The Social Influence Processes* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton 1972), 1-49; and Nagel, *The Descriptive Analysis of Power*.

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causation. Second, causal conceptions of power are less likely to lead to tautologies. And third, "treatment of power as causation enables power researchers to employ methods developed for more general applications."[3]

Despite the ancient origins of the study of power, Dahl maintains that "the systematic empirical study of power relations is remarkably new."[4] He attributes the "vast improvement in the clarity" of power concepts to the fact that "the last several decades probably have witnessed more systematic efforts to tie down these concepts than have the previous millennia of political thought."[5] Even those who would dispute such assertions could agree that international political theorists might find it useful to rethink their views of power in terms of the recent literature on that subject.[6] The purpose of this article is to review some recent scholarship in international relations with special reference to the literature on social power.[7] Topics for discussion include potential power, interdependence, military power, positive sanctions, the zero-sum concept of power, and the distinction between compellence and deterrence.

Before the discussion begins, however, one *caveat* is in order. The increased precision in recent concepts of power has threatened to overwhelm the analyst. Even those most familiar with this literature have complained of interminable theoretical distinctions that make a broad overview difficult to achieve.[8] For purposes of this discussion, therefore, the term "power" will be used in a broad generic sense that is interchangeable with such terms as "influence" and "control." This usage is not intended to deny the validity or the utility of distinguishing among such terms for other purposes; it is intended to imply the relevance of the following discussion for all situations in which A gets B to do

[3] Nagel (fn. 2), 9-10.

[4] Dahl, "Power" (fn. 2), 414.

[5] Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (3rd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1976), 26.

[6] Two important recent works in international relations use Hans Morgenthau's textbook published in 1948 as their basic reference on power: Charles P. Kindleberger, *Power and Money* (New York: Basic Books 1970), and Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books 1975).

[7] For a review of a different set of international relations works with regard to a different set of topics, see Baldwin, "Inter-Nation Influence Revisited," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, xv (December 1971), 471-86. For a suggestion that current "academic practitioners of international relations analysis and theory" have neglected the study of power, see Colin S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era* (New York: Crane, Russak 1977), 1-5. Gray's contention that power analysis is the only approach that "enables students to appreciate the essence of the field" of international relations, however, goes considerably beyond the argument I am presenting here.

[8] Cartwright (fn. 2), 4; and Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (2d ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1970), 16.

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something he would not otherwise do, regardless of how such situations are labeled.[9] The primary focus will be on basic distinctions *essential* to thinking about power rather than on distinctions that are useful in some contexts but irrelevant in others. In discussing power as a type of causation, it is *essential* to specify or at least imply who is influencing whom with respect to what; in short, both scope and domain must be specified or implied.[10] Such distinctions may seem obvious and trivial at first, but I will argue that insistence on them would orient discussions of international power less toward general theories of power and more toward contextual analysis.

Power: Potential, Probable, and Actual

The frequent failure of power predictions has been noted so often by scholars, journalists, statesmen, and the "man in the street" that it deserves a label—something like "the paradox of unrealized power." How is it that "weak powers" influence the "strong"? How is it that the "greatest power in the world" could suffer defeat at the hands of a "band of night-riders in black pajamas"?[11] How do we explain the "cruel and ridiculous paradox" of the "big influence of small allies"? How can the Arabs get away with defying the United States? How can tiny Israel exercise so much influence on U.S. foreign policy? I shall consider two alternative explanations of this so-called paradox.

First, failure to translate alleged "potential power" (or power "resources") into actual power may be explained in terms of malfunctioning conversion processes. The would-be wielder of power is described as lacking in skill and/or the "will" to use his power resources effectively: "The Arabs had the tanks but didn't know how to use them."

[9] For useful arguments in favor of the validity and desirability of distinguishing power from influence, see David V. J. Bell, *Power, Influence, and Authority* (New York: Oxford University Press 1975); and Klaus Knorr, *The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations* (New York: Basic Books 1975).

[10] On the importance of this point, see Lasswell and Kaplan (fn. 1), 76; Dahl, "Power" (fn. 2), 408; Dahl (fn. 5), 33; and Nagel (fn. 2), 14, 115. Among students of international politics, the strongest proponents of this view have been Harold and Margaret Sprout. See their *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics*, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph (Princeton 1956), 39-49; "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1 (December 1957), 309-28; *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs: With Special Reference to International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1965), 83-98, 214-16; and *Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth* (New York: Van Nostrand 1971), 163-78.

[11] "I still believe he [President Johnson] found it viscerally inconceivable that what Walt Rostow kept telling him was 'the greatest power in the world' could not dispose of a collection of night-riders in black pajamas." Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Quagmire Papers," *New York Review of Books* (December 16, 1971), 41.

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"The Americans had the bombs but lacked the will to use them." "The large states controlled the money but lacked organizational unity." And so forth.[12] Bad luck, incompetence, and pusillanimity are the most common elements in such explanations. "He had the cards but played them poorly" is the theme.

A second explanation for the failure of power predictions focuses on variations in the scope, weight, and domain of power. As Harold and Margaret Sprout have reminded us many times, the capabilities (or potential power) of an actor must be set in the context of a "policy-contingency framework" specifying who is trying (or might try) to get whom to do what.[13] From this perspective, the failure of power predictions is likely to be attributed to faulty predictive techniques rather than to the actors themselves. The so-called "paradox of unrealized power" results from the mistaken belief that power resources useful in one policy-contingency framework will be equally useful in a different one. So-called "weak powers" influence so-called "strong powers" because of the power analyst's failure to account for the possibility that a country may be weak in one situation but strong in another. Planes loaded with nuclear weapons may strengthen a state's ability to deter nuclear attacks but may be irrelevant to rescuing the *Pueblo* on short notice. The ability to get other countries to refrain from attacking one's homeland is not the same as the ability to "win the hearts and minds of the people" in a faraway land. The theme of such explanations is not "he had the cards but played them poorly," but rather "he had a great bridge hand but happened to be playing poker."

In order to evaluate these alternative explanations of the "paradox of unrealized power," a closer examination of the concept of "power resources" is in order. What distinguishes power resources from other things? How fungible are power resources? What is the range of variation in the value of power resources? And what working assumptions about power resources are most suitable for international political analysis?

[12] For examples of this type of explanation, see Knorr (fn. 9), 9-14; 17-18; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown 1977), 11, 18-19, 53, 225; Dahl (fn. 5), 37; and Ray S. Cline, *World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press 1975). The inclusion of Dahl in this list is somewhat anomalous since Dahl stresses variations in the scope and domain of power.

[13] Sprout and Sprout (fn. 10). Actually the Sprouts' concept of a "policy-contingency framework" goes beyond specification of scope and domain to include the time, place, and means of an influence attempt. For purposes of this article, however, the Sprouts' insistence that "policy-contingency frameworks" be specified will be treated as roughly equivalent to Dahl's insistence that scope and domain be specified.

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How are we to recognize power resources when we see them? Implicitly or explicitly, almost everyone conceives of such resources as the "means by which one person [actor] can influence the behavior of other persons [actors]."[14] One problem is that it is difficult to imagine what is excluded, since almost anything could be used to influence someone to do something in some situation or another. Another problem is that the means by which one actor can influence the behavior of another depends on who is trying to get whom to do what. A pleasant smile may suffice as a means to get the boss's attention, but a threat to quit may be required to get a raise. Diplomatic pressure may suffice to gain support on a relatively unimportant vote in the U.N. General Assembly, but force may be necessary to get a country to relinquish land claims. What functions as a power resource in one policy-contingency framework may be irrelevant in another. The only way to determine whether something is a power resource or not is to place it in the context of a real or hypothetical policy-contingency framework.[15] Prior to the 19th century, neither oil nor uranium were power resources, since no one had any use for them. Only within the policy-contingency framework of the last hundred years or so have they become resources.

Although it might seem that the predictive value of power resource inventories is impaired by insistence on prior specification of scope and domain (or policy-contingency framework), the opposite is true. The accuracy of our estimate of whether an architect has "adequate" raw materials to complete his project is likely to improve if we first ascertain whether he plans to build a birdhouse or a cathedral.

If there were some generalized means of exercising political power —just as money is a generalized means of exercising purchasing power —the problem of conceiving and measuring political power would be much simpler.[16] Political power resources, however, tend to be much less liquid than economic resources. The owner of an economic resource, such as a petroleum field, has little trouble converting it into another economic resource, such as a factory; but the owner of a political power resource, such as the means to deter atomic attack, is likely to have difficulty converting this resource into another resource

[14] Dahl (fn. 5), 37.

[15] "It seems that what we call a 'resource' is such, not on its own account, but solely because of the uses to which it can be put, and its quantitative aspect, how much resource there is, is still more evidently determinable only in terms of the use." Frank H. Knight, *Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit* (New York: Harper & Row 1921), 65-66.

[16] For a comparison of political power and purchasing power which emphasizes the absence of a political counterpart to money, see Baldwin, "Money and Power," *Journal of Politics*, XXXIII (August 1971), 578-614.

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that would, for instance, allow his country to become the leader of the Third World. Whereas money facilitates the exchange of one economic resource for another, there is no standardized measure of value that serves as a medium of exchange for political power resources.

That is not to say that some political power resources are not more fungible than others. One could rank-order power resources according to fungibility; that is, those most likely to be effective in most situations with regard to most people over the most scopes would rank high. Although agreement on the rank-ordering would be far from complete, one would expect money, time, information, and a reputation for making credible threats or promises to rank generally high; while two-headed goats, smog, hula hoops, and asses' jawbones would rank generally low. Despite such variation in the fungibility of political power resources, it is important to recognize that *no political power resource begins to approach the degree of fungibility of money*.[17] As a group, political power resources are relatively low in fungibility; that is precisely why specification of scope and domain is so essential in analyzing political power.

If the range of variation in the effectiveness of power resources were relatively narrow, explaining the failure of power predictions in terms of A's inability or unwillingness to convert his resources into actual power would be less objectionable. As it is, however, even a *caveat* to the effect that power resources in one issue-area may lose some of their effectiveness when applied to another does not suffice. Power resources (or assets) in one policy-contingency framework may not only lose their effectiveness in another context; they may actually become liabilities rather than assets. Threatening voters with nuclear attack is not merely one of the less effective ways to win a mayoral election in New Haven; it is a guarantee of defeat. Possession of nuclear weapons is not just irrelevant to securing the election of a U.S. citizen as U.N. Secretary-General; it is a hindrance. "First-strike weapons" may not only decline in effectiveness in deterrent situations; they may actually impair one's ability to deter.[18]

The source of this problem is the failure to insist that scope and

[17] See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Robert O. Keohane, "Transnational Relations and World Politics," *International Organization*, XXV (Summer 1971), 736; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "World Politics and the International Economic System," in C. Fred Bergsten, ed., *The Future of the International Economic Order: An Agenda for Research* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books 1973), 121; Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), 146. For an extended critique of the analogy between power and money, see Baldwin, "Money and Power" (fn. 16).

[18] See Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1960), 205-54.

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domain be specified with regard to power resources as well as to power relationships. Money, tanks, bombs, information, and allies are often called "power resources"; but one can easily imagine plausible policy-contingency frameworks within which each of these becomes a liability rather than an asset. To insist that the scope and domain of power resources be specified would probably inhibit (but not prevent) the development of general theories of international power relationships and promote the development of contextual analyses of power. Such contextual power analysis is precisely what Lasswell and Kaplan were calling for:

> Failure to recognize that power may rest on various bases, each with a varying scope, has confused and distorted the conception of power itself, and retarded inquiry into the conditions and consequences of its exercise in various ways. . . .
>
> In particular, it is of crucial importance to recognize that power may rest on various bases, differing not only from culture to culture, but also within a culture from one power structure to another. . . .
>
> What is common to all power and influence relations is only effect on policy. What is affected and on what basis are variables whose specific content in a given situation can be determined only by inquiry into the actual practices of the actors in that situation. . . .
>
> Political analysis must be contextual, and take account of the power practices actually manifested in the concrete political situation.[19]

Although a contextual approach to power analysis would undoubtedly reduce the parsimony of theorizing about power, this disadvantage is less serious than it seems. Specification of scope and domain need not imply atheoretical empiricism. Policy-contingency frameworks can be defined more or less specifically to suit the purpose of the analyst. As the Sprouts put it:

> Estimates of capabilities covering all members of the society of nations in all imaginable contingencies would run to millions of combinations and permutations. No government, even more emphatically no university or private individual, could conceivably carry out so massive a research and analysis. Nor is any such undertaking contemplated or needed by anyone. A great many contingencies—for example, Canadian-U.S. military confrontation—are too remote to justify any consideration. By a process of elimination, one comes eventually to a hard core of contingencies that seem more or less likely to set the major patterns of international politics in the years to come, and with regard to which the relative capabilities of interacting nations are not self-evident.[20]

[19] Lasswell and Kaplan (fn. 1), 85, 92, 94.

[20] Sprout and Sprout, *Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth* (fn. 10), 178. Dahl makes a similar point regarding the possibility of comparing policy-contingency frame-

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Emphasis on policy-contingency frameworks could improve theorizing about international politics by encouraging the development of "middle-level" theories and by forcing the acknowledgment of assumptions that are often left implicit; e.g., the assumption of war-winning capacity that is implicit in much balance-of-power theorizing.[21]

The question of whether to emphasize the fungibility or lack of fungibility of power resources is not a black-and-white issue. The fruitful way to pose the question is: "What working assumption about the fungibility of power resources is most useful for international political analysis during the next decade?" How one answers this question will depend partly on the extent to which one believes power resources to be fungible, and partly on the particular distortions in current thinking about international power relationships that one regards as most in need of correction. The demonstrations by Schelling[22] that even slight changes in the context of an influence attempt can convert a power asset into a power liability, the recent painful demonstration that the "most powerful state the world has ever known" could not achieve its goals in Southeast Asia, and the effect of the 1973 Arab oil embargo on U.S. foreign policy suggest that political power resources are much less fungible than has often been implied. Among students of international politics there is a tendency to exaggerate the fungibility of power resources, often to the point of ignoring scope and domain; but there is hardly any example of international power analysis that exaggerates the importance of contextual variables, i.e., the policy-contingency framework. In the absence of contrary evidence, I would

works: "Power comparability will have to be interpreted in the light of the specific requirements of research and theory, in the same way that the decision as to whether to regard any two objects—animals, plants, atoms, or whatnot—as comparable depends upon general considerations of classification and theoretical import. To this extent, and to this extent only, the decision is 'arbitrary'; but it is not more 'arbitrary' than other decisions that establish the criteria for a class of objects." "The Concept of Power" (fn. 2), 209. Nagel also notes that "domain and scope need not be particularistic or unique. Depending on one's purpose and the limits imposed by reality, the outcome class may contain a few similar members or many diverse elements." (Fn. 2), 14.

[21] Two excellent yet quite different examples of power theorizing based on explicit recognition that power configurations vary from one policy-contingency framework to another are Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), and Hayward Alker, "On Political Capabilities in a Schedule Sense: Measuring Power, Integration, and Development," in Hayward Alker, Karl W. Deutsch, and Antoine Stoetzel, eds., *Mathematical Approaches to Politics* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 1973), 307-73. The former work illustrates the value of "middle-level" empirical theorizing about power; the latter work demonstrates that abstract model-building is not precluded by the assumption that power is multidimensional.

[22] Schelling (fn. 18).

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propose that the international political analyst start with the assumption that power resources are situationally specific. As evidence of fungibility is discovered, appropriate modifications in this working assumption can be made.

Although Keohane and Nye are clearly skeptical about the fungibility of power resources, they appear unwilling to place the burden of proof on those who maintain that power resources are highly fungible. They note that "one of our most important analytical tasks is . . . to understand the exceptions and limitations to basic structural hypotheses that rest on assumptions about the fungibility of power."[23] Whereas they place the burden of proof on those who purport to find exceptions to assumptions of *highly* fungible power, the approach advocated here would place the burden of proof on those who purport to find evidence of exceptions to assumptions that power resources tend to be *low* in fungibility. Whereas the Sprouts and Dahl[24] reject as practically meaningless any statement about influence that does not clearly indicate scope, Keohane and Nye confine themselves to the suggestion that "we may need to reevaluate the usefulness of the homogeneous conception of power."[25]

The "paradox of unrealized power," then, can be explained either in terms of inadequate conversion processes or in terms of mistaken judgments regarding the fungibility of power resources. The latter explanation is preferable for two reasons. First, the emphasis on A's inability and/or unwillingness to convert his alleged power resources into actual power encourages sloppy power analysis. No matter how inept the power analyst has been at estimating A's power resources, the failure of A to influence B can always be attributed to A's lack of commitment, or incompetent execution of the influence attempt. To take it to an absurd but illuminating extreme, one can imagine a power analyst saying, "I just don't understand how a country with so many two-headed goats, so much smog, and so many asses' jawbones could have lost World War III. It must have been due to a lack of skill or commitment on the part of the leaders." To take it to an equally illuminating, more painful, but less absurd point, one frequently hears the following: "I just don't understand how a country with so many nuclear weapons and so many soldiers could have failed to accomplish

[23] Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), 146-47.

[24] Dahl, "Power" (fn. 2), 408; Sprout and Sprout, "Environmental Factors . . ." (fn. 10), 325.

[25] Keohane and Nye, "World Politics and the International System" (fn. 17), 163.

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its goals in Vietnam. It must have been caused by clumsy and spineless national leadership." Emphasis on skill and will in conversion processes makes it all too easy for the power analyst to avoid facing up to his mistakes. In estimating the *capabilities* of states, the probability of successful conversion should be included in the estimate. In estimating *probable* power, the likelihood of sufficient commitment should also be included.

A second reason for rejecting the conversion-process explanation in favor of the relative-infungibility explanation is that the latter is more likely to focus attention on the contextual nature of power. Whereas the former approach draws attention to the skill of the would-be power wielder, the latter treats such skill as just another resource and focuses attention on the actual or postulated policy-contingency framework within which capabilities are being estimated. Thus, the conversion-process analyst is more likely to attribute the failure of A's threatened beating of B to get B to do X to A's clumsy execution of the threat, but the relative-infungibility analyst is more likely to point out that since B is a masochist, A's threat was doomed to fail from the beginning.[26]

Let us examine some recent examples of international power analysis from the perspective of a relative-infungibility analyst.[27] Knorr, in *The Power of Nations*, emphasizes the importance of the distinction between putative and actualized power; he notes that the frequent failure to convert the former into the latter is a source of puzzlement to many. The distinction, according to Knorr, is between power as a "means" and power as an "effect." Power as a "means" is something that nations "have and can accumulate."[28]

At this point, the relative-infungibility analyst is likely to ask two questions: First, why is the distinction not made in terms of potential and actual effects? That would be straightforward and would retain the basic relational quality of the concept of power.[29] The distinction between an actual and a postulated relation between A and B should

[26] The idea that power resources or "power bases" could be identified without reference to the value system of the person or group to be influenced is not found in Lasswell and Kaplan. They make it clear that power relations presuppose B's value system. (Fn. 1), 76-77, 83-84.

[27] Generally speaking, I consider this to be the perspective of all those who emphasize the importance of scope specification, policy-contingency frameworks, and/or contextual analysis, including Lasswell and Kaplan (fn. 1), the Sprouts (fn. 10), and Dahl (fn. 2).

[28] Knorr (fn. 9), 9.

[29] Cf. Nagel (fn. 2), 172-73.

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be easy enough for most readers to grasp. In describing putative power as a means that can be possessed and accumulated, Knorr risks obscuring the relational nature of power and returning to the earlier concept of power as an undifferentiated quantifiable mass. A similar risk is incurred when Knorr describes putative power as "inherent in the things of value" that A is ready to give.[30] A relational concept of power assumes that actual or potential power is never inherent in properties of A, but rather inheres in the actual or potential relationship between A's properties and B's value system. Knorr views putative power as "capabilities that permit the power wielder to make effective threats."[31] These capabilities may be transformed into actual power through a conversion process in which the crucial variables are B's perceptions, values, and propensities. The problem is that such variables must be considered in determining whether A has putative power in the first place, since the effectiveness or potential effectiveness of a threat depends partially on B's perceptions of it and on B's value system. *Before* one postulates whether he is dealing with a coward or a masochist, one can say nothing whatever about the potential effectiveness of a threat. *Before* one can attribute putative power to A, one must postulate a scenario or set of scenarios which specify whom A might try to influence and in what respects. Consideration of B's perceptions, values, and skills cannot be delayed until it is time to discuss A's ability to convert his putative power into actual power. If B's perceptions, values, and skills are such as to make it impossible for A to influence him, then putative power should never have been attributed to A in the first place.

A second question that might be asked is whether Knorr makes it sufficiently clear that there are no generalized means of exercising political power. The means that work in one policy-contingency framework may be counterproductive or irrelevant in another. Although Knorr notes that actualized power differs in weight, scope, and domain,[32] he fails to apply these distinctions to putative power. There is no reason to believe, however, that statements about potential power are less subject to the requirement to specify scope and domain than are statements about actual power relationships.

Cline's *World Power Assessment* represents the polar opposite of the type of contextual analysis advocated by the Sprouts and Lasswell and

[30] Knorr (fn. 9), 313.
[31] *Ibid.*, 9.
[32] *Ibid.*, 18.

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Kaplan. Cline's basic conceptual framework is a formula for measuring national power:

$$Pp = (C + E + M) \times (S + W)$$

where:

Pp = perceived power
C = critical mass = population + territory
E = economic capability
M = military capability
S = strategic purpose
W = will to pursue national strategy.[33]

This formula is applied to forty nations, each receiving a number representing "total weighted units of perceived power."[34] The United States is assigned 35 such units; the Soviet Union gets 67.5.

For the most part, Cline's analysis ignores questions of scope and domain. Although he defines power as the ability of one government to cause another government to do something it would not otherwise do, there is little or no indication that power resources useful in causing one government to do X may be useless or counterproductive in causing another government to do Y.[35]

Whereas the Sprouts insist that strategies (actual or postulated) be treated as *givens* in capability analysis, Cline treats strategy as a variable to be discussed *after* weights have already been assigned to the other variables. Whereas Cline assigns power weights to territory and population, the Sprouts maintain that "such data acquire political relevance only when viewed in some frame of assumptions as to what is to be attempted, by whom, when and where, vis-à-vis what adversaries, allies, and unaligned onlookers."[36]

In allocating weights for national strategy, Cline assigns high values to countries with "clearcut strategic plans for international aggrandizement" and low values to those without such plans. American strategy is given 0.3, while Russian strategy receives 0.8. Toward the end of

[33] Cline (fn. 12), 11. Cline's book is especially interesting as an indication of how power analysis is performed by high-level government officials. He has served as Deputy Director for Intelligence in the CIA and as Director of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State.

[34] *Ibid.*, 130.

[35] Cline describes power as "a subjective factor" (*ibid.*, 8) and uses the term "perceived power" in his formula. In a puzzling footnote, however, he indicates that "real power" is something different from "perceived power" (p. 12n). The distinction is not developed, thus leaving one wondering about the significance of the formula.

[36] Sprout and Sprout, *Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth* (fn. 10), 177.

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the book, Cline describes his preferred strategy for the United States and admits that this strategy has been "implicit in the situation described in preceding pages of this book."[37] A relative-infungibility analyst might point out that it would have been helpful if Cline had made such policy assumptions explicit earlier in the book.

Despite the fact that one can eventually ferret out the vague and implicit policy-contingency framework underlying Cline's *World Power Assessment*, the wisdom of treating power at such an abstract general level may be questioned. If one wanted to promote the idea of power as monolithic, homogeneous, unidimensional and highly fungible, it would be difficult to improve on Cline's approach.

In *Power and Money*, Kindleberger differentiates between "strength" and "power" along lines similar to the distinction between potential and actual power. He treats strength as a means which "exists independently of whether it is used to assert or achieve control over policies of other countries" and power as strength capable of being used effectively.[38] This definition of power, he claims, "does not imply a purpose." But power divorced from purpose begins to sound like generalized or highly fungible power. In context, however, it is clear that Kindleberger intends the statement to differentiate probable from potential power in the sense that a state may have the potential power to influence the policies of another state, but may have neither the intention nor the desire to actually exercise such power. The weakness in Kindleberger's concept of power is that he implies that power can be divorced completely from goals or purposes. Although it is true that potential power does not imply actual purposes, it does imply at least a hypothetical purpose in the sense of a postulated policy-contingency framework.

In considering the "paradox of unrealized power," it has been argued that the most useful way to resolve the paradox is by tying power analysis more closely to specific contexts. I have suggested that one of the most crucial weaknesses in current thinking about international power relationships is the failure to specify scope and domain, and the consequent tendency to exaggerate the fungibility of power resources. In order to demonstrate the usefulness of contextual power analysis, I shall conclude with an examination of the problem of "worst-case" analysis from the perspective of the above discussion.

[37] Cline (fn. 12), 134-35.

[38] Kindleberger (fn. 6), 56. He defines power in terms of ability to use strength "efficiently" at one point (p. 56) and in terms of ability to use strength "effectively" at another point (p. 65). In the context of power analysis the difference is not trivial.

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In worst-case analysis, the assumption is that preparing for the worst is wise and prudent policy. This assumption, often espoused by military thinkers, is usually associated with the idea that policymakers should concentrate on assessing the *capability* of other actors more than (or rather than) on the *intentions* of other actors. "Why not prepare for the worst?" is a superficially appealing slogan that must be refuted each year when military appropriations are being considered. Recognition of the multidimensional nature of power and the low fungibility of power resources is vital in showing why worst-case analysis is not a wise and prudent basis for policy. The reason may be demonstrated by comparing political power with purchasing power.

Storing up purchasing power in order to be able to deal with unforeseen financial catastrophies is an ancient, honorable, and prudent undertaking. The existence of a common denominator of economic value that also serves as a medium of exchange (i.e., money) enables us to treat economic resources *as if* they were unidimensional, thereby allowing us to prepare *simultaneously* for small, medium, and large financial difficulties. The fact that I am indebted to druggists, farmers, the government, bankers, and insurance companies for a wide variety of goods and services hardly matters, since I can use the same purchasing power resource—money—to pay them all. This is why we say that money is highly fungible. In dealing with problems of purchasing power, more money is almost always better than less. Aside from tax problems, it is difficult (but not impossible) to imagine a situation in which too much money prevents one from exercising one's purchasing power.

Political power is quite different from purchasing power. There is no common denominator of political value corresponding to money in terms of which political debts can be discharged. The lack of fungibility of political power resources means that preparing to deal with the worst contingencies may hinder one's ability to deal with less severe ones. ("The worst may be the enemy of the bad!") Thus, preparing for a nuclear first strike may weaken a country's deterrent capability; preparing for nuclear war may weaken a country's ability to get one of its citizens elected Secretary General of the U.N.; preparing for a seven-year famine may weaken a nation's ability to resist the demands of poor countries for food aid; preparing for military domination of the world may make it hard to win the hearts and minds of the people; and preparing for autarky may hurt a country's bargaining ability in international trade negotiations. Because political power is multidi-

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mensional and political power resources are low in fungibility, more power in one policy-contingency framework may mean less in another. Although in terms of purchasing power, more is almost always better than less, the same cannot be said of any particular kind of political power. Since not all contingencies are equally probable, policy makers who prepare for the worst and ignore the intentions of other nations may wind up preparing for a very costly but unlikely contingency at the expense of preparing for a less devastating but more likely contingency. Such policy makers are neither wise nor prudent.

Power and Interdependence

Everyone seems to agree that "interdependence" is important; but not everyone agrees on how it should be defined, or on whether it is increasing or decreasing.[39] Although many would agree that interdependence refers to a situation in which states are "significantly" affected by their interaction, there is less agreement as to how to differentiate "significant" effects from "insignificant" ones. Three possibilities may be considered. First, interaction can be equated with interdependence. It is sometimes suggested that this denotes mere interconnectedness rather than interdependence.[40] Second, interdependence can be defined in terms of interactions (or transactions) that have reciprocal costly effects.[41] The difficulty with this definition is that many forms of international interaction, such as trade, involve reciprocal costly effects but not mutual dependency. Such a conception does not seem to capture the notion of dependence underlying the use of that term in common parlance. Buying what is easy to buy elsewhere (e.g., sand) or buying what is easy to do without (e.g., caviar) are not usually considered to create dependency, although both kinds of transactions involve costs for each trading partner.[42] In conceiving of dependence or interdepend-

[39] See Oran R. Young, "Interdependencies in World Politics," *International Journal*, XXIV (Autumn 1969), 726-50; Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth or Reality?" *World Politics*, XXVI (October 1973), 1-27; Kenneth Waltz, "The Myth of Interdependence," in Charles Kindleberger, ed., *The International Corporation* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press 1970), 205-23; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "International Interdependence and Integration," in Nelson W. Polsby and Fred I. Greenstein, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, VIII, *International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1975), 363-414.

[40] Alex Inkeles, "The Emerging Social Structure of the World," *World Politics*, XXVII (July 1975), 467-95, esp. 477-86.

[41] This definition seems to be the basic concept of interdependence espoused by Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), 8-9. There is some ambiguity about this point, however, since their concept of "vulnerability interdependence" corresponds more closely with the idea of interdependence as transactions that are mutually costly to forego.

[42] The pioneering work by Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley: University of California 1945) is still the best statement

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ence, the relevant costs are not those involved in *carrying out* the transaction, but rather those involved in *foregoing* it. Not everyone who drinks is an alcoholic; not everyone who smokes is an addict; and not every international trading relationship involves dependency. The true measure of our dependency on imported oil is not what we have to give up in order to get it, but rather what we would have to give up in order to go without it. The smoker who can quit whenever he wants to is not an addict; the drinker who can take it or leave it is not an alcoholic; and the country that can easily forego imported oil is not dependent on it. This basic insight of the Stoics deserves reiteration in the context of discussions of interdependence.

A third way to conceive of interdependence, then, is in terms of relationships that are costly for each party to forego.[43] This conception of interdependence has three advantages over most others. First, it captures the intuitive notion of dependency underlying most common parlance. Second, it is consistent with the theoretical treatments of dependency by Thibaut and Kelley, Emerson, and Blau.[44] Although these works are well known in the literature on social power, they are rarely cited in discussions of international interdependence.[45] Cross-fertilization between the social power literature and the international relations literature is more likely if our fundamental concepts of de-

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of the relationship between trade and dependency. "The influence which country A acquires in country B by foreign trade depends in the first place upon the total gain which B derives from that trade; the total gain from trade for any country is indeed nothing but another expression for the total impoverishment which would be inflicted upon it by a stoppage of trade. In this sense, the classical concept, gain from trade, and the power concept, dependence on trade, now being studied are seen to be merely two aspects of the same phenomenon" (p. 18). See also Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The First and Second Discourses*, trans. Roger D. Masters and Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press 1964), 36n, and *On the Social Contract*, trans. Judith R. Masters; ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press 1978), 74n.

[43] See Waltz (fn. 39); also Inkeles (fn. 40), 483-88; Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics*, XXVIII (April 1976), 317-47, at 320. Note that the concept of interdependence as entailing relations that would be mutually costly to break need not imply that such relations are "positive" or "beneficial" for the participants. It merely implies that those involved have a choice, and that in choosing to maintain the relationship they forego some other alternative.

[44] John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (New York: Wiley 1959), 100-125; Richard M. Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (February 1962), 31-41; Peter M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: Wiley 1964), 118-25, 133, 197. If a graduate student were to ask me where to begin the study of international interdependence, I should direct attention to these writers and to Hirschman (fn. 42) rather than to more recent treatments of this topic in the international relations literature.

[45] The extensive bibliography on interdependence compiled by Keohane and Nye for the *Handbook of Political Science* (fn. 39) contains no entry for any of the authors cited in the preceding footnote—including Hirschman.

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pendency are compatible. A third advantage of this conception of interdependence is that it facilitates thinking about the links between dependency and power. In order to study dependency, one must look at opportunity costs of alternative relationships as well as at actual relationships. Likewise, in order to study power, one must look not only at what B does, but at what B would otherwise do.

Interdependence interests international theorists primarily because of its relationship to power. If A and B are mutually dependent on one another, then each could inflict costs on the other by severing the relationship. And the ability to inflict costs on other actors is one measure of influence.[46] Thus, to say that A and B are interdependent implies that they possess the ability to influence one another in some respect. (Note that this approach does not involve the difficulty of describing a gun as a power resource only to discover that one is trying to influence someone who wants to be shot. Both the value systems and the available alternatives for each actor must be considered in determining whether severance of the relationship would entail costs.) In this sense, interdependence *always* implies mutual potential power of some kind. Whether either actor will be able to influence the other to a satisfactory degree, soon enough, with respect to the desired scopes, or at acceptable cost to itself, is quite another matter. As Young has pointed out, a rising level of interdependence increases both the opportunities and the costs of exercising power.[47]

If dependency and power are closely linked concepts, some of the distinctions useful in studying one may be useful in studying the other. Knorr has outlined a number of such distinctions in his discussion of interdependence.[48] Just as power relationships vary in scope, weight, domain, and symmetry, so do relationships of interdependency: contextual analysis may be as appropriate for the study of interdependence as it is for the study of power.

Keohane and Nye suggest that in order to understand the role of power in interdependence, we must distinguish between "sensitivity" and "vulnerability."[49] "Sensitivity interdependence" refers to the liability to incur costly effects within a given policy framework; "vulnerability interdependence" refers to the liability to incur costly effects even after the policy framework has been altered. For example, "sensitivity

[46] Cf. John C. Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games," *Behavioral Science*, VII (January 1962), 67-80; and Nagel (fn. 1).

[47] Young (fn. 39), 746-47.

[48] Knorr (fn. 9), 207-10.

[49] Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), 11-12.

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interdependence" could be used to refer to the costs of working within the framework of the Bretton Woods monetary regime during the late 1960's; "vulnerability interdependence" could be used to refer to the costs associated with changing to a different international monetary regime. The distinction between the two types of interdependence indicates that dependence, like power, varies from one policy-contingency framework to another. Sensitivity interdependence and vulnerability interdependence are simply labels applied to particular kinds of policy-contingency frameworks. Although Keohane and Nye use these distinctions imaginatively to generate important observations about world politics, the distinctions themselves represent no new theoretical insights. Lasswell and Kaplan, Dahl, and the Sprouts have previously pointed out that power relationships in one policy-contingency framework are likely to differ from those in another.

Instead of treating the distinction between sensitivity interdependence and vulnerability interdependence as one of many ways to differentiate among policy-contingency frameworks, Keohane and Nye maintain that the distinction is essential to understanding the "role of power in interdependence."[50] In answer to the question of how this distinction helps us to understand the relationship between interdependence and power, they reply: "Clearly, it indicates that sensitivity interdependence will be less important than vulnerability interdependence in providing power resources to actors."[51] As an empirical proposition, this answer is debatable; as a logical deduction, it is a *non sequitur*. Consider the example of a marriage. Sensitivity interdependence could be used to refer to the costs associated with working nonviolently within the framework of the marriage, of "making the marriage work." Vulnerability interdependence could be used to refer to the costs associated with violent divorce. Although the husband might have the advantage in terms of brute force and economic ability to survive a divorce, it is not clear that this power resource would be more important than the power resources provided by sensitivity interdependence. If both husband and wife were strongly committed to nonviolent resolution of conflict within the framework of the marriage, the power resources associated with asymmetrical vulnerability interdependence might be of little or no importance compared to those associated with sensitivity interdependence. Likewise, if nation-states have a strong commitment to making a given international regime work, the power resources associated with sensitivity interdependence may be more im-

[50] *Ibid.*

[51] *Ibid.*, 15.

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portant than those associated with vulnerability interdependence.[52] If revolution is "unthinkable," the ability to foment a revolution is not a particularly useful power resource. In the absence of information or assumptions about the degree of commitment to maintaining a given policy framework, one can say *nothing* about the relative importance of the power resources provided by sensitivity interdependence and vulnerability interdependence. Although Keohane and Nye have formulated a useful distinction, they have overestimated its importance for understanding the relation between power and interdependence.

It has recently been suggested that Dahl's concept of power is incapable of dealing with interdependence.[53] Since Dahl is close to the "mainstream" of contemporary thinking about social power, some consideration of this viewpoint is in order. It will be argued that Dahl's concept is capable of dealing with interdependence and that the contrary claim is based on a distorted view of Dahl's position. Hart's argument is based on a distinction among three conceptions of power: (1) as control over resources, (2) as control over actors, and (3) as control over events and outcomes. Dahl's concept of power as the ability of A to get B to do what he would otherwise not do is classified as (2): control over actors.[54] Such a classification seriously distorts Dahl's idea, since his concept of power includes *both* actors and outcomes as necessary components. Dahl's insistence that statements about power that fail to specify scope verge on meaninglessness underscores the fact that his concept of power concerns the ability of one actor to influence another actor *with respect to certain outcomes*. In the literature on social power, Dahl's position is often referred to in terms of control over outcomes and is sometimes even classified as an "outcome definition."[55] As Nagel points out, anyone who employs a causal concept of power, such as Dahl's, must state the outcome caused.[56]

Hart's suggestion that Dahl's concept of power cannot account for the possibility of interdependence among actors is puzzling.[57] In the mutual nuclear deterrence between the Soviet Union and the United

[52] The distinction between "sensitivity" interdependence and "vulnerability" interdependence bears some resemblance to that between limited war and "total" (or not-so-limited) war. The policy constraints are obviously fewer in one situation than in the other. For a demonstration that ability to fight a "total" war may be of little help in fighting a limited war, see Charles Wolf, Jr., "The Logic of Failure: A Vietnam 'Lesson,'" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XVI (September 1972), 397-401.

[53] Jeffrey Hart, "Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations," *International Organization*, XXX (Spring 1976), 297, 303.

[54] *Ibid.*, 291. A similar line of reasoning, drawing on Hart's article, is found in Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), 11.

[55] Nagel (fn. 2), 9-10, 14, 29, 114-22, 175-76.

[56] *Ibid.*, 14.

[57] Hart (fn. 53), 303.

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States, the security of each depends on the other. This is typically regarded as an example of interdependence and can be described in terms of simultaneous attempts by each nation to get the other one to do what it might not otherwise do—i.e., refrain from attack. In the third edition of *Modern Political Analysis*, the system of mutual deterrence is even cited by Dahl as an example of a situation of reciprocal influence.[58] The contention that Dahl's concept of power can neither account for nor deal with interdependence is unconvincing.

Military Power

Two of the most important weaknesses in traditional theorizing about international politics have been the tendency to exaggerate the effectiveness of military power resources and the tendency to treat military power as the ultimate measuring rod to which other forms of power should be compared. Both tendencies are anathema to the approach advocated by Lasswell and Kaplan. Although these authors give "special consideration to the role of violence," they repeatedly assert that power does not rest "always, or even generally, on violence"; that "power may rest on various bases"; that "none of the forms of power is basic to all the others"; and that "political phenomena are only obscured by the pseudosimplification attained with any unitary conception of power as being always and everywhere the same."[59] Despite the vigorous efforts of Lasswell and Kaplan and the tradition of contextual power analysis they spawned, the contemporary literature on international relations often exhibits the same tendencies to exaggerate the effectiveness of military power bases as did the earlier works.

Cline's *World Power Assessment* notes the existence of various forms of power, but describes war as the "true end game" in international "chess." "A study of power," according to Cline, "in the last analysis, is a study of the capacity to wage war."[60] In a similar vein, Gilpin acknowledges that power may take many forms, "though, in the final analysis, force is the ultimate form of power." Gilpin even makes the more extreme contention that "ultimately, the determination of the distribution of power can be made *only* in retrospect as a consequence of war."[61] Phrases describing force as the "ultimate" form of power imply that all forms of power are arrayed on a single continuum of

[58] Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (fn. 5), 50. See also Nagel (fn. 2), 142-43; Baldwin (fn. 16), 606.
[59] Lasswell and Kaplan (fn. 1), ix, 76, 85, 94, 92.
[60] Cline (fn. 12), 8.
[61] Gilpin (fn. 6), 24; emphasis added.

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effectiveness or importance. If power is conceived of as a multidimensional phenomenon, it is harder to think in terms of such a continuum. If one thinks of power as situationally specific rather than generalized, the idea of an "ultimate" form of power does not make much sense. It may well be that there are some very important policy-contingency scenarios in which force is a critically important power resource, but it would be more helpful to identify such situations than to assert that force is the "ultimate" form of power. Most states, after all, resolve most international disputes most of the time without the actual or threatened use of force.

Although Keohane and Nye continually criticize the traditional emphasis on military force, even they sometimes seem to exaggerate the effectiveness of military force as a power resource. While noting the increasing costs associated with military force and the inapplicability of force to many situations, they contend that force "dominates" other means of power.[62]

The proposition that military force is more effective than other power resources is both ambiguous and debatable. In the absence of clearly specified or implied policy-contingency frameworks, the proposition that force is more effective than other power bases has little, if any, meaning. As I argued earlier, all generalizations about power should be set in a context specifying (as a minimum) who is trying to get whom to do what. In some situations, force works very well, but in others it is actually counterproductive. Underlying the analysis of Keohane and Nye there seems to be a set of implicit assumptions as to the number of policy-contingency frameworks in which force is effective, and as to the relative importance of such frameworks. It would be helpful if the authors would spell out such assumptions, including the criteria used in assigning weights to such frameworks.

As an empirical proposition, the idea that force dominates other means of power could be formulated as a hypothesis to be tested, but it does not deserve the status of an assumption. According to Keohane and Nye, "*if* there are no constraints on one's choice of instruments"—i.e., if cost considerations are ignored—"the state with superior military force will prevail."[63] Despite the fact that *Power and Interdependence* describes several situations in which force would *not* be effective, and

[62] See Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), 8, 11-18, 27-29, 228. Although the authors use the term "dominates," the context indicates that they are referring to the relative "effectiveness" of force. Credence is lent to this interpretation by their use of the term "effectiveness" instead of "dominance" in an earlier similar discussion. Cf. Keohane and Nye, "World Politics and the International Economic System" (fn. 17), 125-26.

[63] Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), 27; emphasis in original.

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despite the easily demonstrable counterproductivity of military power resources in many policy-contingency frameworks, Keohane and Nye imply that military force will prevail if costs can be ignored.

Let us examine three situations referred to in *Power and Interdependence*. First, Keohane and Nye contend that "military power dominates economic power in the sense that economic means alone are likely to be ineffective against the serious use of military force."[64] Although this is a rather special situation that can hardly serve as the basis for sweeping generalizations about the relative effectiveness of economic and military power, it is not self-evident or manifestly true. Opinions differ, of course, but it is not obvious to me that in 1973 the American threat to use force worked better than the Arab oil embargo. Second, they indicate that "in the worst situations, force is ultimately necessary to guarantee survival."[65] That may have been a useful assumption for students of international politics prior to the atomic age—although I doubt it—but at a time of rapidly multiplying (military and nonmilitary) threats of planetary disaster, it should be treated as a hypothesis to be scrutinized carefully.[66] In today's world, the effectiveness of military force in guaranteeing survival may be steadily and rapidly declining. Third, Keohane and Nye state that "military power helps the Soviet Union to dominate Eastern Europe economically as well as politically."[67] That hypothesis may be plausible, but it also sounds plausible when stated backwards—i.e., "military power *hinders* the Soviet attempt to dominate Eastern Europe, at least in some respects." *A priori*, I have no reason to believe that the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia bolstered the long-run prospects for communism in Eastern Europe. *A priori*, it seems reasonable to suspect that this invasion may have generated (intensified?) some anti-Russian resentment that will not disappear quickly. Although Nye and Keohane may be right, one wishes that students of international politics would consider the possibility that the Soviet use of force in Eastern Europe was counterproductive in at least some respects.[68]

[64] *Ibid.*, 16. [65] *Ibid.*, 27.

[66] For a review of some of these threats, see Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *Multiple Vulnerabilities: The Context of Environmental Repair and Protection*, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 40 (Princeton 1974).

[67] Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), 28.

[68] I do not want to push this argument too far. Jacob Viner was fond of quoting William Stanley Jevons as follows: "It is always to be remembered that the failure of an argument in favor of a proposition does not, generally speaking, add much, if any probability, to the contradictory proposition." For a discussion of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe that identifies several drawbacks to the Soviet use of force, see Chris-

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Even within the military sphere, power discussions could be fruitfully considered in a more contextual manner. The idea of "maximizing the military might" of a state does not make much sense unless military power resources are relatively fungible. In a world of widely differing military policy-contingency frameworks—nuclear war, conventional war, limited war, guerrilla war, and so forth—it might be more useful to speak about different kinds of military power.[69] This approach is especially appealing to the extent that military power assets in one policy-contingency framework become liabilities in another. Schelling's demonstration that first-strike weapons can be liabilities in certain kinds of deterrent situations is a case in point.[70]

Positive Sanctions

Positive sanctions (rewards and promised rewards) have long been important as a means by which some states get other states to do things they would not otherwise do. Whether such relationships should be labeled "power," "influence," or "nonpower influence," need not concern us here, since we are using the term "power" in the generic sense that includes all such labels. The important thing is recognition that positive sanctions are significant resources by which international actors affect the behavior, beliefs, attitudes, or policies of other actors. Knorr has rightly pointed out the paucity of academic literature concerning the role of positive sanctions in world politics.[71] In a world in which destructive power seems to grow exponentially, improved understanding of the actual and potential role of positive sanctions is highly desirable.

The increased attention being focused on economic power in world politics reinforces the need for more research on positive sanctions, since economic power often takes such a form.[72] It is interesting—but not encouraging—to note that the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1968) includes an index entry for "threat" but none for "promise"; an article on "punishment" but none on "reward"; and an article on "military power potential" but none on "economic power potential." Knorr's recent consideration of military power, economic

topher D. Jones, "Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe: The Dynamics of Political Autonomy and Military Intervention," *World Politics*, XXIX (January 1977), 216-41.

[69] On this point, see Knorr (fn. 9), 46.

[70] Schelling (fn. 18), 207-54.

[71] Knorr (fn. 9), ix, 310-11. See also Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," *World Politics*, XXIV (October 1971), 19-38.

[72] See Baldwin, "Economic Power," in James T. Tedeschi, ed., *Perspectives on Social Power* (Chicago: Aldine 1974), 395-413.

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power, interdependence, negative sanctions, and positive sanctions in *The Power of Nations*, however, provides some hope that the next *International Encyclopedia* may fill such lacunae.

One of the most difficult conceptual problems in thinking about positive sanctions is the relationship between exchange and power. Despite the fact that ordinary economic exchange relations can be described in terms of Dahl's broad intuitive notion of power, many scholars resist the use of power terminology in analyzing such relations.[73] Knorr acknowledges positive sanctions as important, but his attempt to distinguish such "nonpower influence" from exchange relations adds little to the discussion.[74] On the one hand, "power influence" is described as "harmful" to B because it restricts his choices. On the other hand, "nonpower influence" is described as "beneficial" to B because it enriches his choices. Although it is useful to define positive and negative sanctions in terms of whether B *perceives* them as rewards or punishments, it seems unwise to assume that B always knows what is best for him. It is not necessarily harmful to restrict the choices available to children, drug addicts, or nation-states. Children can be rewarded with too much candy; drug addicts can be rewarded with too much heroin; and countries can be given more foreign aid than is good for them. The question of whether rewards are actually beneficial to the recipient is an important one, but it seems more useful to treat it as an empirical rather than a definitional question.

Within the category of mutually "beneficial" interaction, Knorr distinguishes between "exchange" and "nonpower influence" as follows:

> What distinguishes nonpower influence flows from . . . exchanges is that one actor gives something of value to another without condition, without any stipulated payment, now or later. For instance, A may extend economic assistance to B, exclusively in order to enable the latter to accelerate his economic development. A expects to receive nothing in return from B, and B understands this.[75]

Such a distinction seems almost impossible for researchers to apply to relations among nation-states. Stipulations regarding repayment may be unstated and may be only vaguely perceived by the actors involved. The social exchange theorists have demonstrated that exchange can be a subtle process and that feelings of indebtedness on the part of the

[73] On this point, see Baldwin, "Power and Social Exchange," *American Political Science Review* (forthcoming). In the literature on international relations, Hirschman's *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (fn. 42) is of fundamental importance. His treatment demonstrates that power potentially inheres in all international trade relations.

[74] Knorr (fn. 9), 7-8, 310-19.

[75] *Ibid.*, 311.

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reward recipient may be created *regardless* of the stipulations or intentions of the reward giver.[76] Furthermore, even the most altruistic benefactor may change his mind and remind the aid recipient that he owes him a favor. In strictly economic exchanges such attempts to make retroactive stipulations regarding payment are unlikely to succeed, because the original recipient can point out that the terms of the transaction were clearly specified at the time it occurred. But social and political exchange are distinguished from economic exchange partly by the vagueness of the obligations involved.[77] Even the example cited by Knorr could be regarded as a type of social exchange. State A could be viewed as exchanging economic assistance for state B's promise to use the money to accelerate economic development (rather than to buy weapons or swell the Swiss bank accounts of the leaders). People and countries exchange money for promises all the time; so there is nothing particularly unusual about such an interpretation of Knorr's example. As long as A places any strings at all on the use of his aid, he may be viewed as making a stipulation as to payment. After all, if the behavior (attitude, policy, or whatever) stipulated by A had no value to him, he would not make the stipulation in the first place. I have never encountered a real-world example of totally stringless aid, and I never expect to. The United States has dispersed billions of dollars to promote economic development in other countries, but it is clear that American policy makers—rightly or wrongly—believed that faster economic development in those countries would enhance the long-run welfare and security of the United States.[78] In sum, although distinctions between power and exchange can be made, I suspect that students of international relations would find it as profitable to focus on the similarities as on the differences.

The fact that the mutual exchange of rewards is so prevalent in international relations may partly explain why the subject lacks excitement; that, in turn, may partly explain why students of international relations have focused their attention on the rarer but presumably more exciting instances in which countries have exchanged threats and/or punishments. However, the role of positive sanctions in world politics has begun to attract scholarly attention. Roger Fisher, Klaus

[76] See Blau (fn. 44); Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (April 1960), 161-78.

[77] "Social exchange differs in important ways from strictly economic exchange. The basic and most crucial distinction is that social exchange entails *unspecified* obligations." Blau (fn. 44), 93; emphasis in original.

[78] See Baldwin, *Economic Development and American Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1966).

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Knorr, Johan Galtung, Richard Rosecrance, Alexander George, Richard Smoke,[79] and a few others have contributed to this discussion, but much work remains to be done. I suggest that further research on this topic could be built on the earlier work of Hirschman and the social exchange theorists. Eckstein's suggestion that exchange theory has much to offer students of international politics deserves to be taken seriously.[80]

Power as a Zero-Sum Game

Traditionally, scholars of international relations have distinguished between conflict and cooperation. Power, it has often been argued, has to do with conflict but not with cooperation. The implied assumption was that we needed less conflict and more cooperation. Thomas Schelling, in *The Strategy of Conflict*, called into question the usefulness of this dichotomy by showing that most, if not all, interesting international political situations involved mixtures of both conflictual and cooperative elements. Although zero-sum games and games of pure cooperation might be useful ways to define the ends of a continuum, neither was likely to describe a real-world situation. Even war—traditionally regarded as the epitome of intense conflict—was shown by Schelling to involve significant cooperative dimensions. Although Schelling relied primarily on limited war to make his point, his logic can easily be extended to include so-called "total war." Nuclear war may not be unthinkable, but a war in which the participants would be *indifferent* to the prospects of planetary destruction is difficult to imagine. Even poker—that prototypical example of a zero-sum game—is hardly ever a zero-sum game in real life. Such values as the enjoyment of the game, concern about the player who is in over his head, and worries about whether the other players will be willing to play again in the future, almost always intrude on what is supposed to be a zero-sum game.

Despite Schelling, nuclear weapons, and ever-increasing awareness of the fragility of the earth's ecosystem, one still finds references to international politics as a zero-sum game in some or all respects. Stan-

[79] Roger Fisher, *International Conflict for Beginners* (New York: Harper and Row 1969); Knorr (fn. 9); Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," *World Politics*, XIX (April 1967), 378-416; Richard Rosecrance, ed., *The Future of the International Strategic System* (San Francisco: Chandler 1972); Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press 1974).

[80] Harry Eckstein, "Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 67 (December 1973), 1157-59.

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ley Hoffmann, for example, has recently argued that the model of a zero-sum game is "a valid account for considerable portions of world politics."[81] His citation of the Arab-Israeli dispute as a case in point is instructive. Although conflict may be the dominant mode of Arab-Israeli interaction, conceiving of the situation as a zero-sum game virtually assures that cooperative dimensions will be overlooked. Even Hoffmann's *caveat*—that he is using the zero-sum model as an "ideal-type" in order to "reveal the essence of the game"—fails to balance the perspective. In zero-sum games, the absence of cooperative elements is not merely one characteristic among many; it is the essential defining characteristic. A portrayal of the Arab-Israeli dispute as a zero-sum game strengthens neither our understanding of the situation nor the prospects of peace.[82]

Robert Gilpin argues that international politics *always* takes the form of a zero-sum game. After noting that "politics is the realm of power," he states that "the essential fact of politics is that power is always relative; one state's gain in power is by necessity another's loss." "From this *political* perspective," he adds, "the mercantilists are correct in emphasizing that in power terms, international relations is a zero-sum game."[83] Regardless of what one thinks of Gilpin's concept of power, it is important to realize that the Dahl-Lasswell-Kaplan conception of power is not a zero-sum view. Their conception permits us to describe situations in which A's ability to get B to do X increases *simultaneously* with B's ability to get A to do X.[84]

The model of the zero-sum game may be a potentially useful conceptual tool for the student of international politics. However, given traditional propensities to exaggerate the importance of negative sanctions while ignoring positive ones and to concentrate on conflictive dimensions of world politics while neglecting cooperative ones, theorists would do well to leave this particular conceptual tool on the shelf for a few years. Mixed-motive game models almost always provide a more accurate description of real-world situations than do zero-sum models.

[81] Hoffmann, "Notes on the Elusiveness of Modern Power," *International Journal*, XXX (Spring 1975), 191.

[82] It is interesting to note that one could neither predict nor advocate Sadat's dramatic visit to Israel on the basis of zero-sum game assumptions. The players in a zero-sum game have no common interests—by definition. Therefore, they never have a reason to negotiate (unless they think their opponent is stupid and can be outwitted).

[83] Gilpin (fn. 6), 22-25, 34; emphasis in original.

[84] For further discussion of this point, see Baldwin (fn. 16), 605-6.

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Compellence and Deterrence

The distinction between compellence and deterrence is frequently noted by scholars in international relations—usually with reference to Schelling.[85] No instance of a challenge to the validity or the usefulness of this distinction has come to my attention. I will argue that an implicit assumption about the probability of a successful influence attempt underlies Schelling's discussion of compellence and deterrence, and that this assumption calls into question both the validity and the usefulness of the distinction.[86] There are, according to Schelling, typical differences between threats intended to make an adversary do something and threats intended to keep him from starting something. These differences concern the probability of success, the clarity of the threat, timing, and the difficulty of compliance.[87]

There is a difference between trying to discourage the Russians from launching a nuclear attack and trying to encourage the South Africans to change their form of government, but describing that difference as the difference between keeping someone from doing something and getting someone to do something is not very helpful. From a purely semantic standpoint, any deterrent threat can be stated in compellent terms, and any compellent threat can be stated in deterrent terms. Thus, we could talk about compelling the Russians to do X (when X is anything except launching a nuclear attack) and about deterring South Africans from doing X (when X is continued white dominance). When we describe an influence attempt as deterrence, we usually have

[85] At times such references become rather confusing. Keohane and Nye, for example, usually use the terms "positive" and "negative" power to refer to the compellence/deterrence distinction ("World Politics and the International Economic System" [fn. 17], 119, 134; *Power and Interdependence* [fn. 12], 44). But elsewhere they refer to the ability to resist influence attempts as "the negative dimension of power." ("World Politics and the International Economic System" [fn. 17], 134.) It seems desirable to maintain a clear distinction between deterring influence attempts and resisting them. The difference between deterring a nuclear attack and resisting one is a difference that matters.

[86] Parts of the argument that follows are drawn from Baldwin, "Bargaining with Airline Hijackers," in I. William Zartman, ed., *The 50% Solution* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1976), 416-21. One example of the extent to which students of international relations have accepted the compellence/deterrence arguments of Schelling is provided by the following passage: "Enough has already been said to indicate the disparities between American and Soviet strategic doctrines in the nuclear age. These differences may be most pithily summarized by stating that whereas we view nuclear weapons as a deterrent, the Russians see them as a 'compellant' [sic]—with all the consequences that follow." Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary*, Vol. 64 (July 1977), 34. It will be argued here that the consequences that follow are by no means obvious.

[87] Schelling (fn. 18), 195-99; and Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966), 69-91.

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in mind a threat that is intended to *reduce* the probability of occurrence of an event that was not very likely to occur in the first place—e.g., nuclear attack, murder, or airline hijacking. When we describe an influence attempt as compellence, however, we usually have in mind a threat intended to *increase* the probability of occurrence of an event that was not very likely to occur anyway. Schelling is quite right in observing that "it is easier to *deter* than to *compel*,"[88] but that is more of a truism than an empirical observation. The person who tries to prevent unlikely things from happening will probably succeed; while the person who tries to cause unlikely things to happen will probably fail.

There are nontrivial differences between trying to do hard things (like changing South Africa's policy of white supremacy), and trying to do easy things (like preventing the Russians from launching a nuclear attack). Almost all of the differences between compellent and deterrent threats suggested by Schelling can be accounted for by the difference in the autonomous probability of the outcome one is trying to influence.[89] The observation that deterrent threats are more likely to succeed than compellent threats seems less profound when one lays bare the implicit assumption that deterrent threats are used for easy tasks while compellent threats are used for hard tasks.

Most of the discussion of the different requirements in timing of deterrence and compellence can be reduced to the truisms that considerable effort will be required to accomplish hard things, while one can accomplish easy things with much less effort. Why do compellent threats have to be "put in motion to be credible"?[90] Because they need

[88] *Ibid.*, 100; emphasis in original.

[89] The autonomous probability of the outcome X is defined as the probability that X would have occurred in the absence of any attempt by A to make it occur. Thus, the autonomous probability of X in a situation in which A is trying to influence B to do X is the probability that B would have done X anyway. See Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (2d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1978), 29-31, 159. Strictly speaking, the autonomous probability of B's performance of X is not the same as the probability of success of A's attempt to get B to do X. A high autonomous probability need not indicate a high probability of success for A, and a low autonomous probability does not necessarily mean that it will be hard for A to get B to do X. B's strong dislike of A may make him reluctant to do X if he knows A wants him to; likewise, B's respect for A may make him eager to do X after he learns of A's desire. Other things being equal, however, it is generally harder to make unlikely events occur than it is to make likely events occur. For purposes of this article, therefore, it will be arbitrarily assumed that influence attempts aimed at bringing about outcomes of low autonomous probability have a low probability of success; while influence attempts aimed at bringing about outcomes of high autonomous probability have a high probability of success.

[90] Schelling (fn. 87), 72.

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a lot of credibility. Why do they need so much credibility? Because they are so unlikely to succeed in the first place!

Schelling also argues that it is likely to be especially difficult to comply with a compellent threat:

> There is another characteristic of compellent threats, arising in the need for affirmative action, that often distinguishes them from deterrent threats. It is that the very act of compliance—of doing what is demanded—is more conspicuously compliant, more recognizable as submission under duress, than when an act is merely withheld in the face of a deterrent threat. Compliance is likely to be less casual, less capable of being rationalized as something that one was going to do anyhow.[91]

Since Schelling uses the term "compellent threat" to refer to situations in which A is trying to get B to do something he is very unlikely to do, and the term "deterrent" threat to refer to situations in which A is trying to get B to do something he was likely to do anyway, the above passage is not surprising. Of course it is harder to rationalize compliance with compellent threats as something one intended to do anyhow, especially since compliance was something one had no intention of doing. It is much easier to give the appearance of doing what comes naturally if one really *is* doing what comes naturally. All of Schelling's comments about ease of compliance must be reversed if one compares the compellent threat—"Breathe or I'll shoot"—with the deterrent threat—"Don't breathe or I'll shoot." It is virtually tautological to say that the higher the autonomous probability of B's performance of X, the harder it will be to detect whether B's performance of X resulted from A's influence attempt. Schelling is quite right in saying that compliance is difficult in what he calls compellence situations. This difficulty, however, is not a characteristic of compellent threats; it is a characteristic of the particular type of influence situations that are being labeled "compellent." The difficulty of compliance with a compellent threat disappears if we change the situation from "Stand on your head and whistle Yankee Doodle or I'll shoot" to "Breathe or I'll shoot."[92] Compliance is conspicuous in some compellent threat situations; in others it is not.

Another difference between compellent and deterrent threats, according to Schelling, is that the former tend to be more ambiguous

[91] *Ibid.*, 82.

[92] "Breathe or I'll shoot" is actually just a variation of "act normally or I'll shoot" —a compellent threat often found in TV dramas depicting the criminal hiding in the closet while the prisoner answers the doorbell.

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than the latter. Once again, particular kinds of situations seem to be implied:

> In addition to the question of "when," compellence usually involves questions of where, what, and how much. "Do nothing" is simple; "Do something" ambiguous. "Stop where you are" is simple; "Go back" leads to "How far?" "Leave me alone" is simple; "Cooperate" is inexact and open-ended.[93]

"Do nothing," however, is not that simple. It leads to "What do you mean; I have to do something, don't I?" or "I can't just do nothing!" "Do nothing that will upset me" is more ambiguous than "Get the hell out of here!" "Stop where you are" is not so simple when said by a hijacker to the pilot of a plane at 30,000 feet. "Leave me alone" is not so simple when said by a tired father to a small child. It invariably leads to "Does that mean I must leave the room or merely that I must stop talking to you?" "Is it all right if I talk to myself?" "How about if I just listen to records?" In such a situation, "Leave me alone" is ambiguous; "Go play in the yard" is simple. Even if one accepts the distinction between deterrent and compellent threats, there is no reason to believe that one type of threat is intrinsically clearer than the other.

The alleged greater clarity of deterrent threats carries over to assurances.[94] Because the assurances associated with compellent threats tend to be ambiguous, they tend to lack credibility. Blackmailers, as Schelling says, "find the 'assurances' troublesome when their threats are compellent"; but blackmailers also find assurances troublesome *even when their threats are not compellent.* The credibility of assurances is not a function of the kind of threat being made; it is a function of the same sorts of things that determine the credibility of threats and promises. The credibility of one's assurance that he will not explode a nuclear bomb if his demands are met grows out of the obvious unpleasantness of such an act, not out of the nature of the threat being made. Sadists, kidnappers, blackmailers, extortionists, and airline hijackers find that the credibility of their assurances is undermined by the obvious opportunities and incentives they have to renege on their assurance commitments, regardless of whether they have made deterrent or compellent threats.

Although the distinction between deterrence and compellence at first appears to be very helpful in analyzing world politics, further scrutiny raises serious questions about the utility of the distinction. The failure to provide a precise definition of compellence makes it hard to

[93] Schelling (fn. 87), 72-73.

[94] *Ibid.*, 74.

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be sure, but a low probability of success seems to be inextricably bound up with the implied definition of this term. It is worthwhile to distinguish between threats and promises and between influence attempts with a high probability of success and those with a low probability of success. Until more precise definitions and more persuasive arguments are produced, however, students of international relations should be wary of the distinction between compellence and deterrence.[95]

Conclusion

A review of selected works in recent scholarship in international relations reveals the continued existence of a number of traditional tendencies in the treatment of power. First, the tendency to exaggerate the fungibility of power resources and the related tendency to neglect considerations of scope are still with us. Despite twenty years of exhortation by the Sprouts, discussions of national capabilities without reference to explicitly stated or clearly implied policy-contingency frameworks are common. Second, the propensity to treat military power resources as the "ultimate" power base, and the related propensity to overestimate the effectiveness of military force, have not disappeared. And third, emphasis on conflict and negative sanctions at the expense of emphasis on cooperation and positive sanctions is not uncommon.

It was suggested that the contextual analysis of power advocated by Lasswell and Kaplan, Dahl, the Sprouts, and others would provide a useful corrective for traditional weaknesses in treatments of power by students of international relations. Such contextual analysis would have a number of implications for the way scholars of international relations talk about their subject. First, the division of the world into "great powers," "small powers," and "middle powers" would be called into question, since such terms usually connote generalized rather than situationally specific power. At the very least, users of such terms would be required to specify the issue-area they have in mind. Second, the idea of a single monolithic international "power structure" would be called into question, since such a concept implies either highly fungible power resources or a single dominant issue-area. Students of world politics must recognize, as students of American politics have recognized, "that the notion of '*the* power structure' of a social unit is a

[95] The closest Schelling comes to a precise definition of compellence is in *Arms and Influence* (fn. 87), 70-71. I suspect that psychologists may have some persuasive arguments as to why it is useful to distinguish between deterrence and compellence. Schelling does not present such arguments, however.

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dangerously misleading siren. There are as many power structures as there are issues fruitfully distinguished."[96] Keohane and Nye take two steps forward when they demonstrate that international power structures vary from one issue-area to another; but they slip one step backward when they imply that an overall structural approach that fails to distinguish among issue-areas and that is based on the assumption that power, like money, is highly fungible, can provide even a partial explanation of world politics.[97] It is time to recognize that the notion of a single overall international power structure unrelated to any particular issue-area is based on a concept of power that is virtually meaningless.[98] It is difficult to see how a model based on a virtually meaningless concept of power can provide even a partial explanation of international political relations. Instead of talking about *the* distribution of power resources underlying *the* international power structure, students of world politics could more profitably focus on the multiple distributional patterns of a wide variety of resources related to a number of significant issue-areas.

The point here is not to deny either the possibility or the desirability of generalizations about power patterns within very broadly—perhaps even vaguely—defined issue-areas. It is to suggest that healthy skepticism and scholarly caution should be proportionate to the broadness and vagueness of the specification of the issue-area. Rough indicators of power hierarchies in given issue-areas can be useful, but only if the limitations and pitfalls of such an approach are clearly understood and acknowledged.[99] The important thing is recognition that the absence of a common denominator of political value in terms of which different scopes of power could be compared is not so much a methodological problem to be solved as it is a real-world constraint to be lived with.[100] Economists, after all, did not invent money in order to solve the conceptual problem of aggregating economic values; they just hap-

[96] Frederick W. Frey, "Comment: On Issues and Nonissues in the Study of Power," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 65 (December 1971), 1086. See also Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics," and "Rejoinder to Frey's 'Comment,'" both in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 65 (December 1971), 1063-80 and 1102-04, respectively.

[97] Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), 43-54, 222-25.

[98] Dahl (fn. 5), 33: "Any statement about influence that does not clearly indicate the domain and scope it refers to verges on being meaningless." For a similar comment, see Sprout and Sprout, "Environmental Factors . . ." (fn. 10), 325.

[99] For an impressive demonstration of generalizaton at a high level of abstraction based on explicit acknowledgment of the importance of scope and domain and the resulting multidimensional nature of power, see Alker (fn. 21).

[100] Cf. Dahl (fn. 5), 32-36; Baldwin (fn. 16).

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pen to be luckier than political scientists. If the real world has not chosen to provide political analysts with a political counterpart to money, it would be folly to pretend that it has.

Although power analysis is probably the oldest approach to the study of world politics, it is also one of the most promising for the years ahead. Refinements in the causal notion of power since 1950 have not yet been fully integrated into the literature on international relations, but there is no reason why this should not happen. Both social power literature and social exchange theory have much to offer the student of world politics. As Hayward Alker has recently observed, "Far from being nearly dead, weak, or inadequate as some critics have implied, power measurement has just begun."[101]

[101] Alker (fn. 21), 370-71.

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AUTHORITY AND POWER IN BUREAUCRATIC AND PATRIMONIAL ADMINISTRATION:

A Revisionist Interpretation of Weber on Bureaucracy

By LLOYD I. RUDOLPH and SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH*

Introduction

WEBER'S understanding of bureaucracy, despite substantial qualification and revision, remains the dominant paradigm for the study of administration and formal organizations. We continue the process of revision by accepting his ideal-typical concepts of bureaucratic and patrimonial administration, but we intend to subject them to theoretical and historical reinterpretation and application.[1]

* This article was presented in an earlier and longer version at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association at Chicago in September 1974, and received the Franklin L. Burdette Pi Sigma Alpha Award for the best paper delivered at the meeting.

[1] There is an appreciable literature that addresses itself to aspects of this paper. It includes Reinhard Bendix and Guenther Roth, *Scholarship and Partisanship: Essays on Max Weber* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1971); William Delany, "The Development and Decline of Patrimonial and Bureaucratic Administration," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, VIII (Winter 1962-63), 458-501; Lloyd Fallers, *Bantu Bureaucracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1965); S. N. Eisenstadt, "Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neo-Patrimonialism," in J. S. Jackson, ed., *Sociological Studies, Social Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1972); Alfred Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Resurrected," in Ferrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes, eds., *Papers in Comparative Administration* (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan 1962), 59-96; John Armstrong, "Old Regime Governors: Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Attributes," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XIV (January 1972), 2-29; Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (New York: Doubleday 1960); Carl J. Friedrich, "Some Observations on Weber's Analysis of Bureaucracy," in Robert K. Merton and Associates, *Reader in Bureaucracy* (New York: Free Press 1952), 27-32; Ernest Barker, *The Development of Public Services in Europe, 1660-1930* (New York: Oxford University Press 1944); E. N. Gladden, *A History of Public Administration*, I, *From Earliest Times to the Eleventh Century*; II, *From the Eleventh Century to the Present Day* (London: Frank Cass 1972); T. F. Tout, *Chapters in the Administrative History of Medieval England*, 6 vols. (London: Longmans, Green 1920-1933); John Markoff, "Governmental Bureaucratization: General Processes and an Anomalous Case," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XVII (October 1975); David Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics* (London: George Allen and Unwin 1974); Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *The Age of Bureaucracy: Perspectives on the Political Sociology of Max Weber* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1974). Some of these works contain useful bibliographies or bibliographical footnotes.

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Weber's anticipation that bureaucracy would triumph historically because it was more efficient and powerful than patrimonial administration and more permanent than charismatic leadership led him to present historical change as an evolutionary process of adaptation which, if not teleological, was at least universal, inevitable, and accessible to human understanding and explanation. Our reading of historical change as it relates to bureaucracy leads us to question Weber's interpretation on a variety of fronts and with a variety of implications. Weber's conceptualization of bureaucracy in terms of rational-legal authority and formal rationality fails to take account of the existence and use of power within and outside of organizations and of the persistence of patrimonial features. The use of power produces conflict and pathologies. What is good for organizations is not necessarily good for their participants or for society: conflict and pathology—when they serve the legitimate values and interests of participants and actors in the organizational environment—can have benign consequences. The persistence of patrimonial features, rather than signalling the survival of dysfunctional atavisms, can promote administrative effectiveness by mitigating conflict and promoting organizational loyalty, discipline, and efficiency.

Ideal Types and the Explanation of Historical Change

Weber's heuristic use of ideal types to explain authority and administration relied on formal contrasts. The formal contrasts in turn became the means for demonstrating historical change from traditional to modern (rational-legal) authority, and from patrimonial to bureaucratic administration. Patrimonial and bureaucratic administration were related to each other not only heuristically, but also historically, as less and more evolved means of organization. Charisma and charismatic administration presented special problems. Unlike traditional and rational legal authority, and patrimonial and bureaucratic administration, charismatic authority is not subject to evolutionary history. It "erupts" in times of severe crisis or rapid change as its bearer attempts to establish a new normative orientation and social order. Succession, if it is to succeed, requires the ritual and administrative routinization of the founder's charisma. As a result, Weber argued, pure charismatic authority lacks permanence. In its routinized forms it too becomes subject to the evolutionary history that tends toward the triumph of formal rationality in bureaucratic organizations.

Weber's interlocking use of formal contrasts and evolutionary his-

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tory led him, like other interpreters of world civilizations, to find unique features in Western civilization that seemed to explain and, implicitly, to justify its cultural and economic dominance among 19th-century world civilizations. The West's uniqueness and power had a historical significance that reached well beyond self-understanding.

> A product of modern European civilization, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself [Weber writes] to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having *universal* significance and value.[2]

If history is understood as open-ended—and, within limits, man-made—and "reality" as pluralistic in time and over time, the notion that history is evolutionary (not in the sense of adaptation but as goal-oriented) and universal becomes problematic. An open-ended and pluralistic understanding of history can accommodate historical change that is cyclical and countercyclical—not because necessity or design guide it, but because, as Weber recognized, ideal and material interests give rise to affirmations, rejections, and counteraffirmations. This view of history stresses continuities, affinities, and the revitalization of values, as well as conflict over ideal and material interests. Our objective, guided by this different understanding of historical change, is to use Weber's heuristic constructs to highlight the similarities and continuities as well as the differences and discontinuities between earlier and later means of administration. Because both have been shaped by patrimonial and bureaucratic influences, we expect to show how the formal contrasts Weber used obscure overlapping characteristics and motives and exaggerate differences in capability and performance.

Weber's use of the formal contrast between patrimonial and bureaucratic administration and the alternative use of the typology that we develop have an objective in common: to analyze and explain the causes of administrative effectiveness and ineffectiveness. Weber isolated and organized features of bureaucracies in order to explain the causes of their superior effectiveness (efficiency as well as goal achievement) and to portray the future. He identified effectiveness with formal rationality—i.e., instrumental or means-ends calculation expressed in organizational structures and roles, and its use in pursuit of putatively agreed-upon organizational goals. Weber found that bureaucra-

[2] Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* [hereafter cited as *Protestant Ethic*] trans. by Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribner Library 1958), 13; emphasis in original.

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cies are "formally the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control [domination] over human beings."[3] "He maintained that the decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with non-mechanical modes of production."[4]

We too select, abstract, and relate organizational characteristics; but we attend (as Weber did only implicitly or indirectly) to participants' motives. For us, the leading characteristics of administrative structures, and a principal problem for their effectiveness, is the potential conflict between authority and power. Authority in administrative structures is based on adherence by participants to the expectations associated with their formal roles, that is, on the assumption that incumbents' motives and orientations will be sufficiently congruent with their roles to obtain the benefits of the formal rationality that guided the establishment of roles and their relationships. When incumbents' motives and orientations are not congruent with formal role expectations (and they rarely are), relationships are re-cast in terms of power. Individuals, isolated groups, and alliances may and do use a variety of strategies (to be explored below) in struggles to realize values, interests, and goals of their own choosing that conflict with those of the administrative structure. Power struggles are a general phenomenon characteristic of both patrimonial and bureaucratic administration.[5] Weber's expectation that the evolution and triumph of bureaucracy would increasingly lead to objectification, i.e., to incumbents *becoming* their roles (what Weber referred to as dehumanization) has led instead to a highly contingent relationship. Bureaucratic administration, like patrimonial, has remained dependent for its effectiveness in setting and realizing goals on the degree of congruence between authority and power. Administrative structures are human as much as they are mechanical contrivances. Because the participants' performances are affected by the variability in participants' purposes, will, and capacities, organizational effectiveness is

[3] Talcott Parsons, ed., *Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1964), 337.

[4] "Bureaucracy" in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press 1946), 214.

[5] Both Eisenstadt and Roth see neopatrimonial features in contemporary states. But they see them chiefly as features of "new nations," features that constitute residues and hangovers and adaptations from a previous patrimonial condition. Roth goes further and focuses on the element of personal loyalties in modern industrial states. See Eisenstadt, and Bendix and Roth (both fn. 1).

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subject to wide variations over time. Formal rationality (and technology) can contribute to organizational efficiency, but can also contribute to organizational ineffectiveness by building up the sources of alienation and resistance, and fueling the struggle of power against authority. The persistence or retention of patrimonial elements in bureaucratic administration can mitigate if not eliminate the struggle, just as the presence of bureaucratic features in patrimonial administration can (and did) enhance its efficiency and effectiveness.

We have been influenced in the construction of our analytic framework by the findings and implications of the literature on formal organizations, by the related lessons that the historical experiences of modern and modernizing societies have provided, and by our recent research on formal organizations and on patrimonial administration in princely India.[6] They have led us to a variety of understandings that differ from Weber's. Bureaucracy has not been as efficient or as masterful as he thought, and feared, it would be. Nor is bureaucracy so distinctly modern as Weber often argued it was. Many features that he identified as patrimonial have persisted and, under a wide variety of circumstances, contributed to administrative effectiveness. Bureaucracies are most effective, not as Weber thought, when they most closely approximate the ideal-typical (heuristic) features he identified—i.e., rationalized and dehumanized to simulate the qualities of a machine; their effectiveness is enhanced to the degree that the pathologies and dysfunctions generated by formal rationality and impersonality (and which are an aspect of the struggle for power) can be channelled and "corrected" by neopatrimonialism in the service of commonly held organizational goals.[7]

[6] See Rudolph and Rudolph, *Education and Politics in India: Studies in Organizations, Policy, and Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1972), esp. chap. 11; *The Coordination of Complexity in South Asia*, VII, Appendix V of the Report by the Commisson on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Murphy Commission) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1975); and (with Mohan Singh), "A Bureaucratic Lineage in Princely India: Elite Formation and Conflict in a Patrimonial System," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXXIV (May 1975).

[7] See Anthony Oberschall, *Empirical Social Research in Germany, 1848–1914* (The Hague: Mouton 1965). In a section on Weber, entitled "A Note on the Non-ideal Type Bureaucracy" (pp. 134-36), Oberschall observes, "It is not generally known that in some of his speeches and little known writings, Weber himself described certain features of bureaucracy which were either not mentioned or in contradiction with his ideal type formulation." The examples Oberschall provides include the contribution of patrimonial relations and personalism to the administrative effectiveness and efficiency of military hospitals in World War I. Weber himself served as a volunteer and left an "unfinished" report of his experience, available in Marianne Weber, *Max Weber, Ein Lebensbild* (Tübingen: Mohr 1926), 545-60.

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Ideal Types in the Service of Contingent and Determined History

Scholars interested in the construction of theory and the philosophy of the social sciences have given ample attention to ideal types. We return to the subject not because it has been neglected, but because we want to suggest some qualifications and difficulties that relate to Weber's work on administration.

Analysis and explanation in social science based on historically derived ideal types is like caricature or stereotype in art and literature: both emphasize by accentuation features that are considered prominent or distinct, and de-emphasize (or eliminate) by lack of attention and detail features that are considered of minor importance to the image or idea being conveyed.

The line between ideal types or models on the one hand and caricatures and stereotypes on the other is a fine one. It is often difficult to discern except by inquiring whether the creator is a scientist/scholar, an artist or writer, or a layman. The terms caricature and stereotype imply abstraction and its attendant reification (the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, in A. N. Whitehead's term)—processes that miss or misrepresent even while conveying the leading, dominant, or energizing principles. The more complex the reality, the more abstraction is required, and the more difficult it is to capture and convey the principal features. And when the reality being interpreted is subject to change as a result of human choice and action (as human as opposed to physical or biological reality is), the likelihood exists that both reality and the causes and processes of change, with all their ambiguities, ironies, and contradictions, will be lost from view.

Weber's explicit methodological position with respect to ideal types most closely approximates the historically derived (inductive-deductive-inductive) mode of analysis. Human events have relationships (*Zusammenhänge*) and regularity (*Regelmässigkeit*), but not lawfulness or necessity (*Gesetzlichkeit*). An understanding (*verstehende*) interpretation of human events reaches to relationships and regularities but not to necessity; i.e., it is governed by meaning, not by laws. In this context, ideal types are imaginative constructs, game plans for slices of reality that tell us how they would be put together and work, how they would be related and patterned, *if* the logical and empirical assumptions about them in fact existed. As Weber put it:

> For purposes of the causal *imputation* of empirical events, we need the rational, empirical-technical and logical constructions, which help us to answer the question as to what a behavior pattern or thought pat-

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tern (e.g., a philosophical system) would be like if it possessed completely rational, empirical and logical "correctness" and "consistency."[8]

Weber explicitly rejected self-evident factuality, i.e., unmediated observation. One cannot distinguish "essential" components from "the infinity of determining factors . . . by the simple 'observation' of the course of events in any case, certainly not if one understands by that a 'presuppositionless' mental photograph of all the physical and psychic events occurring in the space-time region in question—even if such were possible."[9] A "mental photograph" in Weber's view does not reveal a meaningful relationship (*sinnhafte Bezogenheit*):

> An understanding won through interpretation contains in the first instance specific qualitative evidence of differing amounts. That an interpretation possesses this evidence to an especially high degree proves as yet nothing about its empirical validity. For behaviors (*Sichverhalten*) similar in their external development and result can rest upon highly different constellations of motives of which the most immediately evident (*verständlich-evidenteste*) is not always that which was really at work.[10]

Elaborating on the contingent view of reality that interpretation entails, Weber tirelessly reiterated the purely provisional character of ideal types, their subjective dimension, and the limits imposed on them by the intellectual purpose to which a scholar addresses himself. For example:

> We must, in other words, work out in the course of the discussion, as its most important result, the best conceptual formulation of what we here understand by the spirit of capitalism, that is the *best from the point of view which interests us here*. This point of view . . . is, further, *by no means the only possible one* from which the historical phenomenon we are here investigating can be analyzed. Other standpoints would, for this as for every other historical phenomenon, yield other characteristics as the essential ones.[11]

Yet Weber found it hard to preserve the provisional tone of voice. The more definitive worldview of his German historicist paternity speaks through him despite himself. He pressed for higher levels of validity and power for his constructs, for more constraint, more law-

[8] "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics," in Edward Shils and Henry A. Finch, trans. and eds., *Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1949), 42; emphasis in original.

[9] "Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences," *ibid.*, 171.

[10] "Über einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie," in Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen: Mohr 1922), 403; our translation.

[11] *Protestant Ethic* (fn. 2), 49; emphasis added.

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fulness, more closure, than his more cautious methodological moments allowed.[12] Provisional caution to the contrary not withstanding, he used the language of functional relatedness, systemic wholeness, and logical necessity in writing about concrete historical phenomena. Thus, the system logic of capitalism expels "irrational" or "incompatible" behavior:

> The modern capitalist enterprise can not accept what is popularly called "kadi-justice": adjudication according to the judge's sense of equity in a given case or according to other irrational means of law-finding. . . . The modern enterprise also finds incompatible the theocratic or patrimonial governments of Asia and of our own past. . . .[13]

If we take words seriously, one of the ostensible meanings of "ideal type" warns us of a methodological problem: an ideal type is, to borrow Clifford Geertz's language from another context, both a model *of* and a model *for* reality. Ideal types are constituted of "pure" attributes, or reach their "purest" form when they are so constituted. "Pure" can convey a normatively neutral meaning pertaining to unmixed states (e.g., pure poison); but it can also suggest a desirable state of affairs, how things ought to be, and implies that its opposite, impure, is undesirable, how things ought not to be. If Weber insisted that models *for* reality were not what he intended, that no normative judgments were meant or implied, he often failed to observe his own *caveats*.[14]

[12] The relationship of Weber's work to these methodological problems varies greatly. Between two essays, and sometimes within the boundaries of a single essay, he would present generalizations at quite different degrees of abstraction. Thus the discussion of bureaucracy in the essay on types of legitimate domination is relatively more schematic, dogmatic, and insensitive to contrary themes than the same discussion in the essay on bureaucracy. These differences can in part be attributed to the differing intents of the two essays, and to sheer logistical considerations—number of pages. Yet the shorter versions, which obliged him to condense, are a better guide to what, ultimately, he considered critical. By contrast, the numerous caveats, exceptions, and contrary tendencies which he rehearsed in the essay on bureaucracy offer the beginnings of a more complex scheme for handling administration than the patrimonial-bureaucratic diad. It is difficult to evaluate these divergences. Is it to Weber's credit that he recognized so many exceptions? Or is it rather to be deplored that they did not influence his constructs more?

[13] Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds., *Max Weber. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, 3 vols. (New York: Bedminster Press 1968), III, 1395.

[14] Weber frequently cautioned against the propensity to slide from neutral into normative stances. In his critical review of "energetical" theories of culture, he deplored the prevailing tendency to convert the picture of the world (*Weltbild*) provided by particular disciplines into a *Weltanschauung*. See "Energetische Kulturtheorien," in Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze* (fn. 10), 377. Yet it is difficult to read the following passage (fn. 3, p. 337), without a sense that more than a model of reality is meant if not intended:

> Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization—that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy—is, from

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Weber's evolutionary understanding of historical change—what Robert Nisbet terms a metaphor of growth—[15]colored his ideal-typical constructs with a "models for" hue. His sociology of religion, like his sociology of authority, moves from pre-modern to modern. Rational-legal authority and bureaucracy replace traditional authority and patrimonial administration. The ethical striving and discipline required by a transcendent and uncontrollable God replace the ritualism and manipulative exchange required by gods whose magical powers are near to hand. Like the movement of religious ideology, the drift of forms of life generally is in the direction of the impersonal, unreachable and uncontrollable. This pessimistic formulation of history led Weber, at some ontological level, to despair of modern social forms. At an intermediate level of judgment, however, between ultimate value and concrete history (the level that was Weber's most characteristic intellectual ground), he held that these forms, both in religion and in organizational life, were a triumph over all previous ones. Demystification, rationalization, and impersonalization of culture and social forms greatly enhanced the capabilities of Western civilization and marked the course of universal history.

Weber's evolutionary perspective also led him to treat his ideal-typical constructs (which he intended for heuristic purposes) as historical phenomena capable of extinction and actualization. Charismatic authority, to be sure, has no particular historical location; it appears from time to time and is among the principal reasons for historical change. But traditional and rational-legal authority, the two types that have forms of administration associated with them, have a clear unilinear relationship; traditional authority and patrimonial administration are superseded and over-run by rational-legal authority and bureaucracy.

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a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organization and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its own operations, and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks.

As Carl J. Friedrich notes (fn. 1, p. 31), "The very words vibrate with something of a Prussian enthusiasm for the military type of organization and the way seems barred to any kind of consultative, let alone cooperative, pattern. That the latter kind of pattern may be a higher type, that it may represent a 'more fully developed' form of administrative organization, not only in terms of humanitarian values, but also in terms of 'results' is all but excluded as a possibility."

[15] Nisbet, *Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development* (New York: Oxford 1969).

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As the logical principles that characterize bureaucracy become more manifest and effective over time, as the ideal type becomes more "pure," as it becomes more like itself, it can be expected to work better. According to Weber:

> When fully developed, bureaucracy also stands in a specific sense under the principle of *sine ira ac studio*. Its specific nature, which is welcomed by capitalism, develops the more perfectly the more bureaucracy is "dehumanized," the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation. This is the specific nature of bureaucracy and its specific virtue.[16]

The empirical difficulties that consistency and "purity" raise can be illustrated by Weber's treatment of personal authority (a form of personalism or particularism) and the authority of office (a form of impersonality or universalism). For Weber, personal authority stands in the way of formal rationality, the machine-like efficiency of bureaucracy, while the authority of office is a necessary condition for its realization. More generally, the authority of office "goes with" rational-legal authority. But in what sense are these propositions valid? Personal authority may have, to a certain degree in some contexts, hindered the historical formation of the modern state and industrial capitalism in the period when administration and production was shifting from home and family to bureau and factory and when the worker was being "separated . . . from the material means of production, destruction, administration, academic research, and finance. . . ."[17] But personal authority is not necessarily inimical to organizational effectiveness, to the setting and realization of organizational goals.[18] Impersonality has high costs,[19] as well as benefits, and so does personalism. The perceived

[16] "Bureaucracy," in Gerth and Mills (fn. 4), 215.

[17] Roth and Wittich (fn. 13), III, 1394.

[18] Thus Tout, referring to 14th-century British administration, is sure that levels of performance and effectiveness were high. For example, record keeping leaves "nothing to be desired in completeness and precision." Our examination, not yet complete, of the account books of Bedla *thikana* (estate) in Udaipur, a former princely state, produces a similar impression. See T. F. Tout, "The Emergence of Bureaucracy," in Merton (fn. 1), 79.

[19] Weber in his informal, nonsystematic writing recognized the costs of impersonality. According to Oberschall's discussion of Weber's unfinished report on his experiences as a volunteer in military hospitals during the first year of World War I, Weber attributed the level of convalescing soldiers put under arrest to the lack of a volunteer organization that catered to recreational and non-medical needs not attended to by the professional staff; he found that well-educated volunteer nurses from good social backgrounds were more effective in handling patients than the average professional nurse "because of a varied and individual approach [that attended to] their human and intellectual needs." Oberschall (fn. 7), 136.

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quality of the trade-offs involved can vary with historical and organizational contexts. A conceptual strategy that takes these considerations into account by positing a personalism-impersonality continuum or mix rather than an evolutionary dichotomy may reveal that personalism—rather than appearing, at best, as a survival and in any case as an obstacle to the realization of formal rationality—contributes to (as well as impairs) organizational effectiveness.

Weber recognized at the empirical but not at the heuristic and explanatory level how psychic compensations that arise from neopatrimonial motives and relationships contribute to the discipline required for "strict mechanization." The subordination of the will and the self to formal rationality and bureaucratic authority are possible not because participants have *become* their roles (objectified, dehumanized), but because officials are accorded the honor and prestige of a status group.

> Strict discipline and control, which at the same time has consideration for the official's sense of honor, and the development of prestige sentiments of the status group . . . work in the direction of strict mechanization. . . . A strong status sentiment among officials not only agrees with the official's readiness to subordinate himself to the chief without any will of his own but [also] . . . status sentiments are the consequence of such subordination, for internally they balance the official's self-feeling.[20] [Presumably such an explanation makes more sense for British, German, French, and Indian officials, for example, than for American ones.]

But Weber's heuristic, ideal-typical self did not always listen to, or at least did not register, Weber's empirical self. What is the theoretical standing of these vitally important patrimonial motives of status, honor, and prestige and the behavior they produce, according to Weber? The attractions of consistency and logical elegance led to evolutionary and essentialist language and modes of explanation whose implication is that traditional authority and patrimonial motives (personalism) are survivals that will wither away as bureaucracy becomes "fully developed" by realizing its "specific nature" and its "specific virtue."

Authority and Power in Conflict and Congruence

We now turn to a consideration of how Weber's analysis of bureaucracy can be revised in the light of a conceptual strategy that highlights similarities rather than contrasts between bureaucracy and patrimonial administration. In particular, we examine the existence and potential

[20] "Bureaucracy," in Gerth and Mills (fn. 4), 208.

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incongruence between authority and power in all administrative structures. It was Weber's failure to take account of the potential for conflict between authority and power that led him to overestimate seriously the technical superiority of bureaucratic administration. It also contributed to his neglect of patrimonial features and motives in bureaucracies and to his failure to recognize how they—by helping to resolve conflicts between authority and power—can contribute to administrative effectiveness in both bureaucratic and patrimonial administration. The play of contradictory tendencies, which Weber's evolutionary explanation suggests will be resolved, in fact persists. Instead, contradictory tendencies (for example, personal authority and the authority of office) help to explain how administrative structures work in a variety of historical contexts.

Weber conceptualized bureaucracy in terms of authority rather than power. Authority in organizations exists when participants do what is required of them by virtue of their organizational roles. For instance, incumbent A's role authorizes him to ask of incumbent B that he do something, and incumbent B, recognizing the requirements of his formally assigned role, complies. More generally, authority in organizations exists when the incumbents' motivational orientation and behavior is congruent with the requirements of their formal roles. Unlike authority, whose amount is constant and allocated according to calculations based on formal rationality, power in organizations is variable and mercurial. Its amount and distribution vary over time with the purposes and interests of participants; with the distribution of power-relevant resources (e.g., material, symbolic, and coercive); with the participants' control of uncertainty and discretion; and with the participants' willingness to apply or to withdraw efficiency and affect. Unlike authority relationships, power relationships are often unstable and conflictual. A gets B to do what he wants him to do by mobilizing B in the service of shared values, interests, and goals; through the use of the "power" of personality and the exercise of leadership; and by the manipulation of incentives and sanctions (including social, psychological, and physical coercion). A has power over B when B does what A wants him to do and what B would not otherwise do. (A and B should be taken here as collective as well as individual actors.)[21]

[21] Alvin W. Gouldner and Michel Crozier in particular have recognized the problematic nature of power in organizations. See Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1954). Crozier's formulation of power is cast in terms of how organizational actors attempt to control and manipulate uncertainty and rules. Our formulation focuses on the participants' use of power (a multidimensional resource differentially and circumstantially available to organizationl actors) in the

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For Weber, authority was hierarchically distributed and flowed downward from the top of the organizational structure. He assumed that incumbents would internalize their formal role requirements and bear a compliant, consensual, and nonconflictual relation to organizational goals:

> The individual bureaucrat cannot squirm out of the apparatus in which he is harnessed. In contrast to the honorific or avocational "notable," the professional bureaucrat is chained to his activity by his entire material and ideal existence. In the great majority of cases, he is only a single cog in an ever-moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march. The official is entrusted with specialized tasks and normally the mechanism cannot be put into motion or arrested by him, but only from the very top. The individual bureaucrat is thus forged to the community of all functionaries who are integrated into the mechanism. They have a common interest in seeing that the mechanism continues its functions and that the societally exercised authority carries on. . . . The discipline of officialdom refers to the attitude-set of the official for precise obedience within his *habitual* activity, in public as well as private organizations. This discipline increasingly becomes the basis of all order. . . .[22]

One wonders whether even the Prussian bureaucrats who were the source of this caricature achieved such qualities. Weber's contempt for them suggests that some may have. In fact, power in organizations is more often than not distributed inversely to authority, and flows from the bottom up. As Crozier sees it, those at the top have a great deal of authority, but very little power. Weber erroneously assumed frequent and easy role identification; he was wrong to believe that precise obedience would become habitual and the basis of all order. Men may

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context of their limited and fluctuating commitments to organizational authority. See Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1964), esp. p. 158. Although we have benefited from Dahrendorf's revitalization of conflict theory, we cannot agree that participants can be understood exclusively in terms of their organizational roles or that conflict can be understood in terms of the zero-sum distribution of authority across roles. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1958).

[22] "Bureaucracy," in Gerth and Mills (fn. 4), 228-29; emphasis in original. Although there are strong consensual implications in Weber's bureaucratic theory, in light of much of his other work he more properly belongs with "conflict theory." His sociology of religion, for example, grounds ideology in the world view of competing status orders.

Bertolt Brecht created a scene in *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* which illustrates the highest hopes for bureaucratic role internalization. A corporal attempting to recapture the withdrawn affect of an unmilitary-looking footsoldier reluctantly committed to war-like behavior, exhorts him to exhibit organizational zeal: "When you hear a command, you should get a hard-on; when you thrust your sword, you should come." (Revised English version by Eric Bentley.)

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don their organizational masks but they do not easily or frequently *become* them. Weber would have been less impressed with formal rationality and more optimistic about the human condition had he recognized this fact. He feared and rebelled against making men into machines—i.e., subsuming them to their roles in formal organizations—not because he thought doing so was inefficient, but because he thought it was inhuman: "For the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: "Specialists without spirit; sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved."[23]

Weber's tragic sense of the modern was based on the assumption that those involved would not fear, resist, or evade bureaucratic authority, but that they would willingly accept the tasks, rules, and commands their roles required of them. He did not envison that they would find and use power against authority. Nor did he anticipate that the use of power by "lower participants" in organizations would require higher participants to find and use power as well as authority for organizational effectiveness and survival. His conceptualization of bureaucracy failed to take account of the struggle for power that is endemic in administrative relationships.

Weber did, of course, recognize that bureaucracy had power, but not in ways we mean here. In his view, "the power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always overtowering. The 'political master' finds himself in the position of the 'dilettante' who stands opposite the 'expert.' " It does not matter whether the political master is a "people" or a parliament, a collegiate body, a popularly elected president, or an absolute or constitutional monarch.[24] But bureaucracy's power is instrumental and "societal,"[25] not partisan and political, and it is directed to the outside. Bureaucrats are powerful because of their expertise and special knowledge and because they control and manipulate information, particularly by means of the "official secret"—"the specific invention of bureaucracy."

But Weber did not count bureaucracies among the actors engaged in the struggle for power. He did not perceive them as pursuing their interests and values in alliance or conflict with other political actors. When they act, they do so by virtue of expertise, not interest. Nor did

[23] *Protestant Ethic* (fn. 2), 182.

[24] "Bureaucracy," in Gerth and Mills (fn. 4), 232-33.

[25] According to Weber, bureaucracy becomes "an instrument for 'societalizing' relations of power" when it becomes "the means of carrying 'community action' over into rationally ordered 'societal action.' " *Ibid.*, 228.

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he take account, in his systematic writing, of the reciprocal relationship between environmental forces and actors on the one hand and bureaucracies on the other, and the impact of this relationship on organizational goals, resources, and internal power relationships. Finally, as we have already indicated, Weber ignored the role of power inside formal organizations even though it is a necessary condition for bureaucratic effectiveness. These misperceptions are of a piece: if the drive for formal rationality and instrumental efficiency and the requirements of expert and special knowledge are considered the guiding motives of officials, they will not be perceived as engaging in the struggle for power without or within.

Contrary to Weber's view, bureaucrats do engage in struggles for power within organizations and in the political arena. Expertise is not their only motive. Men in organizations resist, and sometimes rebel against, the machine-like expectations of formal rationality and the differential distributions of benefits and authority. In resisting, they pursue strategies and engage in behavior that is, from the perspective of organizational goals and procedures, irrational and dysfunctional, but from their point of view quite the reverse. The result is a paradox: the rationality of irrationality and the function of dysfunction.

Power struggles arise within organizations over interests (e.g., pay, conditions of work, bargaining rights); over values (e.g., the influence of ideology, counter-culture, "wrong" socialization, associational or community membership); and from resistance to appropriation of self (alienation) and the diminution of autonomy that recognition of bureaucratic authority entails.[26] Power struggles in organizations are continuous. They are expressed in conflicts over leadership, goals, policies, rules, procedures, tasks, and so forth;[27] they occur from the top to the bottom of organizations; and they often involve outside forces and actors. Power struggles are sufficiently common and sufficiently important in the life and work of organizations that they cannot be ignored or left at the periphery, or relegated to a residual category. They must stand at the center of any theory of organization.

We consider the importance of the struggle for power a more fundamental codicil to Weber's axiom of bureaucratic efficiency than other qualifying statements about the limits of formal rationality, such as

[26] Robert Blauner's dimensions of alienation supply another account of these areas of conflict; see Blauner, *Alienation and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1964).

[27] We do not mean to suggest that the issues beneath such conflicts are lacking in independent validity.

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March and Simon's term "satisfycing," or Warren Ilchman's even more qualifying call to rely on "optimal ignorance."[28] These terms invoke the much more modest claims that scholars of formal organizations make when they recognize the imperfect, limited, and high-cost nature of information; the variability and uncertainty of commitments to "strict obedience" and organizational goals; the impact of conflicting interests and values within organizations and in their environments on organizational performance and goals; and the effect of unknown and unintended consequences.

The more modest view of formal rationality and organizational efficiency that much of the recent literature on formal organizations suggests arises to a considerable extent from a methodological strategy that simulates the logical operations of economics, imposing reality-approximating modifications on rational-actor models. Assumptions concerning perfect rationality and information are constrained to bring them in line with known limitations of real actors. A focus on power struggles, by contrast, represents a more fundamental modification because it starts with a political rather than an economic model. It takes power rather than formal rationality and economizing behavior as its point of departure and presses substantive rather than instrumental goals to the foreground. Dahrendorf (because he emphasizes conflict, not because he features authority and formal roles), Etzioni, Allison, and, notably, Crozier lead us closer to models of formal organization (and society) that feature power and the struggle for power. In conceptualizations of organizations that feature power, authorities can pursue organizational goals and gain compliance with the requirements of formal roles only if the values, interests, and purposes of the participants approximate those of the organization (a condition that Weber took for granted but which we find unlikely and infrequent), or if they can marry organizational authority with sufficient power to insure efficient compliance by participants.[29] Because the latter condition is extraordinarily difficult to realize at high levels or for very long, we find Weber's claims for the technical superiority of bureaucracy unconvincing. Administrative effectiveness in patrimonial and bureaucratic administra-

[28] James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley 1958); Warren Ilchman and Trilok Dhar, "Optimal Ignorance and Excessive Education: Educational Inflation in India," *Asian Survey*, XI (January 1971), 523-43.

[29] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971); Ralf Dahrendorf (fn. 21); Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (New York: Free Press 1975); Crozier (fn. 21).

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tion (holding technology constant) depends, rather, on the degree to which authority and power are in conflict or congruence.[30]

Bureaucracy and the Struggle for Power: The Environment

Weber failed to appreciate the degree to which bureaucracies and their participants engage in struggle for power, not only—as we have already indicated—within organizations, but also as actors in political arenas outside. As he saw it, bureaucracies did not pursue their own substantive purposes in the struggle for power. As impersonal and disembodied vehicles of societal power, their will and actions were oriented to motives of efficiency and domination in the service of other actors' values and interests. Their goals came from outside in the form of laws and policies to be implemented, or products and services to be supplied: "bureaucracy as such is a precision instrument which can put itself at the disposal of quite varied—purely political as well as purely economic, or any other sort—of interests in domination."[31]

Adding an environmental dimension to the study of formal organizations creates a wholly different understanding. Formal organizations are profoundly affected by environmental forces that try to influence or control their goals, policies, and resource allocations, and by participants' efforts to use environmental forces to benefit the organization or their own positions within it. Environments are not, of course, homogeneous or monolithic. They are composed of a variety of actors: friendly and unfriendly publics; reference groups of differing weight and significance; clients and customers; public authorities and private interests. Together, they constitute a constellation of distant and immediate actors whose power and strategies vary with time and circumstance.

Formal organizations vary in the degree to which they are congruent or incongruent with environmental forces. The more congruent the purposes of organizations and their environments are, the less likely is conflict between them. At the same time, congruence lowers the chances for organizational autonomy. Conversely, incongruence between organizational and environmental goals, values, and interests raises the likelihood both of organizational independence and conflict with environmental forces. Since organizational self-sufficiency is rare

[30] Because conflict often arises out of struggles against alienation or exploitation and for autonomy or equity, conflict may be judged as desirable when weighed against the benefits of efficiency and social order that congruence makes possible.

[31] "Bureaucracy," in Gerth and Mills (fn. 4), 231.

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and some measure of dependence and mutual influence between organizations and their environments is common, we regard it as a serious lacuna in Weber's analysis of bureaucracy that he neglected the environmental dimension.[32]

It is not only the wisdom of hindsight based on knowledge created by scholars of interest groups, the legislative and administrative process, public policy, economic institutions and firms, and industrial sociology that highlights Weber's neglect of the environmental dimension. Even before World War I, one did not have to agree with the Marxist view that the state might be an executive committee of the ruling class to recognize that public authorities had more than a "legal" relationship to their environments, or firms more than a market relationship to theirs.[33] Indeed, Weber did recognize the influence of environmental forces on bureaucratic motives and behavior when he turned from heuristic to empirical analysis. If, at the macrosocial level, the motives of bureaucracy are universal and ahistorical; if, that is, bureaucracy displays a "horror of 'privilege,' " a "principled rejection of doing business 'from case to case,' " and generally pursues levelling and equalizing objectives (thus paralleling and reinforcing the motives and effects of democracy),[34] then, at the empirical level, environmental circumstances and not these universal tendencies become decisive. Bureaucracy does not, it seems, level everything—only that which the needs of the moment require. According to Weber, it strives "merely to level those powers that stand in its way and in those areas that, in the individual case, it seeks to occupy." And under absolutist state structures, universal motives are modified by environmental ones: "Bureaucratization of administration is deliberately connected with the formation of *estates* [in the sense of *Stand*, or status order], or is entangled with them by force of existing groupings of social power." Moreover, "the express reservation of offices for certain status groups is very frequent, and actual reservations even more frequent."[35] These observations bring

[32] Carl J. Friedrich develops at some length the proposition that administrative staffs cannot be understood apart from the environments to which they are responsible ("responsible bureaucracy"); see *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston: Little, Brown; various editions), chap. xix. For a graphic account of relations between a bureaucratic agency and its clientèle and other environments, see Arthur A. Maass, *Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1951).

[33] John Kenneth Galbraith has done much to restore some balance in the understanding of economic behavior by suggesting how much of it relies on political rather than "economic" motivation; see *Economics and the Public Purpose* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1973).

[34] "Bureaucracy," in Gerth and Mills (fn. 4), 224.

[35] *Ibid.*, 231.

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him very close to a Marxian view of the state as the executive committee of the ruling class—to recognizing, that is, the extent to which environmental forces can co-opt or appropriate bureaucratic organizations.

Weber also recognized the existence of "advisory bodies selected from among private and interested circles, which are frequently found in the modern state and whose nucleus is not formed of officials or of former officials."[36] "The thoroughly rationalized system of departmental ministers and prefects, as in France," is "supplemented by the calling in of interest groups as advisory bodies recruited from among the economically and socially most influential strata."[37] Having come this far in recognizing how environmental forces presumably engage in struggles for power to influence bureaucracies, Weber took it all back. The "calling in" of interest groups, he found, is "increasingly frequent" but "it further increases the power of bureaucracy" as the relationship is ordered to put "the concrete experience of interest groups into the service of a rational administration of expertly trained officials."[38] The remark suggests that, as is appropriate to his German context, Weber interpreted interest groups more in the framework of state corporatism than of liberal (or societal) corporatism, interest-group pluralism, or class conflict.[39]

Economic corporations,

> . . . the bureaucratic structures of the modern private economy, . . . complete themselves by drawing in notables [on boards of control] from among disinterested circles for the sake of their expert knowledge or in order to exploit them for representation and advertising. Normally, such bodies do not unite holders of special expert knowledge but rather the decisive representatives of paramount economic interest groups, especially the bank creditors of the enterprise—and such men by no means hold merely advisory positions. They have at least a controlling voice, and very often occupy an actually dominant position.[40]

[36] *Ibid.*, 237. [37] *Ibid.*, 238-39. [38] *Ibid.*, 239.

[39] *Ibid.*, 237-38. Here and elsewhere, Weber anticipated recent work on state corporatism. For an interpretation of interest groups in the context of state and liberal (or societal) corporatism, see three articles in *Comparative Political Studies*, x (April 1977): Philippe Schmitter, "Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in Western Europe," pp. 7-37; Leo Panitch, "The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies," pp. 61-90; and Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Liberal Corporatism and Party Government," pp. 91-122; also see Schmitter's earlier "Still the Century of Corporatism," *Review of Politics*, xxxvi (January 1974), 85-131.

The literature on interest-group pluralism is critically evaluated in J. David Greenstone, "Group Theories," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *The Handbook of Political Science*, II (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1975), 243-318.

[40] "Bureaucracy," in Gerth and Mills (fn. 4), 237-38. German banks and bankers continue to play a critical role in investment decisions of firms and industries as members of boards of directors and apex bodies' governing committees. See Andrew

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Again, having come this far, he did not—as did Thorstein Veblen, for example—recognize that such arrangements created arenas for struggles between those interested in speculative profit and those interested in formally rational production.

We are left, then, with deductions and inferences from Weber's heuristic definition of bureaucracy that do not recognize how struggles for power generated by environmental forces influence organizational motives and actions, and with intimations at the empirical level that environmental forces may act contrary to formal rationality and the setting of organizational goals by political and economic masters. At this juncture, Weber left the subject up in the air with the remark that "discussion of the position of organized interest groups within the administration, which may be in the offing, does not belong in this context."[41]

Bureaucracy and the Struggle for Power: Appropriation

Central to Weber's analysis of bureaucracy is the all-important economic fact of "the 'separation' of the worker from the material means of production, destruction, administration, academic research, and finance. . . ." Such separation "is the common basis of the modern state . . . and of the private capitalist economy. In both cases the disposition over those means is in the hands of that power whom the *bureaucratic apparatus* . . . directly obeys or to whom it is available in case of need."[42] The difficulty with this view is that it is only half of the truth. The other half lies with the continuous struggle to re-appropriate both the material means and the power of the bureaucratic apparatus.

Appropriation of the resources and authority of bureaucracies has a manifest and a latent dimension. The manifest dimension encompasses the appropriation of public authority by bureaucracies—i.e., when bureaucracies themselves become political masters by seizing power or exercising it in their own interest. Latent appropriation encompasses those manifold strategies of resistance to organizational authority that result in the participants' using or taking control of organizational resources, rules, or goals for their own substantive purposes.

Manifest appropriation can occur under conditions of both modern and traditional authority; it is not an exclusive characteristic of patrimonial administration, in which Weber identified appropriation (non-

Shonfield, *Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power* (New York: Oxford University Press 1969), chap. xi, 239-64.

[41] "Bureaucracy," in Gerth and Mills (fn. 4), 239.

[42] Roth and Wittich (fn. 13), III, 1394; emphasis in original.

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separation) as a distinguishing feature of various feudal and prebendal forms. Marx, in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*, formulated the issue of manifest appropriation in the modern state when he observed that, for a time at least, "the executive power subordinated society to itself." The class struggle had produced a stalemate, an equilibrium of sorts that left no class dominant, which enabled the bureaucratic state under the leadership of Napoleon II to rule in its own interest; it was neither an instrument of a ruling class (the "other" Marx), nor the neutral instrument of the *Rechtsstaat* (Weber), the "abstract bearer of sovereign prerogatives and the creator of 'legal norms.' "[43] Other examples of manifest appropriation in which the functional and legal differentiation of the political and administrative realms is obscured can be found in coups by military and/or bureaucratic structures and interests, such as those in 1952 in Egypt, in 1958 in Pakistan, or in the record of Himmler's SS in the Third Reich as it expanded its scope from internal security to military, administrative, and political functions. The inability of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon to replace J. Edgar Hoover as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation—despite administrative regulations and statutes that, *inter alia*, required his retirement, and despite compelling political and personal reasons for doing so—provides a dramatic instance of how an individual's political and bureaucratic power can result in the personal appropriation of public authority.

Examples of manifest appropriation under patrimonial administrations come easily to hand: the shogun of the Emperor in Japan; the Ranas of the King in Nepal; the Nizam in Hyderabad, and many like him, under the Mughal emperors in India. As the Mughal instances suggest, manifest appropriation under patrimonial rule occurs more commonly at the periphery—a result related to extant technology. But feudal patrimonialism, as well as other forms of prebendal administration, where authority and resources—particularly the control of physical force—are highly decentralized, and loyalty and obedience are based on a formally voluntary contractualism, may produce seizures of public authority at the center as well; the reigns of the Dukes of Burgundy in France and Henry Tudor in 15th-century England are examples that come to mind.

The extent to which latent appropriation involves struggles for power is less apparent because it is not explicitly political. Nevertheless, strug-

[43] "Bureaucracy," in Gerth and Mills (fn. 4), 239.

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gles to insure job security, retirement and welfare schemes, promotion by seniority, the manipulation of affect and efficiency and other forms of "retreatism," work-to-rule and other forms of "ritualism," and the selective gathering, suppression, and release of information via secrecy and leaks, constitute various forms of struggle within organizations which are designed to appropriate organizational authority and resources.[44] Security of tenure and promotion by seniority are regarded as necessary if career services are to perform independently and to attract talent. Both are usually conceptualized as an aspect of professionalism. At the same time, they are the modern administration's equivalent of hereditary office and carry the same implication of appropriation that hereditary office does. Our research on princely state administration in India indicates that hereditary claims to office provided less security in the face of the contradictory norm of service at the maharaja's pleasure than do the statutory provisions and the supporting political power of career-service interests under conditions of rational-legal authority and bureaucratic administration.[45]

Operational routines provide fertile ground for participants, particularly those at the middle and lower levels, to appropriate organizational goals, authority, and resources. Mastery and application of operational routines not only contradict "rational actor" assumptions about organizational performance, but also put power in the hands of those with little or no authority. Operational routines constitute a significant barrier to the formulation or implementation of new goals or policies or techniques. Like the spurious compliance involved in working to rule; selecting, withholding, and releasing information; and using "discretion" in situations of uncertainty, the application of routines constitutes a realm of power that enables functionaries and sometimes higher-ups to appropriate organizational purposes and means latently by exercising power against those in authority. (John Ehrlichman's accusation comes to mind that F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover "papered the file" in complying with White House requests to investigate the Ellsberg case because the Director was an old friend of Ellsberg's father-in-law.)

[44] Aspects of these phenomena are dealt with, *inter alia*, in Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 1974); David Wise, *The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy, and Power* (New York: Random House 1973); Harold Seidman, *Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization* (2d ed., New York: Oxford University Press 1976); and Hugh Heclo, *A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 1977).

[45] See Rudolph and Rudolph, "A Bureaucratic Lineage in Princely India" (fn. 6).

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Patrimonialism in Bureaucratic Administration: A Differentiated View of National Histories

We have suggested that in allocating attributes to patrimonial administration and bureaucracy, Weber generally assigned "living," "human" motives to patrimonialism, and machine-like ones (such as precise, habitual obedience) to bureaucracy. We have also suggested that it is the resistance of organizational participants—their assertion of values and interests; their efforts not to be subsumed by organizational roles; their struggles for autonomy—that creates a power-authority incongruence and generates conflict. We now want to suggest that patrimonial features are common to traditional and modern administration, and that they can resolve (as well as exacerbate) conflicts that arise from the incongruence between power and authority.[46]

If administrative institutions under conditions of traditional or rational-legal authority are conceptualized as a dual system of authority and power relationships, effectiveness becomes less a matter of formal or instrumental rationality (holding technology constant) than of the degree of congruence between authority and power relationships. In other words, administrative effectiveness in the setting and accomplishment of goals is more likely to be optimal when the values and interests of functionaries and authorities are congruent. This finding is as true for the "servants" of dynastic, absolute, or constitutional monarchs as it is for corporate executives in industrial economies and civil servants in modern states. Patrimonialism expressed in the personal authority of leadership, the charisma of office,[47] and in the appropriation of (participant influence over or control of) organizational rules, goals, and resources can "save" something of formal rationality by countering the sense of alienation and/or exploitation that breeds resistance to its requirements. It is in this sense that patrimonialism can "correct" the

[46] We are tempted to use the word neopatrimonialism when examining how personal authority, personalism, particularism, and appropriation can close the gap between power and authority in modern bureaucratic contexts, and we shall occasionally do so. Such usage raises theoretical difficulties because it bears the imprint of the very dichotomy we are attempting to revise. Daniel Edwards suggests that there may be problems to employing the word patrimonialism in modern contexts because of the intellectual baggage it carries. Our decision to use it is based on the belief that a rhetorical device of this kind will break through the persistent belief that "patrimonial" features have a traditional location only. See Edwards's "Bureaucracy in Nepal: Developments in Administration from the Rana Years to Present," Ph.D. diss. (Department of Political Science, University of Chicago 1977).

[47] For this concept and its application, see Etzioni (fn. 29), chaps. XII and XIII.

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dysfunctions and pathologies that are generated by resistance to authority and power struggles over its use.

A re-examination of the leading cases that figure in the history of modernization, combined with attention to some recent concerns of the literature on organizations, suggests that traditional and patrimonial features are *both* evident in and important for effective administration. Weber's analysis of bureaucracy (and politics) is most compelling in the context of continental (i.e., French and particularly Prussian and German) historical experience. It is less so in the context of English and American experience.

Situated in the middle of Europe with open frontiers to east and west, Prussia's survival and expansion from the late 17th through the 19th century required an enormous military effort that exposed most of the male population to military training. The result was to "militarize" not only Prussian administration, but also Prussian society and culture. The revival and application of the tradition of Roman civil law to state administration complemented and deepened, more than it contradicted, the orientations created by militarization. The habitual and precise discipline that Weber took for the basis of all social order, and the centralization, specialization, and hierarchy that he identified with formal rationality, were as much a product of Prussia's military and legal institutions and historical experience as they were elements of a universal history of culture that revealed the essential nature of the modern.[48]

Despite his astonishing comparative reach, Weber ultimately took Germany as the ground from which to construct his ideal type of bureaucracy. In the face of Britain's pre-eminent industrial and political role in the 19th century, he perceived her patrimonial administrative features as lags in the process of achieving the technical superiority that bureaucracy can bring, rather than as possible explanations of what made the system work so well:

> The advance of the bureaucratic structure rests upon "technical superiority." This fact leads here, as in the whole field of technique, to the following: the advance has been realized most slowly where older structural forms have been *technically well developed* and *functionally adjusted to the requirements at hand*. This was the case, for instance, in the administration of notables in England and hence England was the slowest of all countries to succumb to bureaucratization or, indeed, is still only in the process of doing so.[49]

[48] See, for example, Hans Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy* (Boston: Beacon Press 1958).

[49] "Bureaucracy," in Gerth and Mills (fn. 4), 228; emphasis added.

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Yet, it was after all neither Prussia nor France, but England that became the world's first and, for almost a century, leading industrial power. It was the British Empire that circled the globe and has never been equalled. And the English experience was very different. An island kingdom making its history as a trading and naval power, England missed the militarization that affected both France and Germany, remaining basically "civilian" from the 17th to the 19th century. Parliamentary politics and common-law tradition were dominated by the practice of collegiality and a principled affirmation of doing business case by case (mitigated but not erased by *stare decisis*). Britain's administrative life was profoundly shaped by the patrimonial orientation, practices, and power of the landed aristocrats and gentry, and of guilds and corporations. Administration was not in the hands of professionals and specialists, but of gentlemen amateurs who were proud to be known as generalists and all-rounders. It was typically decentralized, collegial, or private, and carried out through local courts and unpaid justices of the peace, boards of control and trade, chartered companies, and distant colonial governments; it was affected by private member bills in parliament, and disciplined by standards of honor, duty, and decency. Where German education for public servants stressed public law and political economy—the *Staatswissenschaften*—British school and university education in the 19th century featured training in character, leadership, and the classics, none of which would qualify as specialized professional training for experts.[50] The public-school prefect who commanded the loyalty and obedience of his house in terms of personal qualities, the light touch, good manners, a sense of style, and a capacity to do the right thing person by person, provided the model for public men exercising public authority. Cleverness and specialized knowledge was less admired than determination and character. The bonds that united old boys to each other in politics and service were the bonds of friendship and previously shared experience. Personalistic networks were an institutionalized product of the public schools. The social order that enabled Britain to be the first and greatest of the modern nations

[50] Weber was, on the one hand, emphatic that bureaucracy furthers the specialist at the expense of the "cultivated man." "The modern development of full bureaucratization brings the system of rational, specialized and expert examinations irresistibly to the fore." *Ibid.*, 241. On the other hand, he qualified his main assertion empirically without letting the qualification either weaken the dominant theme or break it into a multifaceted generalization: "Expert examinations are neither indispensable to nor concomitant phenomena of bureaucratization. The French, English and American bureaucracies have for a long time foregone such examinations entirely or to a large extent, for training and service in party organizations have made up for them." *Ibid.*, 240.

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was grounded more in patrimonial than in bureaucratic features, in the discipline of honor and decency, of duty, deference and manners—not the discipline of the barracks, the law, or the office based on orders, commands, and expert authority.

American patterns of administration diverge from both the formal rationality approximated by the Prussian paradigm and the patrimonial arrangements of Britain—although democratic structures, curiously enough, preserve more patrimonial features than one would expect. An examination of the American pattern confirms what the British case suggested: the disproportionate influence of the Prussian example on the image of bureaucracy in Weber's thought.

Civil servants in Germany, France, and Britain benefited from the history and mystique of the state and the standing conferred on those who served it. In America there were no status orders, no lords of the robe or the sword, no educated and cultivated professionals whose service to patrimonial or absolute rulers was a source of honor, prestige, and lay ennoblement. The dominant Jeffersonian tradition, in contrast with the recessive Hamiltonian, taught that the least government was the best government. Independent and producing landowners and farmers in a society free of the corruption and degradation of urban commerce and industry could and should live with as little public authority as possible. The Jacksonian legacy compounded and deepened the negative attitude toward state service. By "democratizing" the standards, competence, and knowledge required for state service to the point of distrusting and attacking intellect and expertise, and by establishing "rotation in office" to counter the alleged privileged, self-serving, and monopolistic consequences of permanency, the Jacksonian legacy helped to establish the doctrine that "to the victor belong the spoils" of office. Rotation and spoils, when combined with the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian tendency to belittle and disesteem the state, led to the even more extreme view that state service meant "feeding at the public trough."

Weber understood the Jacksonian legacy, but he believed that civil-service reform had, in the latter part of the century, set America on the road to bureaucratic rationalization:

> The United States still bears the character of a polity which, at least in the technical sense, is not fully bureaucratized. But the greater the zones of friction with the outside and the more urgent the needs for administrative unity at home become, the more this character is inevitably and gradually giving way to formally bureaucratic structure.[51]

[51] *Ibid.*, 211.

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He did not recognize the extent to which populist and anti-state ideology continued to differentiate the status and authority of civil servants in America from those in Prussia or Britain. Nor did he recognize the extent to which American federalism and the British derived affection for local government sustained particularities, variations, and amateurism that were absent from parallel German settings.

His belief that administration in America was moving toward "full bureaucratization" arose in part from his technocratic misreading of the word "machine" when applied to American parties:

> . . . the rise of the "machine," as it is significantly called in the United States, and the growing importance of officialdom everywhere . . . are all stages of . . . [bureaucratization]. The partly unbureaucratic form of the state structure in the United States is materially balanced by the more strictly bureaucratic structures of those formations which, in truth, dominate politically, namely, the parties under the leadership of professionals or experts in organization and election tactics.[52]

In the dispersed, discontinuous, and patrimonial baronies staffed by full-time amateurs that characterized American parties, he thought he saw the bureaucratized German Social Democratic Party as depicted by Robert Michels:

> Democratic mass parties have completely broken with traditional notable rule based on personal relations and personal esteem. . . . Democratic mass parties are bureaucratically organized under the leadership of party officials, professional party and trade union secretaries, et cetera. . . . In the United States, both parties since Jackson's administration have developed bureaucratically.[53]

Two recent revisionist works provide some support for Weber's reading of party "machines" in America. Martin Shefter argues that by the 1880's, New York's political clubs were more bureaucratic than prior literature suggested;[54] and Ira Katznelson stresses that the separation of workplace from ethnic communities opened the way for working-class organizations even if it did not overcome the negative effects of ethnicity on class formation and organization.[55] But such new work on party and ethnicity does not justify Weber's interpretation of party in America as paralleling Europe's bureaucratized working-class parties. It was a mistake to believe that the "moonlighting"

[52] Roth and Wittich (fn. 13), 1398; "Bureaucracy," in Gerth and Mills (fn. 4), 211.
[53] *Ibid.*, 225.
[54] Shefter, "The Emergence of the Political Machine: An Alternative View," in Willis Hawley and Michael Lipsky, eds., *Theoretical Perspectives on Urban Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1978).
[55] See aspects of Katznelson's *City Trenches* (New York: Pantheon, forthcoming).

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employees on public payrolls who dispensed favors, access, welfare goods, public esteem, and recognition, and who helped with the mysteries of "Americanization" were the products of an impersonal, precise, and habitual obedience to bureaucratic authority rather than of the disciplined loyalty to persons and communities that marks patrimonial relations.[56]

These historical instances suggest a highly varied distribution of patrimonial and bureaucratic features across modern administrative systems. Weber, by contrast, couched his characterization of bureaucracy in universal language.[57] At the heuristic level, universal tendencies, independent of national or cultural context, are at work: it is the inner coherence and logic of capitalism and democracy that account for the inner coherence and logic of bureaucracy.

> The capitalist system has undeniably played a major role in the development of bureaucracy. . . . Its development has created an urgent need for stable, strict, intensive and calculable administration. It is this need which gives bureaucracy a crucial role in our society as the central element in any kind of large-scale administration.[58]

Weber made even stronger statements about the symbiotic relations between bureaucracy and democracy, especially "mass democracy."[59]

[56] "Bureaucracy," in Gerth and Mills (fn. 4), 224-25. Weber identified two principles that distinguished political parties in modern states—"*organizations for job patronage*" [Weber's emphasis], which he associated with the United States and attributed to the absence of a parliamentary system, and ideological parties (*Weltanschauungsparteien*), oriented to the realization of "*substantive* [Weber's emphasis] political ideals," which he associated with continental parties, pre-eminently the German Social Democratic Party. Poor state management of the economy by dilettanti could be tolerated in the United States "in view of the limitless abundance of economic opportunities. The increasing necessity of replacing the untrained party protégé and sometime-official with the technically trained career official diminishes progressively the parties' benefices and results inescapably in a bureaucracy of the European kind." Whether, when, or to what degree the conditions mentioned by Weber have changed are open questions. His observation that "despite the resulting corruption [of patronage appointments] this system was popular [in the United States] since it prevented the rise of a bureaucratic caste" suggests at a minimum that bureaucracy in the United States was not and has not become "of the European kind." Roth and Wittich (fn. 13), 1397-98.

[57] Alvin Gouldner, "On Weber's Analysis of Bureaucratic Rules," in Merton (fn. 1, p. 48), briefly attends to the contradiction between multiple historical manifestations of bureaucracy and its common features. John Markoff's characterization of theories of the causes of bureaucracy since Weber's time also makes the case for autonomous and plural explanations, in "Governmental Bureaucratization . . ." (fn. 1); see p. 480 for his summary.

[58] Parsons (fn. 3), 338.

[59] Weber did attend to the contradictions between democracy and bureaucracy and capitalism when he observed that democracy tries to prevent the development of "closed status groups in the interest of a universal accessibility of office," when it tries to minimize "the authority of officialdom in the interests of expanding the sphere of 'public opinion' . . . ," and when it attempts to make "a clean sweep of . . .—at

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At the historical and empirical level, Weber, as usual, qualified his universalism. He explained how bureaucracy emerges independently of both capitalism and democracy. He observed, as we have already pointed out, that absolutist states in collaboration with status orders bureaucratize administration. More generally, he argued that, while democratization of society "in its totality" and "in the modern sense of the term . . . is an especially favorable basis of bureaucratization," it is "by no means the only possible one." He had similar reservations with respect to capitalism:

> Early modern capitalism did not *originate* in the bureaucratic model states where bureaucracy was a product of the state's rationalism. Advanced capitalism, too, was at first not limited to these countries, in fact not even primarily located in them. . . . Today, however, capitalism and bureaucracy have found one another and belong intimately together.[60]

Yet at the theoretical or heuristic level—and in this sense, ultimately—Weber clung to the view that bureaucracy has general characteristics, structural and motivational features, and a logic that links them together in an ideal type in ways that are independent of national historical differences. A differentiated view of historical experience and its imprint on cultural orientations and institutions indicates that the qualities that Weber featured in his analysis of bureaucracy do not adequately and equally explain the nature of effective administration. Particular historical constellations, as suggested by the instances of Germany, Britain, and America, rather than the logic of impersonality, calculation, levelling, and rationalization as expressed in bureaucratization and as re-enforced by capitalism or democracy, seem to explain more adequately how these (and other) nations became "modern."

Patrimonialism in Bureaucratic Administration: Personal Leadership

Our comparative and historical view of effective administration, particularly the finding that patrimonial or neopatrimonial features play an important part in the modernization of economic and political as well as administrative life, is consistent with some recent concerns of the literature on formal organizations.[61] Particularly important in our

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least in intent—the plutocratic privileges in administration." "Bureaucracy," in Gerth and Mills (fn. 4), 226 and 225.

[60] Roth and Wittich (fn. 13), 1465; emphasis in original.

[61] There is, of course, an extensive literature on leadership in administration, some of which is relevant to our prospective analysis. Among the most influential writers are Chester Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge: Harvard University

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view has been the attention given to personal leadership and authority, the flexible, "particularistic," and "diffuse" team play that accompanies it, and its capacity to counter if not "cure" bureaucratic pathology. In constructing his ideal types of legitimate authority, Weber recognized the importance of personal leadership for traditional authority; he made it the central feature of charismatic authority, but virtually expelled it from rational-legal authority.[62] With respect to his analysis of patrimonial and bureaucratic administration, he followed a parallel and consistent usage: leadership in the form of personal authority, office charisma, and other forms of personalism figure prominently in patrimonial, but not at all in bureaucratic administration. Leadership and personalism, along with affective and communal relationships, fall victim to functional differentiation and specialization as impersonality is assigned to bureaucratic structures and roles, and personalism to the vocation of politics.

It is politicians as demagogues, not bureaucrats, who bring personalism into play by appealing to "irrational" elements, matters of the heart, and the emotions rooted in communal and historical sentiments. Those who inhabit the world of formal rationality and bureaucratic authority, *sine ira ac studio*, live as a race apart, innocent of politics, under the aegis of strict and habitual discipline and without wills or interests.

Patrimonialism enters such a world for many reasons. In the form of personal authority, it can come into play to cope with bureaucratic pathology by bringing power and authority into closer congruence. Robert McNamara's experience as Secretary of the Department of Defense, perhaps the world's largest and most bureaucratic bureaucracy, suggests just one aspect of this process.[63] There are at least two sides to Robert McNamara. There is the Harvard Business School, Ford Motor Company, DoD management technician, who first made his mark by setting up a "revolutionary statistical control program" as an Air Force officer during World War II and who "tamed" the military service brass and put an end to their wasteful, counterproductive rivalry for resources and missions by cost-effectiveness techniques. And there is the Robert McNamara who captained the whiz kids (a metaphor that

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Press 1938), and Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson 1957).

[62] Etzioni (fn. 47, chaps. XII and XIII) argues that "*personal (or pure) charisma may be originally achieved in organizational offices*" (p. 307; emphasis in original).

[63] Brock Brower, "McNamara Seen Now, Full Length," *Life* (May 10, 1968). All subsequent citations on McNamara are from this article.

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invokes an unbeatable basketball team at the University of Illinois in the mid-1940s)[64] in the Air Force and at Ford, and their functional equivalent in the DoD. It is this second, less celebrated Robert McNamara who contributes to an understanding of the patrimonial dimension of administration as it is expressed in the metaphor of team leadership.

When he agreed to accept John Kennedy's offer at Defense, he laid down one condition—"absolute authority in his choice of people." He got the people he wanted: in the first instance, people of intelligence, experience, and wisdom; but in the final instance, people he knew. "It's a very dangerous proposition," he said, "hiring people you don't know." The group he assembled stayed with him almost to a man throughout his seven years at Defense, moving from job to job "with intellectual ease and administrative versatility." However expert or skilled they were—and some, at least, were—their special virtue and strength lay in personal loyalty to McNamara and a sensitive, intuitive understanding of his views and style. As team players who knew their captain's mind, they stayed at least one step ahead of the opposition, based on "a disciplined, canny pre-emptive way of thinking." "McNamara," we are told, "used these men very personally, scouting them all around the Pentagon to bring the various services and agencies into mesh with his own office," and enabling him to overcome the operational routines, vested interests, and organizational complexity of the DoD. They were the means for overcoming the obstacles to administrative effectiveness that formal rationality—division and specialization of labor, job specifications, and hierarchy—impose. "He had his own lines out through these people," and he used them, when required, independently of their organizational location. His team was composed of people "who could understand and realize new policies," people who were flexible and broad—"not just oriented to particular jobs." It was McNamara loyalists responding to his personal authority and leadership as much as his penchant for and skill at formal rationality that made for effective administration during his term as Secretary of Defense. And it was the McNamara model that Presidents increasingly adopted in search of means to control and direct the political baronies and bureaucratic enclaves of the executive branch—sometimes to the nation's peril.[65]

[64] The term "whiz kid" passed into colloquial usage as "Whiz Kid. Slang. A youthful and exceptionally successful or intelligent executive, agent or advisor." *Random House Dictionary of the English Language* (Unabridged Edition 1967).

[65] For a favorable view of Presidential efforts to control and direct the foreign-policy bureaucracy through penetrating and colonizing executive agencies with Presidential

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Conclusion

We have tried to show that the simplifying assumptions Weber used to create formal contrasts between patrimonial and bureaucratic administration, when used to explain historical change and administrative behavior, exaggerate the degree of their independent existence and the superiority of bureaucratic administration. We found that patrimonial, bureaucratic, and charismatic features are more akin to a field of force that, depending on circumstances, variably conditions administrative behavior and effectiveness. Weber's efforts to interpret the course of universal history in terms of Western civilization's pre-eminence and dominance among world civilizations led him to overstate the bureaucratic features shared by Western nations. In the process, he neglected the ways in which national historical experiences exhibited various combinations of patrimonial and bureaucratic features in the course of becoming modern and achieving world eminence. Finally, his failure to recognize at the heuristic (ideal-typical) level the distinction between authority and power and, at the empirical level, their tendency to be in conflict, prevented him from appreciating the extent to which patrimonial features can help to overcome bureaucratic pathologies by orienting behavior in terms of organizational loyalty and discipline.

By conceptualizing administrative behavior in terms of conflicts between authority and power and suggesting that patrimonially oriented behavior can alleviate the bureaucratic pathologies such conflicts generate, it is not our intention to provide yet another technique to "save" formal rationality and bureaucratic authority. We do not want to be read as holding that compliance and efficiency can or ought to be bought, manipulated, or coerced in order to eliminate conflict and to promote the triumph of bureaucracy. What is good for organizations cannot be assumed to be good for their participants or for society. What is dysfunctional, pathological, or costly for organizations may be func-

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loyalists and team players, see I. M. Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974). For a critical view and suggestions for alternative modes of coordination, see Rudolph and Rudolph, *The Coordination of Complexity in South Asia* (fn. 6). The peril to the nation is featured in George Reedy, *The Twilight of the Presidency* (New York: World Publishing Company 1970), and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1973). Hugh Heclo's *A Government of Strangers* (fn. 44) assumes a critical stance toward the President-centered interpretations of the leadership and coordination requirements of the executive branch, such as Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership With Reflections on Johnson and Nixon* (New York: Wiley 1976).

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tional, efficient, or beneficial for participants or for society. Indeed, regulated conflict among participants inside organizations, and efforts by actors in their environments to influence or control organizations in order to affect organizational goals and behavior, may promote desirable values and legitimate interests and enhance administrative effectiveness.

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THE RATIONAL TIMING OF SURPRISE

By ROBERT AXELROD*

SURPRISE is frequently possible only by risking the revelation of the means of surprise. Thus, anyone who has the means to surprise his opponent faces the problem of when his resource for surprise should be exploited, and when it should be conserved for a time when the stakes are higher and the surprise would be more valuable. Using the resource for surprise at the first opportunity would mean getting less from it than would be possible if a more suitable event were to come along immediately after the resource for deception had been expended. On the other hand, it is frequently necessary to pay significant costs to maintain a resource for surprise. And, as in all calculations about getting things at one time or another, it is better to get a given payoff sooner rather than later.

The problem that I address in this paper is *when* a resource for surprise should be exploited. In the first part of the paper, I will show how broad this type of problem is in the area of international relations in general, and in political-military affairs in particular. In the second part of the paper, I will develop a rational-choice model to treat this sort of problem. In the third section, I will examine the ways in which actual actors are likely to differ from fully rational actors; by means of these differences I will then develop some important implications of the model.

I. Resources for Surprise

A fascinating example of a resource for surprise is a spy who has been discovered and has had his loyalties changed. This is a double agent. A double agent is a resource for surprise because he is under the control of the government he is supposed to be spying upon. Therefore, this government can use the double agent to send back false information and thereby deceive the government that originally sent the spy.

A striking case of the use of double agents on a grand scale was the achievement by the United Kingdom in World War II of capturing

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every single one of the German agents operating in Britain and using many of them against Germany.[1] The British achieved this feat by the beginning of 1941, but acted cautiously until they were certain that their control of the German espionage system in Britain was complete. Although they were sure by 1942, they decided to continue their caution in order to be able to exploit their resource to the fullest in one grand deception. The occasion was to be the Allied invasion of Europe. The British realized that they would incur a cost in the meantime—a cost measured in terms of valid information that would have to be supplied to Germany through these agents in order to maintain their credibility. But the stakes involved in D day were so high that it was worthwhile to conserve these controlled agents at least until then. This patience was amply rewarded: the Germans fell for the grand deception and kept a large number of troops at Pas de Calais—even several days after the real attack at Normandy.

Today, spies and double spies have been surpassed in importance by technical means of collecting information, such as reconnaissance satellites.[2] These technical means allow a great deal to be observed. They also allow powerful inferences to be made about the significance of observed patterns of behavior.

But even if the observations are accurate, the inferences can be deceptive. In fact, one way to deceive someone who is watching closely is to use a pattern of behavior which allows certain inferences to be drawn and verified.[3] Then, once this pattern is well established, changes can be made in such a way that the inferences are no longer correct. It is now widely recognized that a government's standard operating procedures allow an opponent to make inferences about the first government's behavior.[4] What is not so widely recognized is that, if the observed side can discover *its own* standard operating procedures, it has a resource to deceive the enemy. The same trick may of course

[1] J. C. Masterman, *The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1972).

[2] Richard M. Bissell, Jr., "The Bissell Philosophy: Minutes of the 1968 'Bissell Meeting' at the Council on Foreign Affairs as Reprinted by the Africa Research Group," reprinted as Appendix to Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Knopf 1974), 381-98; Herbert Scoville, Jr., "Is Espionage Necessary for Our Society?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 54 (April 1976), 482-95.

[3] For a discussion of indices of behavior, see Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970), 18 and 41-65. See also Erving Goffman, *Strategic Interaction* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1969).

[4] Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971).

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not work twice; therefore the question arises as to when this resource should be exploited.[5]

Double agents and standard operating procedures are both resources for achieving surprise through deception. They are means of providing believable but misleading information. However, if the other side is sufficiently confident that the information channel is under your deliberate control, there is no resource for surprise, or at best a resource of attenuated value. Therefore, in discussing resources that achieve surprise through deception, an important point to keep in mind is that I will deal only with information channels that are accepted by the other side even when the stakes are high.[6]

Some resources for achieving surprise do not depend on deception. One important category is an enemy code that has been broken. For example, when the Allies broke the German U-boat code in World War II, they were able to spot and sink German submarines with unusual frequency. After a short time, the Germans guessed that their code had been cracked; therefore, once this resource had been exploited, the codes were changed immediately. Allen Dulles, former head of the CIA, has presented the problem of when to exploit this type of knowledge as follows: "One can risk terminating the usefulness of the source in order to obtain an immediate military or diplomatic gain, or one can hold back and continue to accumulate an ever-broadening knowledge of the enemy's movements and actions in order eventually to inflict the greatest possible damage."[7]

A particularly good example of this dilemma occurred in the North African campaign of World War II. The British had developed a method of cracking the major German codes. The method was called Ultra. In order to preserve the security of Ultra, they decided not to

[5] The morality of deception is worth at least a footnote. Most of us find deception distasteful. In everyday relations we regard deception as immoral. We don't deceive others around us and we feel we have a right to expect that they won't deceive us. But not all relationships are of this basically cooperative, trusting type. Wars certainly are not. Whenever a relationship is based on violence, it seems hardly immoral to add some deception. Indeed, it would have been immoral for the British and Americans not to try to deceive Hitler about the location of the D-day attack, for example. Thus, whether deception is moral or not depends upon the nature of the relationship between the two sides. (I would like to thank Alan Donagan for this formulation.) When the relationship has less than total conflict, there is an additional consideration. The very practice of deception tends to make the relationship less trusting and more hostile.

[6] Goffman (fn. 3), 69, states that when the stakes become high enough, "nothing (it can be thought) ought to be trusted at all." I think that even when the stakes are high, something has to be trusted.

[7] Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York: Harper & Row 1963), 75.

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attack an enemy ship on the basis of Ultra alone.[8] Instead, an aircraft had to be sent to the ship to make a visual report so that the enemy would believe that aerial reconnaissance rather than code breaking was responsible for sinking the ship. However, during a critical period in the North African campaign, on October 26-27, 1942, fog protected an Axis convoy from aerial reconnaissance. The British were therefore faced with the dilemma of allowing Rommel's supplies to get through or risking the disclosure of Ultra. Churchill was consulted. "Churchill hesitated for an appreciable period as he weighed the alternatives, then he ordered that the ships were to be attacked and sunk. This time Churchill was willing to risk Ultra."[9]

A fourth category of resources that can be exploited for surprise is information obtained through a spy. As with information obtained through a code that is broken, the use of such information risks the ending of its usefulness. A striking example from the 1960's is provided by the Israeli agent Eli Cohen, who managed to infiltrate the leadership of the Syrian Baath Party. The Israelis exploited their information for propaganda purposes by broadcasting a number of secret Syrian cabinet decisions. This apparently alerted the Syrians to the possibility of a highly placed spy. When, in November 1964, the Israelis exploited this information even further by showing astonishing accuracy in attacking long-range artillery emplacements in Syria, Cohen's radio signal was detected and located by Syria within two months.[10] He was captured and executed.

Another example of how superior knowledge can be exploited is the introduction of a new weapon. The first use of a new weapon or new capability gives great advantages. These advantages are of at least two types. First, the other side has not yet had a chance to adapt to its use and therefore will have a suboptimal response. Typically, this advantage is lost shortly thereafter, as the other side learns how to

[8] Anthony Cave Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies* (New York: Harper & Row 1969), 128. See also Patrick Beesly, *Very Special Intelligence* (London: Hamish Hamilton 1977), 90f.

[9] Cave Brown (fn. 8), 128. Was the success of the German air raid on Coventry a result of the British reaching the opposite decision—namely to protect Ultra by deliberately not taking advantage of the information it provided? Brown, p. 40, says yes. Michael Howard, in "The Ultra Variations," *Times Literary Supplement* (May 28, 1976), 641-42, and David Kahn, in "The Significance of Codebreaking and Intelligence in Allied Strategy and Tactics," summarized in *Newsletter of the American Committee on the History of the Second World War*, No. 17 (May 1977), 3-4, dispute this and argue that Coventry was not a deliberately martyred city.

[10] Zwy Aldouby and Jerrold Ballinger, *The Shattered Silence: The Eli Cohen Affair* (New York: Coward 1971), 226, 325f.

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adapt to the weapon and perhaps even to use it.[11] There is also a psychological effect. A Soviet military study puts it this way: "The experience of past wars teaches us that the unexpected employment of new weapons has always had a powerful moral-psychological effect on the enemy."[12] Since both the nonadaptive and the psychological effects are reduced after the first use of the weapon, the familiar problem arises as to whether the weapon should be introduced at a given time or saved for a later and perhaps better occasion.

A good example of how it can pay to wait is presented by the Syrian decision not to use its new SAM air defense system in September 1973. Knowing that they would be attacking Israel less than a month later, the Syrians withheld the use of their new SAM system when a major air battle started over Syrian skies and then extended over the Mediterranean. Withholding the use of the SAMs cost Syria twelve planes to Israel's one, but it preserved the secrecy of the effectiveness of the system. The effectiveness of the SAMs in Egypt as well as in Syria was one of the major surprises the Israelis encountered in the opening days of the 1973 war.

All these examples present the same structural problem in determining whether to wait or whether to exploit the resource immediately. In all of them, the stakes vary over time: there may be an even more important situation later than there is now. Likewise, in all of them, there is a cost in maintaining the resource. Also, in all of the cases, the use of the resource risks its future value. Finally, in all cases, there are several reasons why one would prefer a given payoff at once rather than wait until a future opportunity. These structural similarities suggest that a mathematical model will be helpful in understanding the rational timing of surprise.

In order to develop such a model, it is necessary to look at the structure of the problem more closely.

1. *The stakes vary.* In each case the stakes vary over time, so that however great they are now they may be greater later. For example, the Syrians knew that an air battle had significant stakes, but they also knew that the stakes would be even higher in the following month when their major attack would be undertaken. Typically, future stakes are not known precisely, but some estimate can be made with greater or lesser confidence.[13] Thus, when Churchill decided

[11] James C. Aller, "Electronic Warfare Concept," *Naval War College Review*, XXII (May 1970), 75-79.

[12] A. S. Milovidov and V. G. Kozlov, *The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War* (Moscow: Military Publishing House 1972; trans. ed., Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), 198.

[13] We are assuming that the determination of the stakes is independent of the choice

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to risk Ultra for the sake of sinking some supply ships to Rommel, he had to decide whether the latter was worth it; one of the considerations would have been the stakes in future situations when Ultra might be even more valuable.

In general, the gains from exploiting a resource are proportional to the stakes. The costs of maintaining a resource are also proportional to the stakes, although the proportionality factor is typically lower. For example, the bigger the air battle over Syria, the greater the stakes; hence, the greater would be the gain if the SAM system were used, but also the greater would be the price of not using it. Naturally, the stakes must be considered in terms of the resource at hand. Thus the use of the SAM system had stakes that were determined by the magnitude of the air battle and its relationship to broader policy considerations. Obviously, the concept of stakes has to be viewed broadly in order to take into account all of the gains and losses that are relevant to the decision.

2. *There are costs to maintaining a resource.* If a resource is not used today, a cost must typically be borne to preserve it for tomorrow. For example, if a controlled agent is to continue to be credible, he must provide some valid information. In the same way, if a standard operating procedure is going to be used for deception later, it must be maintained in the meantime. While it is being maintained, there are real costs to allowing an opponent to make valid inferences about one's own behavior. In the case of waiting to exploit a code that is broken, or a spy who is in place, or a new weapon that can be introduced, the costs are necessary in order to minimize the chance that the opponent will learn that such resources are available for use.

3. *Exploitation risks exposure.* If it were not for the fact that exploitation of the resource risks its exposure, there would be no need to calculate at all. For example, in achieving surprise through the exploitation of a standard operating procedure, the risk of exposure is likely to be very great. To try to deceive in the same way again means that the deception itself becomes stereotyped. A Soviet military text makes this point well: "Stereotype contradicts the very essence of surprise. If one has succeeded in deceiving the enemy once, then he will not allow himself to be deceived a second time by the very same technique."[14]

The same text notes that the introduction of a new weapon cannot

whether to use a resource for surprise. Put another way, the stakes are exogenous to the model.

[14] V. Ye. Savin, *The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics* (Moscow: Military Publishing House 1972; trans. ed., Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), 235.

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remain secret for very long. "Therefore sooner or later the monopoly on the new weapon is lost and the level of technical outfitting begins to even out."[15] Similarly, once a controlled agent has been exploited, he may be disbelieved in the future.

4. *Value is discounted over time.* In all cases, it is reasonable to suppose that if the value were the same for exploiting a resource today or waiting until tomorrow, the choice would be made to exploit it today. There are at least two important reasons why there is a substantial discount rate in decisions concerning international politics and military affairs. The first is that the resource may disappear even if not used. Even without being exploited, a controlled agent may be blown, a cracked code may be changed, or a secret weapon may be uncovered. A second reason is that a gain today may accumulate in its impact on future events. Thus, a relatively small advantage over Rommel in 1942 could be leveraged into greater and greater advantages through one battle after another.

There is one important factor that tends to reduce the discount rate: a resource which is not used may actually grow or ripen. Thus, a double agent who is not exploited may be evaluated as more reliable, precisely because he provides a run of valid information. A standard operating procedure that builds a track record in terms of verifiable inferences is more likely to be trusted when the time for exploitation actually arrives. In the case of a new weapon, waiting until it can be introduced on a large scale can bring substantially greater rewards than rushing it into use as soon as possible.

To simplify the discussion, let us temporarily make two assumptions which will be dropped later. The first is that when the resource is exploited, it is certain to be discovered; therefore it can only be used once. The second is that the factors making for a positive discount rate and the factors making for a negative discount rate cancel each other out, and we therefore do not have to worry about the discount rate. With these simplifying assumptions, we can represent the problem of when to exploit a resource for surprise in terms of a simple gambling situation involving a single six-sided die. The point is to show that even under the simplest assumptions, the calculations are not the kind that can be done easily by intuition; yet, they can be done quite readily with a little simple algebra. Thus, even the simplest situation displays some of the advantages that a mathematical model can offer in the understanding of these types of problems.

[15] *Ibid.*, 236.

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Suppose we are offered the following game. A die is rolled and we have two choices. The first choice is to pay the face value of the die in dollars and continue. The other choice is to collect twice the face value of the die and end the game. For example, if the first roll of the die were a five, we could end the game and collect $10, or we could continue the game by paying $5 and rolling again. This could go on as long as we were willing to pay to roll again.

What is the best strategy when faced with such a game? That is to say, when should we exploit our resource and when should we be willing to pay to maintain it into the future? Clearly, whenever a six comes up, we should cash in because there is no point in paying to go on; we could never do better anyway. On the other hand, if a one is rolled, it is probably worth paying the $1 necessary to continue the game in the hope that we will get something more worthwhile soon.

Let us take the analysis a little further: if we do cash in on the first roll of the die no matter what it is, the expected gain is simply twice the average of the die roll. The average die roll is 3.5, and thus the expected gain of stopping on a die roll, no matter how small, is twice 3.5, or $7. Thus, if we followed the strategy of stopping no matter what came up, we would get an expected value of $7 from the game. This shows that the game would be worth an expected value of at least $7, and perhaps more if we could find a better strategy.

If we follow the strategy of stopping when a two or more comes up on the die roll, then we will be paying for all the one's, and collecting on the first two, three, four, five, or six. Thus, our average gain when we do cash in will be twice the average of all the numbers between two and six; this means that on the turn when we cash in, we will get —on average—twice four, or $8. However, we will also have to pay if a one turns up before any higher number. A third strategy is to wait until a three or better shows up before cashing in. In general, since the die rolls are independent, the best strategy will take the form of waiting for a sufficiently large number and paying what is necessary to continue the game until this sufficiently large number comes up on the die.[16]

The question, then, is where to set our threshold so that when we do cash in, we will be receiving a large payoff, but will not have to pay too much to wait for that time to arrive. The reader is invited to guess

[16] This strategy assumes that what we are trying to maximize is expected value—i.e., average dollar winnings. It ignores risk aversion and the possibility that we will run out of money to maintain our position while waiting for a good roll.

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what the best strategy is: that is to say, how large a die roll should we wait for before cashing in? The answer is given below.[17]

II. The Model

SPECIFICATION OF THE BASIC MODEL

The gambling game illustrates the basic problem in the rational timing of surprise. At each point in time there is a conflict between the desire to exploit the resource immediately for its potential gain, and a competing desire to pay the necessary cost to maintain the resource in the hope that an even better occasion for its use will come along soon.

An algebraic representation will help to gain a deeper understanding of this type of problem. It would represent the expected payoffs that can be achieved if the decision is made to exploit the resource whenever the stakes are at least as great as some given threshold level. The problem then is to find the best threshold.[18] It should be high enough so that the resource is exploited only in a worthwhile circumstance, but not so high that great investments have to be made to wait, while the stakes remain lower than the threshold.

First, consider what happens if the stakes are at least as great as the threshold. In that case, the resource is used, giving a value that is proportional to the stakes. In the die game, this constant of proportionality was two, but in general it can be any positive number. This number will be called the enhancement factor, E. Thus, if the stakes are at least as great as the threshold, the value received is the enhancement factor times the current stakes. Under our temporary simplifying assumptions, the resource can only be used once, so when this value is collected, the calculations will end. Thus, if the stakes are at least as great as the threshold, the expected value of the current situation is $E\bar{S}$, where E is the enhancement factor and $\bar{S}$ the average stakes, given that the stakes are at least as great as the threshold.

On the other hand, if the current stakes are less than the threshold

[17] The highest expected value is achieved by waiting for a three or more. This would give an expected value of $8.25 to the game. If we stopped at one or above, we would get on average $7; at two or above, $7.80; at three or above, $8.25; at four or above, $8; at five or above, $6; and at six, a *loss* of $3.

[18] It can be shown that a threshold decision rule is optimal for the type of model being described in the body of the paper. It can also be shown that for a broader class of model, embodying Markov processes, the optimal decision rule need not be a threshold rule. The proofs are available in the appendix of Axelrod, "The Rational Timing of Surprise," IPPS Discussion Paper No. 113, available from the author or the Institute of Public Policy Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109.

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level, the decision will be to pay the price of maintaining the resource. In that case, there will be an immediate loss that is proportional to the stakes, and the same decision problem will arise with the next stakes. Without loss of generality, we can take *this* constant of proportionality equal to one, as we did in the die game. Thus, if the stakes are less than the threshold, the expected value of the current situation is $-\underline{S} + V$, where $\underline{S}$ represents the average stakes, given that they are below the threshold factor, and V represents the expected value of going on to the next event.

For a given threshold, the probability of collecting and stopping is determined by the probability that the stakes will be at least as large as the threshold. If we let this probability of using the resource at a given time be P, the probability the threshold will not be met or exceeded is $1 - P$. Putting all this together allows a calculation of the expected value of the given threshold in terms of a weighted average of the payoffs of stopping and continuing, where the weights are the probabilities of these two choices. Thus, the value of using a given threshold is:

$$V = PE\bar{S} + (1 - P)\,(-\underline{S} + V).$$

The enhancement factor, E, is known. Also known is the probability distribution of the stakes. Therefore the choice of threshold determines three numbers: the probability that the threshold will be exceeded, P; the average stakes if it is equalled or exceeded, $\bar{S}$; and the average stakes if it is not equalled or exceeded, $\underline{S}$. Thus, the problem is to select the threshold that gives the highest value of V.

We are here assuming that the discount rate is zero and the stakes are independently determined from one event to the next. This means that if the threshold is not exceeded on a given trial, then the necessary cost of $\underline{S}$ is paid, and the situation merely repeats itself. That is why there is a V on both sides of the equation.

Solving for the value of the game, V, gives:

$$(1 - (1 - P))\,V = PE\bar{S} + (1 - P)\,(-\underline{S})$$
$$PV = PE\bar{S} + (1 - P)\,(-\underline{S})$$

and finally

$$V = E\bar{S} - \frac{1 - P}{P}\,(\underline{S}).$$

The problem of when to exploit the resource is now reduced to the problem of finding the threshold that results in the largest value of V.

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For example, in the illustration of the die game, there are six possible thresholds; the one that gives the highest value is three. When the game is stopped at three or more, the average value of the stakes when the threshold is equalled or exceeded is $\bar{S} = 4.5$. The average value of the stakes when the threshold is not equalled or exceeded is the average of one and two, which is $\underline{S} = 1.5$. The probability that a three or more will be rolled on a single turn is $P = 2/3$. Using an enhancement factor of $E = 2$, we have $V = 2(4.5) - \left(\frac{1/3}{2/3}\right)(1.5) = 9 - .75 = 8.25$. Since no other threshold gives a value as great as \$8.25, the best decision rule is to maintain the resource until the stakes are three or larger. Using this decision rule, one can expect an average gain of \$8.25. Since the decision rule calls for stopping on a three or greater, the odds of stopping on a given roll are $P = 2/3$.

In actual practice, not all stakes are equally likely to occur. In international relations and military affairs, the more typical expectation is that low-stake situations are much more likely than high-stake situations. Moreover, there is often a great range of stakes, from low-stake events that are fairly common up to events that are quite rare but have stakes that are very great. The old question then arises in even more intense form: how big should the stakes be before the resource is exploited? Very large stakes will come along once in a great while and will be worth waiting for. But their very rarity makes it expensive to wait for them.

A concrete example is the historical distribution of wars over a long period of time. Richardson's statistics are a convenient source.[19] In the period between 1820 and 1945, there were 282 wars which caused 300 or more deaths. Dividing these into logarithmic intervals, the distribution of wars by magnitude is as follows:

Size of War	*Number of Wars*
About 1,000	188
About 10,000	63
About 100,000	24
About 1,000,000	5
About 10,000,000	2
	282

[19] Lewis F. Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press; Chicago: Quadrangle Press 1960).

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If we suppose that the stakes are proportional to the size of the war and can be expected to be distributed in the same manner as these wars were distributed, what is the best decision rule to use? Our earlier calculation shows that it pays to wait for the largest kind of war, even though it is less than one percent of all wars. This is so with an enhancement factor of two—when the gain from exploiting a resource is twice the cost of maintaining it for any given stakes. Even if the enhancement factor is only one, it still pays to wait for the largest category of war.

Notice how much the situation has changed when the distribution of stakes becomes so skewed. In the die game, the best thing to do was to wait for a three or more, which meant that the probability of using the resource on any given turn was two-thirds. In the case of the distribution of wars, where there are only a few medium-size wars and even fewer very large wars, the best thing to do is to wait until the largest category of war. This means that the probability of using the resource on any given turn is less than one percent.

Typical decisions about the exploitation of resources for surprise are generally not made on the basis of wars, but on the basis of some smaller unit of analysis, such as a battle. However, the expected distribution of stakes is usually similar to the distribution of wars: many events of small stakes, a few events of large stakes, and a very few of very large stakes. For any given belief about future stakes, and any given estimate of the enhancement factor, it is thus possible to calculate whether the current stakes are sufficient to merit the exploitation of the resource, or whether it is best to pay the price of maintaining the resource and to wait.

EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL

It is easy to extend the model to take account of the fact that when a resource for surprise is used, it still has some chance of surviving. For example, a double agent who is used to mislead an opponent may not be discredited the first time he gives false information.

The British use of double agents to mislead the Germans about the location of the D-day attack is a brilliant example. In fact, not a single double agent was compromised by this massive deception.[20] The reason appears to be that the information provided by the agents served to confirm the cover story. As real troop formations reached France, they

[20] Masterman (fn. 1), 168.

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were always units that had already been identified by the agents. Thus the information that could be verified by the Germans turned out to be accurate, and this led them to trust the other reports as well. The Germans apparently held to the belief that if the invasion at Normandy had not been so successful, the major attack would in fact have occurred at Pas de Calais.[21]

If a resource for surprise is thought to have a chance of Q for survival when used (where Q is greater than zero), then its use is less costly than if it were certain to be lost upon its first use. The optimal decision rule can be calculated as before, but with the modification that the value of using the resource is no longer $E\bar{S}$, but instead is $E\bar{S} + QV$.

At the same time, we can go one step further and introduce the idea of a discount rate greater than zero. Earlier, we assumed that the discount rate was zero, meaning that the reasons for wanting an immediate payoff counterbalanced the reasons for expecting the value of a given exploitation to grow. As previously stated, there are at least two important reasons why the discount rate is significantly greater than zero. One is that the resource may disappear even if not used; the second is that a gain today may accumulate in its impact on future events. These two factors often dominate the offsetting factor that the resource's value for surprise may grow over the time that it is maintained.

Introducing a discount rate means that the value next time is $(1 - D)$ percent of the value this time. For example, if the discount is 10 percent per event, a given payoff received in the next event is only worth 90 percent of what it would be worth today. With a significant discount rate, we would tend to exploit the resource earlier, and thus would be satisfied with a somewhat lower payoff, provided it came soon. Thus, as the discount rate goes up, the optimal threshold goes down.[22]

To calculate the optimal threshold when a discount factor exists, we note that whenever the resource survives, the value that is attained for its survival is no longer V, but $(1 - D)V$.

Taking both the survival odds of Q and the discount rate of D into account, the value of using a given threshold is then:

$$V = P(E\bar{S} + Q(1 - D)V) + (1 - P)\,(-\underline{S} + (1 - D)V).$$

As before, the term that is multiplied by P represents the payoff for getting or exceeding the threshold. In that case, the resource is exploited, and a payoff of $E\bar{S}$ is received immediately. Moreover, there is

[21] *Ibid.*, 157f.

[22] This is true regardless of the distribution of stakes and the value of the other parameters.

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now a Q chance that the resource will survive to be used again. If it does survive, it is worth, on average, $(1 - D)V$, which is the value of using the same decision rule the next time, discounted to take account of the necessary wait for the next event. Similarly, the term that is multiplied by $(1 - P)$ represents the payoff if the stakes are less than the threshold. In that case, the decision rule calls for paying $\underline{S}$ to maintain the resource, and the expected value of waiting is again $(1 - D)V$.

As before, the calculations can proceed by solving for V. The result is an elementary but not very pretty formula:

$$V = \frac{EP\bar{S} - (1 - P)\underline{S}}{D + (1 - D)(1 - Q)P}$$

This formula is consistent with the basic formulation in the previous section when $Q = 0$ and $D = 0$.

To take a concrete case, let us suppose that there is a 50 percent chance that the resource will survive even if used. Let us also suppose that the discount rate is 10 percent per event, which takes into account the reduced value of a given payoff if it has to be waited for, the chance that the resource will be lost even if not used, and (in the opposite direction) the potential growth in the exploitation value of the resource if it does survive.

Now what is the best thing to do? Let us assume that the stakes are distributed just as the wars have been—with many relatively small events and a few very large ones—and that the enhancement factor is still two. We should recall that when there was no chance that a resource would survive if used, and that, when there was no harm in waiting (except for the cost to maintain the resource), the optimal decision rule was to wait for the largest class of events even though fewer than 1 percent of the events were this large.

With a 50 percent chance of survival of the resource every time it is used (instead of no chance) and with a 10 percent discount rate (instead of a zero rate), there are now two good reasons to be more willing to use the resource than before. In fact, increasing the survival rate if the resource is used, and/or increasing the discount rate, will always lower the optimal threshold.[23] But what is more interesting is that the optimal threshold does not go down very much when the stakes are

[23] See Axelrod (fn. 18) for the proof. If the risk to the resource is constant per year rather than per event, then the discount rate per event will be greater in peacetime, when events are few and far between compared to wartime. With a high discount rate per event in peacetime and the expectation of protracted peace, there would be an incentive in peacetime to exploit the resource to achieve such things as affecting the other side's defense investments and force postures. I am grateful to William R. Harris for this point.

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as skewed as they have been in the distribution of wars. Even with these survival and discount rates it is best to wait for an event at least as large as the next-to-largest category. Such events constitute less than 3 percent of all events, but they are large enough to be worth waiting for—even though using the resource might not destroy it, and even though waiting reduces the future payoffs by 10 percent for each of the many events that are likely to pass in waiting for such a high-stake event.

III. Policy Implications

The most important relationship illuminated by the model is that there is a common structure to problems involving the use of resources for surprise. Double agents, standard operating procedures, cracked codes, spies, and new weapons can all be regarded as resources that have the potential to create surprise in the opponent. In each case the same problem arises: when the resource should be risked and when it should be maintained for a later, potentially more important event. This problem appears in historical accounts of many of the examples cited, but no one seems to have appreciated just how general it actually is, nor how it can be analyzed with a formal model. If quite diverse phenomena are seen to be structurally related, an understanding of each separate phenomenon can expand the understanding of each of the others.

Even beyond this, a formal model can suggest new ways of looking at the whole range of phenomena in question. In the case of the model developed in this paper, this means that the model itself can be used to suggest policy implications for the rational timing of surprise. There are implications both for the exploitation of such a resource and for protection against its exploitation.

Before looking at these implications, it is worth repeating that the model deals only with certain types of situations. In particular, when dealing with resources for surprise that work through deception, the model only treats those information channels which the other side will believe even when the stakes are high. The model also deals only with situations in which the determination of the stakes is independent of the decision concerning the exploitation of a resource for surprise. With these restrictions in mind, we can turn to the policy implications of the model.

Of course, these implications can be developed in a quantitative fashion only if the parameters of the model can be measured quantitatively.

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In practice, quantitative measurements of variables, such as the chance that the resource will survive if used, are difficult to estimate with any great degree of confidence. Fortunately, a quantitative estimate is not always needed. There are a number of important policy implications that rely only on the qualitative assessment of the parameters. An example is the result that the lower the survival rate when the resource is used, the higher should be the threshold, and thus, the less readily should the resource be exploited. This result is what might be expected, so let us now turn to some less obvious policy implications.

1. Patience is a virtue. When rare events have very high stakes, the best strategy may be to wait for these rare events before exploiting a resource for surprise. As we have seen, even if the resource has a good chance of survival when used, and even if there is some chance that it will be destroyed when not used, the distribution of stakes may be such that it still pays to wait for a very rare but important event.[24] It is widely asserted that democracies are less patient than more centralized forms of government. If so, and if the distribution of stakes is as skewed as the distribution of wars has been, then a good deal could be gained from resisting the temptation to exploit resources on occasions where the stakes are only moderate.

2. Since the optimal strategy will often require quite long waits, the bureaucratic incentives may not actually reflect the national interest. A bureaucrat or president may not have a very great probability of being in the same job when a sufficiently important event comes along. Therefore, he has an incentive to exploit the resource prematurely, since he is likely to care more about how his own performance looks than about how his successor or his successor's successor looks. The implication is that those who have control over the use of resources for a surprise should be rewarded for passing on a good inventory of undestroyed resources, as well as for the successful use of such resources.

3. Another implication of the need to be patient is that it is to be expected that many resources will "wither on the vine," as reflected in the discount rate over the many events that pass before a sufficiently important event occurs. The agony of waiting is well expressed by the man who helped run the double-cross system in Britain in World War II:

> It must be remembered that we had always looked forward to the day when we should take part in the great final deception which would pay ten times over for everything we had given out earlier. But no one can

[24] The way in which the distribution of stakes affects the optimal threshold is shown in Axelrod (fn. 18).

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> maintain a bluff indefinitely; sooner or later a blunder or sheer mischance will inevitably give it away. How should we feel if the whole of the double-cross system collapsed before it had been put to the test in a grand deception?[25]

The willingness to accept this risk and to preserve the resources intact until D day was one of the reasons that the double-cross system was so successful.

4. Turning the perspective around, one can see that it would be a mistake to evaluate the opponent's resources for surprise by what you have seen when the stakes were low or moderate. He may be rationally waiting for an event with sufficiently large stakes to justify the exploitation of whatever resource for surprise he has. This point has very broad application. For example, in judging the reliability of a spy who may be controlled by the other side, it is not sufficient to note that the reports of the spy have been "usually reliable." Instead, it would be wise to take into account explicitly the relative stakes at each point in time. Thus, if the agent provided verifiable reports in situations with higher stakes than the current ones, this would be greater evidence for reliability than would a longer string of verifiable information in situations of uniformly low stakes.[26] The same principle applies to other resources for deception. For example, a rule of inference about the other side's behavior which has worked in a series of low-stake situations may not work when the stakes are greater, precisely because the other side may have been waiting to exploit a standard operating procedure as a resource for surprise.

5. This leads to the fundamental principle that when stakes get very large, a great deal of surprise can be expected. Indeed, this may be one of the primary reasons why nations so often are overconfident about their ability to predict the actions of their potential opponents. They simply do not fully take into account the fact that being able to predict when the stakes are low does not provide a good reason to believe that prediction will be good when the stakes are high. Thus, knowing that the other side is predictable when the stakes are low should not be very comforting. In order to avoid paranoia, one should have an estimate of how many resources for surprise the other side might plausibly have. The availability of resources for surprise aids an attacker, but it can also work against him. Knowing that when the stakes are large, his

[25] Masterman (fn. 1), 127.

[26] Once again it should be emphasized that stakes really need to be evaluated not only in terms of the overall importance of the current event, but also in terms of the relevance of the resource to the event. For example, the stakes for a resource involving tank operations will be low if the current event mainly involves aerial combat rather than armored combat.

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opponent may also exploit his resources for surprise may have the net effect of increasing uncertainty. If so, it could help strengthen the stability of deterrence.

6. Just as one may expect surprise more when the stakes are high, there are occasions when one may expect surprise less. One is when the stakes are low—especially if they are low relative to anticipated future stakes. Another type of situation in which little surprise would be expected is after an event of very high stakes, such as the outbreak of a major war. Many resources for surprise may have been used, and those with a low survival rate cannot be used again. Therefore, less surprise from these would be expected after a very high-stake situation.[27]

7. The model constructed for the rational timing of surprise also has implications for the use of current information in the updating of prior beliefs. That is the task of Bayesian inference. A weatherman can use Bayesian statistics to update his estimates of how his indicators can be used to predict tomorrow's weather. A government can do the same in trying to predict the behavior of another government. However, in doing so, it would be wise to keep in mind that the patterns that provide the best predictions of behavior when the stakes are low do not necessarily provide the best predictions when the stakes are high—especially when the opponent is deliberately shaping his behavior in such a way as to mislead, and when high-stake situations are relatively rare. In principle, Bayesian estimation can take these factors into account. It is important that they be treated explicitly since, if they are not, the quality of predictions will be unexpectedly poor just when the stakes become relatively high. A recent report by a CIA analyst on the CIA's use of Bayesian inference for the assessment of political events provides no indication that this point is appreciated.[28]

8. Another implication is that, in making predictions when the stakes are high, one should try to use data that are unlikely to be a resource for surprise by the other side. Such data can take any of the following forms: (a) things that the other side cannot control, (b) things that the other side can control only with great expense, (c) things that the other side does not know are being observed, or (d) things

[27] An important but somewhat tangential point is that, in writing treaties, it is sometimes possible to shape the stages of the implementation so that the stakes are relatively uniform. There would then be no occasion in which one side would have an incentive to surprise the other by breaking the treaty. Treaties dealing with staged withdrawals are of this form, as are some types of staged arms-control agreements. The object in both cases is to design the sequence of events so that at no time do the stakes make it rational to exploit one's resources for surprise.

[28] Nicholas Schweitzer, "Bayesian Analysis for Intelligence: Some Focus on the Middle East." Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Toronto, February 1976.

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that the other side is unlikely to realize can be used as indicators of its future behavior.

9. For those situations in which speed is of utmost importance—such as air defense—rules for the exploitation of surprise can be developed in advance. A good example is provided by the case of the Syrian SAM missiles which were ready to operate before the attack on Israel in October 1973. As we have seen, the Syrians did not use these SAMs during an air battle in September, thereby preserving an important resource for surprise. But what would the Syrians have done if the Israelis had launched a pre-emptive air strike against Syria hours before the Syrian attack was scheduled to begin? (A pre-emptive air strike was actually suggested to the Israeli Cabinet by the Chief of Staff, General Elazar, but was rejected.)[29] Such an attack might have come so quickly that it would have been impossible for the Syrians to change standing orders. Therefore, an optimal Syrian policy would have been to calculate the magnitude of an air attack that would justify the exploitation of their SAM missile system for the first time. This type of contingent rule could be calculated at leisure in peacetime and applied immediately when an event occurs that is specified by the decision rule.

10. A final, sobering policy implication is that, as observational technology improves, the potential for surprise and deception does not necessarily become less. If the rational timing of surprise is not well understood by the target of a deception, then the better the target can observe the other side's activities, the more readily it can be deceived when standard operating procedures are used as a resource for surprise. The more an unsophisticated side can observe, the more readily it can be deceived. The reason is simply that the more a side can observe, the more things can be presented as patterns of behavior in order to build up a false sense of confidence in the ability to predict. Thus, the presence of ever more sophisticated photographic and electronic reconnaissance devices may simply allow the observed side to obtain more and more resources for surprise. The resolution of this dilemma is not so much in the further improvement of observational technology as it is in the more sophisticated understanding of the proper way to draw inferences from observations. This understanding includes an appreciation of the ways in which resources for surprise can be exploited as a function of the stakes of the situation.

[29] Chaim Herzog, *The War of Atonement* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1975), 52f; Michael I. Handel, "Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War," Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, No. 19 (1976), 38.

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THE UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF DEVELOPMENT LITERATURE:

The Case of Dependency Theory

By TONY SMITH*

IN the midst of the turbulent seventies, when the ascendancy of the "South," or non-Communist industrializing countries, is everywhere in evidence, it is a bit difficult to remember back to the sixties when the social science establishment in the United States apparently dominated world literature on the topic of political and economic modernization in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The end of colonialism and the expansion of this country's global power into the "vacuums" open to revolutionary activity were largely responsible for calling forth much of this scholarly effort; and, thanks to a growing interest in model building and to well-financed opportunities in area studies, solid professional careers were built in relatively short order. Some of this work has stood the test of time: monographs on delimited problems or, more rarely, theoretical explorations of general patterns of development. For the most part, however, standards of historical scholarship were not high, and to reread the methodological sections of these works with their jargon and their models is often a tedious affair, tempered only by amazement at the poverty of it all. Nor did this literature do much apparent good in influencing political judgment in Washington, if the last two decades of American policy in Southeast Asia or Latin America are any standard by which to measure.

Today a rival literature has appeared on the scene which might be called dependency theory. North Americans figure in its ranks, but the writers are more likely to bear African, Asian, or Latin American surnames. The term "dependency" originated with writings on Latin America; previously, work of this sort was better known for speaking of "neocolonialism," thereby betraying its African or Asian origins. As the different nomenclature suggests, the *dependencistas*, if we may use their Latin American name, are no monolithic group. Their general outlook has been in evidence for some time in a variety of places, so that substantial disagreements exist within this "school." Nevertheless,

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it is useful to distinguish the *dependencistas* as a group, since in important respects these writers share an identity of outlook.

Probably the chief feature of the dependency school is its insistence that it is not internal characteristics of particular countries so much as the structure of the international system—particularly in its economic aspects—that is the key variable to be studied in order to understand the form that development has taken in non-communist industrializing countries. Such an emphasis is not the only distinguishing mark of dependency literature, of course: it tends to put more weight on the interaction of political and economic forces than does its developmentalist rival, and it often identifies itself as being unambiguously on the side of change in the South in order to benefit the poorest and most oppressed members of society there. But, as its name implies, dependency theory's most distinctive point is its insistence that the logic of contemporary southern development can only be grasped by placing this process firmly within a globally defined historical context. That is, contemporary political and economic change in the South must be understood as aspects of imperialism today and yesterday. From this perspective alone—from the standpoint of local histories globally understood—can the logic of the development process be comprehended correctly.

As a result, dependency literature has emerged as a powerful ideological vehicle joining southern nationalists and Marxists (together with their northern supporters) within the confines of a generally agreed-upon form of historical analysis. The importance of this union, whatever the tensions existing within it, should not be underestimated: dependency theory is not simply an academic exercise. For the most part, *dependencistas* are committed by their ideas to a form of political action (as they would maintain their developmentalist opponents in the United States to be, however much the latter might deny it). The literature stands out, therefore, because it is something more than a movement in the intellectual history of our day; it is an ideology as well—a form of discourse able to motivate significant political activity. That is, dependency theory represents far more than the intellectual association of Marxism and southern nationalism. It also represents an effort at the practical, concrete unification of two of the most important historical forces of our century, with potentially significant consequences for both local and world history.

This essay is an attempt to investigate what I believe to be a major historiographic failure of dependency theory. It is not intended to as-

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sess the relevance of this theory to concrete historical change, nor is it meant as a comprehensive review of the literature (needed as both of these studies are). My argument is simply that dependency theory in general substantially overestimates the power of the international system—or imperialism—in southern affairs today. This is not to deny that northern power is real in the South, nor to dispute that its effect may be to reinforce the established order of rank and privilege there, nor to suggest that imperialism is a term altogether lacking in meaning today. But it is to assert that dependency theory has systematically underestimated the real influence of the South over its own affairs, and to point out the irony of nationalists who have forgotten their own national histories. I hope to suggest not only a critical flaw in dependency theory as it is now written, but an alternative approach to the study of subordinate states in the international system.

I

Although it is an obvious oversimplification to reduce a complex and variously interpreted position to a few propositions, I will attempt to present a summary of the general tenets of the "dependency" or "neocolonial" form of historical analysis; further discussion will show that there are substantial disagreements among its different proponents. According to the best-known exponents of this perspective, the sovereign states of the South have long been dependent for an evolving mixture of technology, financing, markets, and basic imports on the international economic system dominated by the northern capitalist powers (including Japan). These less developed countries may be called "hooked": they cannot exist without their dependence, but they also cannot exist with it.

According to this thesis, the Third-World countries cannot do with their dependence because their form of incorporation into the international system has tended to inhibit their industrialization, relegating their economies to the less dynamic forms of growth associated with agriculture or the extractive industries. A surprising number of dependency theorists—until quite recently the great majority—have maintained that these countries would simply be unable to move beyond the industrialization associated with limited import substitution. As we shall see, such a basic error in analysis is typical of this group's way of thinking and of its preference for conclusions dictated by theoretically logical but empirically unsubstantiated concepts drawn on the grand scale. No wonder, then, that a number of statistically minded political economists have sought to test these propositions and have

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been unable to confirm them: it appears as a general rule that the countries most integrated into the world economy have tended to grow more quickly over a longer period than those that are not.[1] To those dependency theorists like Fernando Henrique Cardoso, however, who see the clear evidence that the manufacturing sector *is* expanding dramatically in many Third-World countries, the process remains nonetheless neocolonial, since the leading sectors are inevitably controlled by multinational corporations with headquarters in the North.[2] These corporations, despite whatever benefits they may bring in the form of managerial and technological know-how, take more than they give and—what is more important—make it virtually impossible for local, self-sustaining industrialization to occur. This form of analysis has affinities with Marxism, for it is the economic process which is seen as the dynamic of history. Thus, the stages of economic development of the international system (from mercantilism to free trade to finance capital to the multinational corporation, to take one possible way of marking its development through time) come to interact with the various pre-industrial economies in ways that may be different but that in every case soon establish the dominance of the world order over the form of growth followed locally. Over time, imperialism changes in form but not in fact.[3] Dependency theorists do not argue in any dia-

[1] See Robert Kaufman and others, "A Preliminary Test of the Theory of Dependency," *Comparative Politics*, VII (April 1975); David Ray, "The Dependency Model and Latin America: Three Basic Fallacies," *Journal of Interamerican Affairs and World Studies*, XV (February 1973); Patrick J. McGowan, "Economic Dependency and Economic Performance in Black Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, XIV (No. 1, 1976); Elliot J. Berg, "Structural Transformation versus Gradualism: Recent Economic Development in Ghana and the Ivory Coast," in Philip Foster and Aristide R. Zolberg, *Ghana and the Ivory Coast: Perspectives on Modernization* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1971); and Patrick J. McGowan and Dale L. Smith, "Economic Dependency in Black Africa: An Analysis of Competing Theories," *International Organization*, XXXII (Winter 1978).

[2] Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1973), and Cardoso, "Dependent Capitalist Development in Latin America," *New Left Review*, Vol. 74 (July-August 1972).

[3] While the local economies as well as the international system are seen to change over time, in these analyses the dominant partner and therefore the shaper of the overall movement is always the world economy. The subordinate member develops as a "reflection" (Theotonio Dos Santos) or with a "reflex reaction" (Dieter Senghass) to these forces which it can neither escape nor control. Among others, see Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 60, (May 1970); Dieter Senghass, "Introduction" to a special number called "Overcoming Underdevelopment," *Journal of Peace Research*, XII (No. 4, 1975); Susanne Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment," in K. T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges, eds., *Readings in U.S. Imperialism* (Boston: Porter Sargent 1971).

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lectically recognizable fashion that the process is sowing the seeds of its own destruction. For the present at least, the system is still expanding and consolidating its gains.[4]

But if the Third World cannot do with its dependent status, neither can it do without it. For what has occurred is that the local political elites in these areas have almost invariably structured their domestic rule on a coalition of internal interests favorable to the international connection. Thus, it is not the sheer economic might of the outside that dictates the dependent status of the South, but the sociological consequences of this power. The result, as most dependency theorists see it, is that the basic needs of the international order must be respected by the South if this system is to continue to provide the services that the local elites need in order to perpetuate their rule in their turn. In other words, a symbiotic relationship has grown up over time in which the system has created its servants whose needs dictate that its survival be ensured, whatever the short-term conflicts of interests may be. In the case of decolonization, for example, the nationalists who led the drive against colonialism in Africa and Asia potentially faced two foes other than their colonial rulers: local rival class or ethnic groups whose loyalty the nationalists had not managed to secure; and hostile neighboring peoples who were anxious to ensure their interests in the wake of the departing northerners. The situation did not significantly alter once independence was obtained: civil war and jealous neighbors—in each case potentially abetted by the East-West confrontation—continue to jeopardize the independent regimes. Thus the system has at its disposal sanctions for transgressing its basic rules which are all the more powerful since their greatest force comes *not from an active threat of intervention* so much as *from a threat of withdrawal*, which would abandon these dependent regimes to civil and regional conflict; a great many of them would be quite unprepared to face such a fate. So far as I am aware, this last point has not been made by any of the dependency theorists. Nevertheless, it is clearly implicit in their form of analysis. Once again, there are affinities with Marxism: it is understood that economic forces do not act alone in any sense, but must be grasped sociologically as modes or relations of production creating specific configurations of political conflict over time.

[4] Immanuel Wallerstein does not foresee the end of the system for another century or two. See "Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation within the Capitalist World Order," *African Studies Review*, XVII (April 1974), 2.

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Certain observations made by the dependency theorists are persuasive and serve as a useful antidote to the claims of those who see in decolonization's "transfer of power" more of a watershed in world history than was actually the case. But these insights exist alongside a number of arguments of dubious validity which I would link to a single yet fundamental theoretical shortcoming common to this style of thinking. Too many writers of this school make the mistake of assuming that since the whole (in this case the international system) is greater than the sum of its parts (the constituent states), the parts lead no significant existence separate from the whole, but operate simply in functionally specific manners as a result of their place in the greater system. They hold that it is sufficient to know the properties of the system as a whole to grasp the logic of its parts; no special attention need be paid to specific cases insofar as one seeks to understand the movement of the whole. "Apart from a few 'ethnographic reserves,' all contemporary societies are integrated into a world system," writes Samir Amin, an Egyptian working in Africa and known in Europe as a leading dependency theorist. "Not a single concrete socio-economic formation of our time can be understood except as part of this world system."[5] As a consequence, in the words of André Gunder Frank, one of the more influential members of this school working on Latin America, "underdevelopment was and still is generated by the very same historical process which also generated economic development: the development of capitalism itself."[6] In myriad forms, the argument appears again and again. A writer on contemporary African politics asserts that underdevelopment "expresses a particular relationship of *exploitation*: namely, the exploitation of one country by another. All the countries named as 'underdeveloped' in the world are exploited by others and the underdevelopment with which the world is now preoccupied is a product of capitalist, imperialist and colonialist exploitation."[7] A book comparing China's and Japan's economic growth after their contact with the West goes so far as to maintain that Ch'ing China and Tokugawa Japan were fairly similar up to the early 1800's, and that any later differences in their economic performance may be explained chiefly by the character of their contact with the West:

[5] Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment*, I (New York: Monthly Review Press 1974), 3.

[6] André Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment," in James D. Cockcroft and others, *Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy* (New York: Anchor Books 1972), 9.

[7] Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London: Bogle-l'Ouverture 1973), 21-22; emphasis in original.

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> This study argues that the paramount influence in the rise of industrial capitalism in Japan was . . . [that Japan] occupied a position of relative autonomy within the nineteenth-century world political economy. For a variety of reasons other societies were more strongly incorporated as economic and political satellites of one or more of the Western capitalist powers, which thwarted their ability to industrialize. . . . in contrast . . . China's location in the world political economy dominated by the Western capitalist nations, must be considered of prime importance in China's failure to develop industrial capitalism during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. China was more strongly incorporated than Japan and thus lacked the autonomy to develop the same way.[8]

Other scholars report they "view Latin America as a continent of inadequate and disappointing fulfillment and seek to pinpoint the co-ordinates of sustained backwardness in examining the process of economic change in a dependent, peripheral, or colonial area."[9] And a book on the Middle East concludes,

> The products of Turkish craftsmen, well known and in great demand in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, declined along with the products of the rest of the Middle East when Turkey failed to keep pace with the industrial development of the West. Machine production swept craftsmanship off the markets not only in Europe, but also in Turkey. The latter fell back on agriculture, but in 1908, under the Young Turk movement, she began to take an interest in industrial development.[10]

In the United States, this general argument has reached its fullest expression in the work of Immanuel Wallerstein.[11] In a companion essay written after the completion of *The Modern World System*, Wallerstein approvingly cites Georg Lukacs and says that a central tenet of Marxist historiography is that the study of society should "totalize," or begin with an understanding of the whole. The passage from Lukacs is worth quoting:

> It is not the predominance of economic themes in the explanation of history which distinguishes Marxism from bourgeois science in a decisive

[8] Frances V. Moulder, *Japan, China, and the Modern World-Economy: Toward a Reinterpretation of East Asian Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1977), vii-viii.

[9] Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependency in Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press 1970), viii.

[10] Kurt Grunwald and Joachim O. Ronall, *Industrialization in the Middle East* (New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press 1960), 331.

[11] Wallerstein's first book in a four-volume series has been published under the instructive title *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press 1974).

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> fashion, it is the point of view of the totality. The category of the totality, the domination determining in all domains of the whole over the parts, constitutes the essence of the method Marx borrowed from Hegel and that he transformed in an original manner to make it the foundation of an entirely new science. . . . The reign of the category of the totality is the carrier of the revolutionary principle in science.[12]

Working from this perspective, Wallerstein declares that "the only kind of social system is a world-system, which we define quite simply as a unit with a single division of labor and multiple cultural systems." He explains:

> But if there is no such thing as "national development" . . . the proper entity of comparison is the world system. . . . If we are to talk of stages, then—and we should talk of stages—it must be stages of social systems, that is, of totalities. And the only totalities that exist or have existed historically are mini-systems ["simple agricultural or hunting and gathering societies"] and world systems, and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there has been only one world-system in existence, the capitalist world economy.[13]

This tyranny of the whole over the parts can be easily illustrated in Wallerstein's own work on the sixteenth century; but I will look instead at the work that dependency theorists have done on the problems of underdevelopment in the world of the last two centuries. Here the American most frequently and favorably mentioned by the members of this school is Paul Baran. Appropriately enough, Baran chose as the epigraph for his book *Monopoly Capital* (written with Paul Sweezy) Hegel's dictum "The Truth is the Whole." And fortunately for our purposes, Baran's writing is a particularly egregious example of this form of reductionist historiography.

Taking the case of Indian economic development, Baran makes of the country under the pressure of British imperialism a *tabula rasa* such that whatever the land's problems past or present, they spring directly from this foreign presence. In a passage extraordinary in its exaggeration, he writes:

> Thus, the British administration of India systematically destroyed all the fibres and foundations of Indian society. Its land and taxation policy ruined India's village economy and substituted for it the parasitic landowner and moneylender. Its commercial policy destroyed the Indian artisan and created the infamous slums of the Indian cities filled with

[12] Georg Lukacs, "Rosa Luxembourg, Marxiste," in *Histoire et conscience de classe* (Paris: Editions de Minuit 1960), 47-48.

[13] Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XVI (September 1974), 390.

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> millions of starved and diseased paupers. Its economic policy broke down whatever beginnings there were of an indigenous industrial development and promoted the proliferations of speculators, petty businessmen, agents, and sharks of all descriptions.[14]

Baran speculates on what India's fate might have been without the British: "Indeed, there can be no doubt that had the amount of economic surplus that Britain has torn from India been invested in India, India's economic development to date would have borne little similarity to the actual somber record. . . . India, if left to herself, might have found in the course of time a shorter and surely less tortuous road toward a better and richer society."[15]

But surely this account—which is based on virtually no hard evidence—imputes far too much power (for evil or otherwise) to the British. Thus, despite his allegation that India without the British might have found its own autonomous way to industrial development with less human suffering, Baran makes no effort to assess the probability that Mogul India could have accomplished such a transformation or to evaluate what price the pre-British system exacted from its subjects. Life was surely not easy under the Moguls. Warfare was constant, particularly in the years preceding the British takeover, and the levels of taxation were quite high. The most significant accounts of which I am aware dismiss the likelihood that pre-British India had any capacity for sustained economic change. As M. D. Morris writes, "The British did not take over a society that was 'ripe' for an industrial revolution and then frustrate that development. They imposed themselves on a society for which every index of performance suggests the level of technical, economic and administrative performance of Europe five hundred years earlier."[16]

It is not at all accurate to suggest, as Baran so adamantly does, that pre-British India was without original sin or that the British were the authors of unmitigated evil. "Parasitic landowners and moneylenders" were not unknown before the British set foot on the subcontinent; British "commercial policy" is now thought by some to have "destroyed" far fewer artisans than was previously believed; British economic policy surely did more to create the foundations for industrial society in India than to "break down whatever beginnings there were" (however much the effort fails by comparison with Meiji Japan);

[14] Paul Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (2d ed.; New York: Monthly Review Press 1962), 149.

[15] *Ibid.*, 150.

[16] Morris D. Morris, "Towards a Reinterpretation of Nineteenth-Century Indian Economic History," *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, v (March 1968), 6-7.

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British "land and taxation policy," far from "ruining" the village economy, was surely less exploitive than that of the Great Mogul and probably provided for a modest per capita increase of income during the nineteenth century; and British "administration" did not destroy "all the fibres and foundations of Indian society," but actually accommodated itself rather well to indigenous ways in the manner of most conquerors of large populations.[17] Of course there is no particular reason to sing hosannas about the British presence. For example, British rule clearly inhibited industrialization in the late-nineteenth century: the efforts of the Lancashire cotton processors especially were successful in keeping Indian customs duties low until World War I, and so stunted the growth of Indian manufactures.[18] But as the Great Mutiny of 1857 demonstrated, India herself possessed strong forces resisting change. In what seems to be a balanced judgment of the forces guiding India's development, Barrington Moore puts the effects of British policy within the context of the persisting strength of indigenous practices and institutions:

> In addition to law and order, the British introduced into Indian society during the nineteenth century railroads and a substantial amount of irrigation. The most important prerequisites for commercial agricutural and industrial growth would seem to have been present. Yet what growth there was turned out to be abortive and sickly. Why? A decisive part of the answer, I think, is that *Pax Britannica* simply enabled the landlord and now also the moneylender to pocket the surplus generated in the countryside that in Japan paid for the first painful stages of industrialization. As foreign conquerors, the English were not in India to make an industrial revolution. They were not the ones to tax the countryside in either the Japanese or the Soviet fashion. Hence, beneath the protective umbrella of Anglo-Saxon justice-under-law, parasitic landlordism became much worse than in Japan. To lay all the blame on British shoulders is obviously absurd. There is much evidence . . . to demonstrate that this blight was inherent in India's own social structure and traditions. Two centuries of British occupation merely allowed it to spread and root more deeply throughout Indian society.[19]

[17] See Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press 1966), chap. 6; Angus Maddison, *Class Structure and Economic Growth: India and Pakistan since the Moghuls* (London: Allen and Unwin 1971); Morris (fn. 16), and "Trends and Tendencies in Indian Economic History," *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, v (December 1968).

[18] Romesh Dutt, *The Economic History of India: In the Victorian Age, 1837–1900* (2d ed.; Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India 1970), Book II, chap. 12, and Book III, chap. 9; Daniel Houston Buchanan, *The Development of Capitalistic Enterprise in India* (New York: Macmillan 1934), 465-67.

[19] Moore (fn. 17), 354-55.

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When Baran takes up the question of the reasons for the success of Japanese industrialization, he advances the same reductionist formula: once again the part (Japan) disappears into the momentum of the whole (the dynamism of expansionist capitalistic imperialism):

> What was it that enabled Japan to take a course so radically different from that of all the other countries in the now underdeveloped world? . . . reduced to its core, it comes down to the fact that Japan is the only country in Asia (and in Africa or in Latin America) that escaped being turned into a colony or dependency of Western European or American capitalism, that had a chance of independent national development.[20]

In explaining why Japan was not so incorporated, Baran refers once more to the properties of the international system: its preoccupation with other parts of Asia, its conviction that Japan was poor in markets and resources, its internal rivalries. That Japan may have escaped colonial rule and initiated the single successful attempt to industrialize outside of North America and Europe in the nineteenth century for reasons having to do with forces internal to the country is an idea to which Baran does not pay the slightest heed. Indeed, he is so ignorant of conditions in late Tokugawa Japan that he calls the Meiji Restoration a bourgeois revolution.

There is no doubt that the international system under the expansionist force of European and American capitalism has had an impact on the internal development of technologically backward areas of the world over the last two centuries. Dependency theorists make us aware how intense and complex these interactions were (and still are), and there is substance to their criticism that development literature as it is currently written in the United States tends to mask these linkages for its own ideological reasons.[21] Nor is my objection to the simple omission of evidence relevant to the construction of an historical argument. Selective judgment in the presentation of material is an inevitable part of the study of history. Rather, the objection is to a certain style of thinking which—to use two of the dependency school's favorite words—is biased and ideological, distorting evidence as much in its fashion as the "bourgeois science" that it claims to debunk.

As I suggested earlier, the chief methodological error of this kind of writing is to deprive local histories of their integrity and specificity, thereby making local actors little more than the pawns of outside

[20] Baran (fn. 14), 158.

[21] André Gunder Frank, "Sociology of Underdevelopment and Underdevelopment of Sociology," in Cockcroft (fn. 6); Susanne J. Bodenheimer, *The Ideology of Developmentalism: The American-Paradigm-Surrogate for Latin American Studies* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics 1971).

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forces. Feudalism as a force in Latin America? Nonsense, says Frank (to be applauded by Wallerstein); since capitalism has penetrated every nook and cranny of the world system, the concept of feudal relations of production cannot be validly used.[22] Destroy the particular, exalt the general in order to explain everything. Cite Hegel: "The Truth is the Whole." Tribalism as a force in Africa? Colin Leys cannot even bring himself to use the word without putting it in quotation marks, asserting that "among Africanists [this] point . . . perhaps no longer needs arguing." "'Tribalism,'" Leys maintains, "is a creation of colonialism. It has little or nothing to do with pre-colonial relations between tribes. . . . In neo-colonial Africa, class formation and the development of tribalism accompany each other."[23] Why? Because the logic of the whole (capitalist colonialism) has found it expedient to work its will in the part (Africa) through creating, virtually *ex nihilo*, the divisive force of "tribalism." By such reckoning, all the social structures in history after a certain low level of development in the division of labor could be dissolved—feudal and bureaucratic estates, castes and clans, as well as tribes—in favor of class analysis, the only "real" social formation.

Because this approach is formulistic and reductionist, it is bad historiography. It is formulistic in the sense that it seeks to specify universal laws or processes in blatant disregard of the singular or the idiosyncratic. By the same token it is reductionist, since it forces the particular case to express its identity solely in the terms provided by the general category. The error of this approach is not that it draws attention to the interconnectedness of economic and political processes and events in a global manner, but that it refuses to grant the part *any* autonomy, *any* specificity, *any* particularity independent of its membership in the whole. Such writing is tyrannical. And it has its ties, I suspect, with other ways in which these writers view history. Thus, as late as 1962, in the preface to the second edition of *The Political Economy of Growth* (much lauded by dependency theorists), Paul Baran gives his *nihil obstat* to Stalin's forced industrialization of the Soviet Union in terms that depend for their authority on the author's ability to "totalize," to grasp the logic of the whole.[24]

[22] André Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment," and "Economic Dependence, Class Structure, and Underdevelopment Policy," in Cockcroft (fn. 6); Wallerstein (fn. 13). For criticism of Frank's view, see Ernesto Laclau, "Imperialism in Latin America," *New Left Review,* Vol. 67 (May-June 1971); Michael Barratt Brown, *The Economics of Imperialism* (New York: Penguin Books 1974), chap. 11.

[23] Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism, 1964–1971* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1974), 198-99.

[24] Baran (fn. 14), xxxvi.

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The problem of the relationship of the whole to the parts is, of course, a recurrent one in the social sciences. The only key to understanding their interaction, so far as I am aware, is to recognize that, while the whole does have a logic undiscernible from analysis of the parts considered separately, the parts too have an identity that no amount of understanding of the whole will adequately reveal. In his monumental *Critique de la raison dialectique*, Jean-Paul Sartre makes a telling criticism of Marxists who make "a fetish of totalizing." He illustrates it with an example of the problem of relating an individual biography to a social milieu: "Valéry is a petit bourgeois intellectual, no doubt about it. But not every petit bourgeois intellectual is Valéry. The heuristic inadequacy of contemporary Marxism is contained in these two sentences."[25] Part and whole must be comprehended at the same time as an aspect of each other and as analytically autonomous—although the degree of relative independence will obviously be more or less complete depending on the historical moment. The theoretical consequences are clear: systems composed of complex parts may expect change to come not only from the evolution of the whole (considered dialectically or otherwise), or from outside influences in the form of the impingement of other systems, but also from developments *within the parts* whose movements are endogenously determined. Therefore, in studying the changing configurations of power in North-South relations over the past several decades, we must be aware not only of the way the system is changing overall (for example, in terms of the growing role of the multinational corporation), or of the way the system is being challenged from outside itself (such as in the arms race with the Soviet Union), but also of the manner in which the units within it (both North and South) are evolving in response to locally determined forces whose ultimate development may have profound effects on the greater system outside. Historical analyses that hold to these premises may be difficult to write, since lines of movement tend to become more numerous and more difficult to see synthetically. But only such a form of writing can hope to portray at all adequately the complexity that history actually is.

II

At the risk of sounding hopelessly old-fashioned, I would suggest that, in order to understand the nature of their specificity apart from

[25] Sartre, *Critique de la raison dialectique* (Paris: Gallimard 1960), 44. For a criticism of Sartre on precisely the grounds that he also rides roughshod over the individual case on occasion, see Tony Smith, "Idealism and People's War: Sartre on Algeria," *Political Theory*, 1 (November 1973).

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the international system, the primary single structure of southern countries to be studied is the organization of the state. Even in colonial situations, where the apparatus of the state was under foreign control at the highest levels, the natives invariably wielded significant power at lower levels of the government and in a variety of informal ways. Indeed, it was precisely these constellations of interests accommodating or opposing foreign rule that made for many of the significant differences in the pattern of postwar decolonization.[26] For the colonial regimes themselves had never amounted to more than a thin crust of European officials and officers atop complex networks of local collaborating groups. In the case of India, for example, Mahatma Gandhi tirelessly pointed out to his fellow countrymen that, in the 1930's, a mere 4,000 British civil servants assisted by 60,000 soldiers and 90,000 civilians (businessmen and clergy for the most part) had billeted themselves upon a country of three hundred million persons. The British had constructed a delicately balanced network through which they gained the support of certain favored economic groups (the zamindars acting as landed tax collectors in Bengal, for example), different traditional power holders (especially the native princes after the Great Mutiny of 1857), warrior tribes (such as the Sikhs of the Punjab), and aroused minority groups like the Muslims. Such a brokerage system was to be found in every colonial territory. In some there was a foreign economic presence: the Chinese in Vietnam, Malaya, and Indonesia; the Asians in East Africa; the Levantines in West Africa; the European settlers in Kenya and Algeria. In other cases, there were alliances with traditional ruling groups: the Native Authorities in Nigeria, the Princely States in Malaya, the imperial bureaucracies in Tunisia and Morocco, the Hashemite family in the Fertile Crescent, the ruling cliques in Cochin China and Tonkin which were interested in acting independently of Hue. Still another source of support came from the oppressed groups who found their rights protected and their interests secured by foreigners: Muslim sects in the Levant, Jews in Algeria, Christians in many parts of Asia and Africa. Simple rivalries also played their part: the *politique des races* practiced by Gallieni in Madagascar, or the support of competing religious brotherhoods in the British Sudan and French North Africa. There also were the agents of Western ways: caids in North Africa, native schoolteachers in West Africa, and economic middlemen (compradors). The latter entered into important collaboration with European overseas expansion when a rich Hindu

[26] See Tony Smith, "A Comparative Study of French and British Decolonization," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XX (January 1978).

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merchant failed to bring his army to the support of his Muslim overlord, the Nabob of Bengal, thereby assuring Robert Clive's great victory at Plassey in 1757. This description should not give the illusion of a system of permanent alliances: old friends could become new enemies and old enemies new friends on the shifting grounds of political competition; ultimately, the collaborative networks found themselves superseded by indigenous forces determined to achieve independence. Thus, even when they failed to control the heights of the state, native political forces played a fairly powerful role in the colonies; it was their character and structure that profoundly influenced the process of decolonization.

Just as the variety of local political structures working for or against colonial rule must be understood in order to make sense of the intricate pattern of decolonization, so the range of state structures in the South in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is the best general organizational feature for sorting through the wide number of cases involved and for making sense of their experience. The spectrum of state structures extends from those that are clearly the paramount power within their society (monopolizing the means of violence and thereby enforcing a complete set of rules ranging from property ownership to the way political participation is permitted) to those that are states in little more than name, lacking either the party or the bureaucratic structures that would give them the scope of local control properly incumbent upon a state. Yet even in these latter cases (except perhaps for a few extreme examples among the sheikdoms of the Arabian Peninsula or in the poorest parts of Africa) the existence of an indigenously controlled state does insulate the local society from the international system in a manner greater than was true under direct colonial rule. Short of military intervention, the leverage of the outside is significantly reduced, since foreign ties with local groups are in general restricted to certain economic interests and occasional religious bodies. Foreigners have neither the scope nor the intensity of ties within the independent southern country which they had under colonialism. Moreover, the power capacity of local interests and the state tends to grow as bureaucrats in the government and the army, jealous of their positions, show themselves likely to act on behalf of foreigners only when such behavior coincides with their own interests. Thus, no matter how great the diversity among southern countries, they almost all have a state apparatus that depends on the aggregation of at least some local interests and is possessed of the ability to take at least some in-

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itiatives in regard to domestic and international issues. In this respect, the use of the word "neocolonial" is misleading to the extent that it suggests—as it apparently does to many—that the political distinctions between independent and colonial status are trivial. Surely Kwame Nkrumah overstated the case when he wrote in 1965, "The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside."[27]

Many dependency theorists, seemingly persuaded of the correctness of the traditional Marxist reduction of the state to an administrative body of the ruling class, either overlook the function of the state entirely, or dismiss it as historically insignificant, or recognize its importance only to reduce it forthwith to a product of the international system. Thus, writing on the fate of independent Africa in relation to the world order, Frantz Fanon calls for a strong state, able to protect the nation from imperialist designs and improve the quality of life for the mass of the population; what he actually sees are weak governmental bodies, the servants of a new African bourgeoisie which itself has entirely sold out to foreign interests:

> The national middle-class which takes over power at the end of the colonial regime is an under-developed middle-class. It has practically no economic power, and in any case it is in no way commensurate with the bourgeoisie of the mother country which it hopes to replace. . . . Since the middle-class has neither sufficient material nor intellectual resources . . . it limits its claims to the taking-over of business offices and commercial houses formerly occupied by the settlers. From now on it will insist that all the big foreign companies should pass through its hands, whether these companies wish to keep their connections with the country, or to open it up. The national middle-class discovers its historic mission: that of intermediary.[28]

In this descriptive account of a number of post-independence African regimes, Fanon is undoubtedly correct. But as an analytical principle for the study of Third World countries past, present, and future, his point is surely inadequate.

Nevertheless, it is precisely as an analytical point that Immanuel Wallerstein means to press the issue. He writes:

> . . . the world-economy develops a pattern where state structures are relatively strong in the core areas and relatively weak in the periphery.

[27] Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last State of Imperialism* (New York: International Publishers 1966), ix.

[28] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press 1966), 122.

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> . . . What is necessary is that in some areas the state machinery be far stronger than in others. What do we mean by a strong state-machinery? We mean strength vis-à-vis other states within the world-economy including other core-states, and strong vis-à-vis local political units within the boundaries of the state.[29]

Apparently not even these strong states can compare with the real mover of international affairs—the dynamic of economic forces: "It is the social achievement of the modern world, if you will, to have invented the technology that makes it possible to increase the flow of surplus from the lower strata to the upper strata, from the periphery to the center, from the majority to the minority, by eliminating the 'waste' of too cumbersome a political superstructure."[30] Thus, Charles V was the last to make the impossible attempt of putting the entire economic apparatus of the West under a single political authority. The present eclipse of the United States, Wallerstein believes, should in no way endanger the system: "such a decline in United States state hegemony has actually *increased* the freedom of action of capitalist enterprises, the larger of which have now taken the form of multinational corporations. . . ." Indeed, he minimizes the role of the state to such an extent that he can say: "There are today no socialist systems in the world economy any more than there are feudal systems because there is one world system. It is a world-economy and it is by definition capitalist in form." But history does not move blindly, free of human agency. If not states, then what social force coordinates this activity, fights its battles, projects it into the future? The obvious answer is class:

> We must maintain our eye on the central ball. The capitalist world economy as a totality—its structure, its historic evolution, its contradictions—is the arena of social action. The fundamental political reality of that world-economy is a class struggle which, however, takes constantly changing forms: class-consciousness versus ethno-nationalist consciousness, classes within nations versus classes across nations.[31]

As we have seen, this set of assumptions is somewhat similar to that of many dependency theorists who make little reference to the state and hold that the international system has established its interests locally through the medium of an alliance with the dependent classes of the Third World.

Although there may be many instances when state action is not important, Wallerstein's abrupt dismissal of the potential significance of

[29] Wallerstein (fn. 11), 355. [30] *Ibid.*, 15-16.

[31] Wallerstein (fn. 13), 412, 415; Wallerstein "Class Formation in the Capitalist World-Economy," *Politics and Society*, v (No. 3, 1975), 375.

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the state is in error. I have recited his argument at some length in order to illustrate the theoretical importance of correctly understanding what a strong state may be able to accomplish. For even on his home ground, the sixteenth century, Wallerstein is surely wrong in his discussion of state power. As Theda Skocpol has pointed out, the strong states of the sixteenth century were not at the core (in England and Holland), but on the periphery (in Spain and Sweden). Holland was ruled by a federation of merchant oligarchs while the English crown, deficient in terms of a bureaucracy or a standing army, was beholden to merchants and local notables.[32] Later history substantiates Wallerstein's position no better. Alexander Gerschenkron has demonstrated that the "late industrializers" in every case were successful because of exceptionally strong state structures that were determined to modernize. One-time peripheral countries like Russia, Germany, and Japan could not possibly have developed as they did without the vigorous leadership of the state.[33] Nor is it clear today that the state structure of the United States corresponds to the Leviathan one might expect of the "core country of the world-economy" any more than that many governments on the periphery are the weak structures which Wallerstein declares them to be.

Granted, some of the literature associated with dependency does recognize the importance of southern states. But in its discussion, these governments sound more like products of the international system than of local circumstances; thus it loses by one set of assumptions part of what it has gained from another set. A large number of essays and books appearing in recent years on Latin America have maintained that the "bureaucratic-authoritarian" or "authoritarian-corporatist" regimes so prevalent there since the mid-1960's are the most recent result, in the words of Philippe Schmitter, of situations of "delayed, dependent capitalist development and non-hegemonic class relations."[34] In an essay on authoritarian government in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, Robert R. Kaufman, drawing heavily on the work of Guillermo O'Donnell, comes to much the same conclusion: "such regimes are linked to a particular phase (or crisis) of capital accumulation en-

[32] Theda Skocpol, "Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 82 (March 1977), 1083ff.

[33] Alexander Gerschenkron, "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective," in *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1963).

[34] Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" *Review of Politics*, XXXVI (January 1974), 108. Also see fn. 35.

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countered in the maturation of dependent industrializing economies"; he points out that their advent is related to increasing local investments by multinational corporations.[35] And several contributors to an anthology of essays on Latin American authoritarianism observe that since this kind of regime occurs not only in South America, but in other parts of the Third World, what they all have in common is their dependent status internationally. *Ergo*, the character of the world system is said to be the factor that is basic to the genesis of all authoritarian Third-World regimes. O'Donnell asserts that the focus of his work is on Latin America "only in a trivial sense; the pertinent historical context is provided by the political economy of nations that were originally exporters of primary materials and were industrialized late, but extensively, in a position of dependency upon the great centers of world capitalism."[36]

It should be emphasized that these authors do not intend to provide a simplistic explanation of how the dependent status of these countries engendered authoritarian regimes. From their perspective, the fact that the United States reacted to Castro's coming to power by increasing aid to the militaries of Latin America, thereby encouraging them to topple civilian governments, is only incidental to the process. They point to the long-term evolution of South America's social structure, insisting that the strains and tensions that were the product of dependent development set the stage for the wave of authoritarian regimes of the past fifteen years. The indirect molding power that the North exercised through the international economic system did more to cause these developments than direct political intervention alone could have accomplished.

But the obvious question is by what line of reasoning we are brought to see that authoritarianism grew out of dependency; that in assigning relative weights of importance to domestic and external factors in such developments, it is the latter that emerge as decisive. Is there not historical evidence—provided, for example, by Germany and Japan

[35] See Kaufman, "Mexico and Latin American Authoritarianism," in José Luis Reyna and Richard S. Weinert, eds., *Authoritarianism in Mexico* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues 1977), 195, and the chart derived from O'Donnell, 197. Nevertheless, neither Kaufman nor Schmitter should be classified as dependency theorists: see Kaufman (fn. 1), and Schmitter, "Desarrollo retrasado, dependencia externa y cambio político en America Latina," *Foro Internacional*, XII (December 1971).

[36] Guillermo O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the State," in James M. Malloy ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 1977), 54. For similar observations in the same volume, see Silvio Duncan Baretta and Helen E. Douglass, "Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: A Review Essay."

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—to suggest that authoritarian regimes do not reflect dependency but the effort to avoid subordination? And does the case of India not suggest that at times dependency has contributed to liberal forms of government outside Europe? More to the point, there are reasons to link authoritarian governments in Latin America to domestic rather than to foreign causes. One internal factor (usually conceded by dependency theorists themselves) is that three hundred years of rule by Catholic Spain and Portugal left Latin America a legacy of authoritarian government complete with a corporatist ideology. The vertical ties of patron-client relations for which the continent is well known, especially in its agrarian structures, and the traditions of regional caudillo rule must have made their contribution to the form of governments we see today.

Or we could move forward in time, pointing out that the political heritage of the last hundred years set the pattern for authoritarian government in more recent years. For example, both Lorenzo Meyer and Roger Hansen see more continuity than change in style between the Porfiriato (1876–1910) and present-day government in Mexico.[37] An even better line of reasoning linking Latin American authoritarianism to domestic factors would be to maintain that it is the fruit of unsuccessfully resolved problems born of the populist nationalism common to most of the continent after 1930. World War I and especially the Great Depression brought populist leaders such as Vargas and Perón to the fore in Latin America; they were opposed to foreign influence and its local collaborators (chiefly the landed oligarchs of the export sector), and committed to developing their countries through import substitution industries. In this sense, Latin America "decolonized" in the 1930's; populist nationalism appeared triumphant. By the 1950's, import substitution had exhausted itself as a means of domestic economic expansion; at the same time, the market for Latin exports weakened, thus beginning a period of decline in the terms of trade for these commodities. The result was economic crisis.

The civilian governments in power proved unable either to correct the situation or to muster enough support to ensure stability. The drastic inflation rates of the period were symptoms of the government's trying to please rival sectors of the polity. Ultimately, the situation was

[37] Meyer, "Historical Roots of the Authoritarian State in Mexico," in Reyna and Weinert (fn. 35). Meyer speaks of Díaz's "inability to transform an authoritarian situation into an authoritarian system" and states that "the Mexican Revolution did not destroy the authoritarian nature of Mexican political life, it modernized it" (pp. 9, 4); Roger Hansen, *The Politics of Mexican Development* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press 1971), 149.

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exacerbated to the point that the populist alliance disintegrated, with the middle and upper classes choosing authoritarian military governments over their quasi-democratic republican predecessors. This choice provided stability, but it did not ensure growth. Only when the authoritarian governments enlisted the multinational corporate community in their development drives could the Latin American economies once again experience expansion at a significant pace. In this (admittedly schematic) account, it is unquestionably the domestic factors that emerge as the predominant force behind the creation of authoritarian states—however much one may wish to blame external influences for making the failure of populist ambitions inevitable and for supplying aid to military dictatorships once the crisis had come. For populism *itself* bred corporatist government, albeit of the kind that initially included significant mass participation. As the governing structure was elaborated, however, it became fairly easy to exclude this same political membership. Argentina and Brazil certainly fit this pattern, but the case of Mexico is especially clear-cut: the Partido Revolucionario Institucional which has ruled Mexico since the Revolution (under various appellations) took its most important steps toward institutionalizing itself in its present corporatist form around 1938, at the very time the Cárdenas Government was dramatically bearding Washington with its expropriations of American utility and oil companies in Mexico. The chief explanation for the contemporary spread of authoritarianism through the continent is not the dependent status of Latin America internationally, but the internal evolution of its social and political forces.

Histories of the nineteenth century have too often painted the states of the pre-industrial world in drab, uniform colors, depicting them as *reacting* to European expansion in a helpless manner, rather than as active centers of development in their own right. But the power of the Great Mogul in Delhi was already in disarray by 1757—the date of Clive's victory—as a result of maladministration and the incursions of the Persians, Afghans, and especially Marathas over the preceding decades. Similarly, in West Africa, former slave kingdoms such as Dahomey, Bonny, and Lagos had successfully converted their economic base to the export of palm oil and groundnuts; but in the latter part of the nineteenth century they proved quite unable to administer the hinterlands effectively when new European steamships began to ply the upstream waters and caused struggles with the African middlemen who were handling this trade. Even with more effective governments, Africa might not have been treated as Latin America was after 1875;

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but the fact that these African states were relatively rudimentary institutions surely contributed to the Partition.[38]

By contrast, the Ottoman state in the 1800's was a complex, long-lived institution; but when the pressures of Western expansion reached it in earnest, it proved unable to reverse a decline of some two hundred years. In contrast to Tokugawa Japan which, while also in decline, had, in the words of Barrington Moore, been sapped by more than two hundred years of "peace and luxury," the Sublime Porte entered the nineteenth century after more than two hundred years of internecine warfare and economic decay. Admittedly, the Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention of 1838 and the large debts to foreign creditors that the Sultan ran up later in the century played a part in making the Empire more difficult to hold together. But were these factors more the cause or the effect of a deficient state authority? Surely it is the effect that deserves the emphasis.

There seems to be no disagreement among historians that, by the seventeenth century at the latest, the state left by Suleiman at his death in 1566 was in decline. An attempt by Selim III to imitate Peter the Great and to modernize defensively in order to protect his realm against Russia and the West met with defeat in 1808 when the Janissaries (backed by religious authorities) assassinated him. The state's next ambitious attempt at reform, the Tanzimat proclaimed in 1839 under Abdul Medjid, achieved some notable results, but it proved quite unable to live up to the expectations of its creators—not because of foreign opposition (indeed, Britain and France were eager for the reforms to succeed in order to build Turkey up against Russian expansion), but because the Ottoman government could not overcome *internal* obstacles to the Tanzimat's proposals. It was not until Kemal Ataturk took charge of the Turkish government after World War I that the state gained the strength to define its objectives and to attain them as the result of a concerted effort at internal reform.[39]

[38] Kenneth Onwuka Dike, *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830–1885* (New York: Oxford University Press 1956); C. W. Newbury and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, "French Policy and the Origins of the Scramble for West Africa," *Journal of African History*, x (No. 2, 1969); A. G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (London: Longman 1973), chap. 4.

[39] Frank Edgar Pailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826–1853* (New York: Howard Festig 1970); Z. Y. Hershlag, *Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East* (Leiden: E. J. Brill 1964); Charles Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1966); Stanford J. Shaw, "The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vi (October 1975); Edward C. Clark, "The Ottoman Industrial Revolution," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v (January 1974); Z. Y.

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What a more powerful state might have accomplished in the Middle East is suggested by the history of the amazing Albanian adventurer Mehemet Ali, who became pasha, and then viceroy, of Egypt. Having arrived in Egypt in 1801 with the Ottoman forces that were to reclaim the land after Napoleon's withdrawal, Mehemet Ali managed to gather a following around himself; in 1811, he completed the work of internal reform of the local elite structure by smashing the Mameluke ruling class and emerging as the undisputed leader of the land. Ali was thereupon free to begin an effort which can be best described as the forced industrialization of Egypt. His state created marketing monopolies in agriculture, and dramatically increased the production of export crops, particularly cotton. With the substantial revenues gained from these sales abroad, the state created protected industrial monopolies within Egypt. By the 1830's, there was a work force of at least 30,000 in modern iron foundries, cotton mills, ammunition works, and a shipyard. Industrial employment did not reach this figure again for nearly a century.[40]

The obstacles Ali faced were tremendous. Egypt in 1800 was a very backward land. Its population, between six and seven million in Roman times, now numbered no more than two-and-a-half million. Wheeled vehicles were unknown, transportation unsafe, and the formerly great city of Alexandria had a citizenry of only 8,000 living in its ruins. But if these internal factors did not cause Ali's fall, his overweening ambitions to claim for himself the entire Ottoman Empire finally did. In 1831, under the pretext of pursuing 6,000 escapees from forced labor in Egypt into Syria, Ali began the first of two campaigns whose ultimate goal was to take Constantinople. The result was consternation in Europe, as Britain and France saw Russia offer its aid in defense of the Sultan. A second campaign, begun at the end of the decade, finally prompted British intervention; in 1842, Ali was obliged to reduce the size of his army (the chief market for his factory production) and to dismantle his industrial monopolies, permitting the import of cheap European goods.

Now the stage was set for the "underdevelopment" of Egypt, much

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Hershlag, *Turkey: The Challenge of Growth* (Leiden: E. J. Brill 1968); Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Developments in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru* (Edison, N.J.: Transaction Books 1977).

[40] Charles Issawi, *Egypt in Revolution: An Economic Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press 1963), chaps. 1 and 2; A. E. Crouchley, *The Economic Development of Modern Egypt* (London: Longmans, Green 1938), chap. 2; *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., XVIII, s.v. "Mehemet Ali." The figures for industrial workers may be found by comparing Hershlag, *Introduction* . . . (fn. 39), 86, with Issawi, 43.

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in the manner schematized by the dependency school. Ali's successors converted Egypt into a single-crop export economy based on cotton, and contracted larger debts than they could repay. Ultimately, the nationalist reaction to these foreign pressures alarmed the British to such an extent that they saw no choice but to occupy Egypt in order to assure the security of the Suez Canal. "It would be detrimental to both English and Egyptian interests to afford any encouragement to the growth of a protected cotton industry in Egypt," wrote Lord Cromer, Consul General of Egypt in 1891. During his tenure in office (1883–1907), Cromer refused to protect any Egyptian manufacturers, going so far as to levy an excise tax on certain products made within Egypt so that they had no protection behind a revenue-raising import duty.[41] It was not until 1920, with the founding of the Bank Misr by Egyptian capital, that a stable foundation was finally provided for the growth of an Egyptian entrepreneurial class. Tariff autonomy (1930) and fiscal autonomy (1936) followed, permitting the Egyptian state to take a more forceful hand in the country's economic development. Thereafter, as Charles Issawi reports, there was a shift of economic power in three primary directions: of business over landed interests; of national over foreign investment; of state over private initiative. After Nasser came to power and the Suez Invasion of 1956, the role of the state emerged as the decisive element in Egypt's economic development.[42] One can, to be sure, mark the principal periods of Egyptian economic activity in terms of the movements of the international system. But I would suggest that a better way to understand the Egyptian experience is by reference to the vicissitudes of the Egyptian state.

Certainly the ability of Japan to industrialize and to become in its turn an important member of the international community cannot be understood apart from the actions of the state. For in the aftermath of the Meiji Restoration (1868), it was the state, acting on behalf of the nation and not at the behest (although in the interests) of any particular group or class, that undertook a fundamental reordering of the Japanese government and economy. It was the state that insisted on agrarian reform in order to accelerate industrial development; it was the state that invested in a whole range of industrial enterprises where merchant capital at first feared to enter; it was the state that absorbed

[41] E.R.J. Owen, "Lord Cromer and the Development of Egyptian Industry, 1883–1907," *Middle Eastern Studies*, II (July 1966).

[42] Robert L. Tignor, "Bank Misr and Foreign Capitalism," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, VIII (April 1977); Charles Issawi, "Shifts in Economic Power," in Issawi (fn. 39), 505ff.

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as many samurai as it could into its bureaucracies and broke the resistance of the rest; it was the state that began modern systems of banking, taxation, and education in Japan.[43] To be sure, these dramatic developments cannot be isolated from the assault Japan correctly feared from the international system, nor from the advantages given the state in its social and economic heritage from the Tokugawa period. But to underestimate the independent role of the state—to see developments in Japan as the product either of international factors alone or as the reflection of no more than domestic class interests—is to miss the central feature of Japan's exceptional economic performance.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, it was only in Latin America that a group of states had escaped direct colonial control and had also managed, in contrast to Peking and Constantinople, to expand their capacity to rule. A good part of the explanation surely has to do with the continent's geographic remoteness from the centers of geopolitical rivalry, and with the Monroe Doctrine which had a real, if limited, influence on keeping the area free of competitive annexations. But a more basic reason for the success of these states in establishing themselves locally had to do with the strength they drew from participation in the international system. In China, the Ottoman Empire, and Africa, the international connection functioned mainly *to undermine* the local political systems (however much the Europeans may have hoped to do otherwise); in Latin America, these same linkages worked instead *to reinforce* the position of the ruling elite. *Not so much designs formulated at the center, but rather conditions among the states on the periphery were the fundamental factors determining the impact of European economic power abroad.* As John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson put it in regard to the concerns of the British early in the century:

> Ideally, the British merchant and investor would take into partnership the porteños of Argentina, the planters of Alabama, the railway builders of Belgium, as well as the bankers of Montreal and the shippers of Sydney. . . . At the same time, the trader and missionary would liberate the producers of Africa and Asia. The pull of the industrial economy, the prestige of British ideas and technology would draw them also into the Great Commercial Republic of the world. In time the "progres-

[43] Moore (fn. 17), chap. 5; Trimberger (fn. 39); Angus Maddison, *Economic Growth in Japan and the USSR* (London: George Allen & Unwin 1969); G. C. Allen, *A Short Economic History of Modern Japan: 1867–1937* (New York: Praeger 1962); Henry Rosovsky, "Japan's Transition to Modern Economic Growth, 1868–1885," in Rosovsky, ed., *Industrialization in Two Systems: Essays in Honor of Alexander Gerschenkron* (New York: Wiley 1966).

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> sive" native groups within the decaying societies of the Orient would burst the feudal shackles and liberalise their political and economic life. Thus the earlier Victorians hoped to help the Oriental, the African and the Aborigine to help themselves. Many would be called and all would be chosen: the reforming Turkish pasha and the enlightened mandarin, babus who had read Mill, samurai who understood Bentham, and the slaving kings of Africa who would respond to the Gospel and turn to legitimate trade.[44]

The history of nineteenth-century Africa and Asia is, of course, largely that of the failure of this dream. But the same is not true of British commerce with Latin America: although it eventually came to have a retarding influence on the industrialization of the continent, for a period it exercised a strong influence in favor of economic development. A simple comparison illustrates the point: by 1880, Egypt and Argentina had each received British investments totaling between 20 and 25 million pounds sterling, and each was permeated with foreign influence. Egypt was on the verge of collapse, however, while Argentina was moving into position to become Britain's most important economic satellite in South America. An observer interested in proving the all-pervasive power of the international system over the pre-industrial states within it might take the history of these two countries, *considered separately*, as proof of his argument. But I am more impressed with the *different impact* European expansion had on these two areas, and would suggest that a major explanation (certainly not the only one) has to do with internal differences between Egypt and Argentina, which can best be approached through a study of their respective state structures.

From the struggle for independence from Madrid, Spanish America had emerged economically impoverished and politically divided. Although Foreign Secretary Canning is widely quoted for his remark at the time that "Latin America is independent, and unless we mismanage our affairs she is English," the economic record suggests that this prize amounted to very little indeed until after the middle of the century.[45] By that time, a symbiotic relationship was establishing itself in which political stability in Latin America increased foreign economic interest in the continent in the form of loans and commerce; at the same time, these links to the outside provided assistance to the various

[44] John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, *Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism* (New York: Doubleday 1968), 3-4.

[45] D.C.M. Platt, *Latin America and British Trade, 1806–1914* (New York: Harper & Row 1973).

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national governments intent on solidifying their power locally. Richard Graham describes the case of Brazil between 1850 and 1865:

> Whereas up to that point the landed aristocrats had viewed the central government with suspicion—first as foreign and then as radical—they now saw it wedded to their own interests. They therefore submitted to the control of the central government and, by allowing the tradition of a centralized national administration to arise, unwittingly contributed to the weakening of their own position once the central government became more responsive to the pressures of rising urban groups.[46]

The emergence of the state in nineteenth-century Latin America was therefore characterized not only by its Iberian heritage and by its contemporary need to control a population that was geographically and especially ethnically quite heterogeneous (ranging from the Indian, mestizo, and creole populations in Mexico to the large number of slaves in Brazil), but also by its ability to create an economic basis for rule through sales to the international system. It is well to recall in this connection that the American Confederacy initially believed Britain would intervene on its behalf once the Union blockade of cotton exports was felt in Lancashire, and that Prime Minister Palmerston and Foreign Secretary Russell at first hoped for a Southern victory.

Yet I have difficulty in understanding by what obvious measure one can say that the British connection "delayed," "distorted," or "exploited" Latin American economic development. To be sure, trading interests within Latin America sought to obstruct high protective tariffs before the turn of the century and so might perhaps be viewed at first glance as "enemies within," willing to sell out the national interest for their own private gain. Certainly most *dependencistas* suggest that this was the case. But, as Graham points out in his study of Brazil, whatever costs were thereby incurred must be weighed against the substantial benefits the international connection provided in economic terms. Indeed, it may well be that a closer analysis will reveal that what has been accepted as an article of faith—that it took the Great Depression, throwing Latin America on its own, to stimulate industrial production on the continent—is an exaggeration. For where is the evidence that Latin America was so in thrall to export interests that it lay completely open to a flood of cheap foreign manufactures—an argument almost invariably advanced by nationalists or Marxists. To the contrary, it should be recalled that tariffs on imports were the chief source of

[46] Graham, *Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil, 1850–1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1968), 27-28.

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revenue for these states in the nineteenth century. In 1870 in Argentina, for example, at least $14 million of the $14.8 million state budget came from trade duties. D. C. M. Platt writes:

> It is clear that by the last decades of the nineteenth century there were no serious institutional obstacles to the development of manufacturing. In Mexico, at least, import substitution had become a prime element in government tariff policy, and to a lesser extent the same was true of the other Latin American nations with industrial pretentions—Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru.[47]

Nor was the phenomenon limited to Latin America. In the 1890's, the British found themselves obliged to impose excise taxes on Indian and Egyptian textile production in order to reduce the effect of the protection revenue duties on imports which worked to the detriment of the Lancashire cotton industry.[48] In other words, revenue tariffs were in effect protective walls for infant industries in these two countries, and probably in Latin America as well. Latin America may not have been the plaything of international economic forces to the extent often supposed. Indeed, it appears to Carlos Díaz Alejandro, one of the most respected historians of Latin American economic development, that in terms of economic rationality, Argentina probably withdrew overly from the international system. Comparing the case of Argentina to those of Canada and Australia in the twentieth century, Díaz writes:

> The most ironic lesson of postwar Argentine experience is that if there had been less discrimination against exports, manufacturing expansion would have been greater. Indeed, the annual growth rate of manufacturing during 1900–1929 (5.6%) was higher than during 1929–1965 (3.7%). The ratio of imported to total consumption of manufactured goods probably would have been higher, but there is little to be said on economic grounds for minimizing this ratio.[49]

Of course it may be maintained that because Latin America did not grow economically along the lines of what is today called "basic human needs," its development was "delayed" and "distorted." For example, Rene Villarreal refuses to speak of "development"—as do many other dependency theorists—unless it involves full employment, equal income distribution, and external economic independence.[50] Ethically

[47] Platt (fn. 45), 78, 84.

[48] On Egypt, see Owen (fn. 41); on India, see Dutt (fn. 18), Book II, chap. 12, and Book III, chap. 9.

[49] Carlos F. Díaz Alejandro, *Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1970), 138; for his comparisons with Canada and Australia, see 110-14.

[50] Villarreal, "The Policy of Import-Substitution Industrialization, 1929–1975," in Reyna and Weinert (fn. 35).

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speaking, this concern with words may be commendable; but when matters of definition become the key issue, as they frequently do, it is fairly obvious that major issues of structural analysis are being lost sight of. That is not to say that moral concerns should not make themselves felt in the study of history, but rather that their pursuit should not interfere with our appreciation of structural historical development. To cite but one example, Bradford Burns describes early nineteenth-century Latin American economic development in the ambiguous language one finds recurrent in the literature:

> The elite proudly regarded the new railroads, steamships, telegraph lines, and renovated ports as ample physical evidence of the progressive course on which their nations had embarked. In their satisfaction, they seemed oblivious to another aspect of modernization: that those very steamships, railroads, and ports tied them and their nations ever more tightly to a handful of industrialized nations in Western Europe and North America. . . . They failed to take note of the significance that many of their railroads did not link the principal cities of their nations but rather ran from plantations or mines directly to the ports, subordinating the goal of national unification to the demands of the industrial nations for agricultural products and minerals. As foreign investment rose, the voices of foreign investors and bankers spoke with greater authority in making economic decisions for the host countries. Local economic options diminished. In short, modernization magnified Latin America's dependency.[51]

The clear inference to be drawn from such writing is that the process victimized Latin America and that some alternative form of economic development was possible. But the author defends neither allegation. Was an alternate path available? In his own account Burns gives evidence aplenty that, following the struggle against Spain, national populations were small, the agrarian structures of the countries were rigid, political instability was rampant, and capital for investment simply did not exist in any quantity. Men can hardly be blamed for being "oblivious" to options that did not exist. Nor is it so apparent that the choices made victimized Latin America as a whole. Díaz writes that the rapidity of growth in Argentina from 1860 to 1930 "has few parallels in economic history," it was so rapid, and he points out the compelling logic of reliance on the international system:

> Pre-1930 growth can be said to have been "export-led" [because] . . . exports and capital inflows led to an allocation of resources far more efficient than the one which would have resulted from autarkic poli-

[51] Burns, *Latin America: A Concise Interpretive History* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall 1972), 130-31.

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> cies. In particular, the domestic cost of capital goods, which would have been astronomical under autarky, say in 1880, was reduced to a low level by exports of commodities produced by the generous use of an input—land—whose economic value under autarky would have been quite small.[52]

With very good reason one may of course object that the social form economic development has taken in Latin America is ethically objectionable (and has been for some time). But to suggest—as many influenced by dependency theory appear to do—that because the social form is objectionable, growth itself was "delayed" and "distorted" is to mix the arguments, to draw empirical conclusions from normative premises in an unacceptable manner.

During the nineteenth century, world trade grew tremendously under the impetus of the industrial revolution, and European and American investments abroad grew apace. In 1820, world trade was valued at 341 million pounds sterling; by 1880, its value topped 3 billion pounds. In 1810, British investments abroad were approximately 10 million pounds sterling; by 1890, they approached 200 million and probably represented about half the European and American investments abroad.[53] How could this dramatic increase fail to have repercussions on the pre-industrial countries of the globe as the industrial leaders sought primary materials and markets as well as strategic vantage points in their competitive race? Indeed, any specific southern area *looked at in isolation* will show clear signs of the impact. But when the range of southern countries is *placed side by side*, what also emerges is the *variety* of responses to this global experience of the expansion of the industrial revolution. The Ottoman Empire disintegrated while Japan modernized successfully; Africa was partitioned while Latin American governments were more effectively expanding and consolidating their rule. Although the study of the international system as such may suggest some reasons for these differences, it is by no means able to substitute for an inspection of each specific case.

The key variable to be analyzed in order to explain these significant differences lies in the abilities and behavior of the various southern states as they encountered the technologically superior force of Europe

[52] Díaz (fn. 49), 2, 11. For a similar argument on Brazil, see Carlos Manuel Peláez, "The Theory and Reality of Imperialism in the Coffee Economy of Nineteenth-Century Brazil," *Economic History Review*, XXIX (May 1976).

[53] For trade figures, see E. J. Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire* (London: Pelican 1969), 139, and J. Forbes Munro, *Africa and the International Economy, 1800–1960* (London: Rowman and Littlefield 1976), 40; for investment figures, see Michael Barrett-Brown, *After Imperialism* (New York: Humanities Press 1970), 93.

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and the United States over the last century-and-a-half. Some states, such as the kingdoms of West Africa which had been built up partly through a preceding period of trade with the North, were taken by assault; others, like the Ottoman Empire and the Manchu Dynasty, collapsed—for reasons fundamentally caused more by internal factors than by the overwhelming power of the North; Japan managed to mount a rival industrial establishment; and the Latin American states drew strength from the international connection—albeit of a sort that made them satellites of the economic dynamism of the North. Both Theda Skocpol and Ellen Kay Trimberger have suggested that the key to whether a nineteenth-century agrarian order could preserve itself in the face of internal and external threats may lie in whether the state was functionally independent enough of the economic elite to take initiatives despite the opposition of this class. Skocpol writes of governmental responsiveness to the threat of revolution:

> The adaptiveness of the earlier modernizing agrarian bureaucracies was significantly determined by the degree to which the upper and middle ranks of the state administrative bureaucracies were staffed by large landholders. Only state machineries significantly differentiated from traditional landed upper classes could undertake modernizing reforms which almost invariably had to encroach upon the property or privileges of the landed upper class.[54]

Trimberger makes the same general point with reference to the ability of the Meiji State and Kemalist Turkey to undertake economic modernization, and she goes on to link these experiences with contemporary developments in Latin America. The central characteristic of a strong state, she argues, is that its bureaucracy—and particularly the military officer corps—be neither recruited from nor responsible to the classes economically dominant in society.[55] The autonomy from vested reactionary interests allows such a state to undertake the necessary (and always, to some, unpopular), reforms necessary for modernization. At the same time, however, it is well not to overemphasize the autonomy of the state: any ruling apparatus must have some allies, potential or actual, in the population at large. For all the usefulness of Skocpol's and Trimberger's distinctions, Bill Warren's point on the multiple forms that vigorous state rule may take calls attention to the danger of defining the issue too narrowly:

[54] Theda Skocpol, "France, Russia, China: A Structural Theory of Social Revolution," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XVIII (No. 2, 1976), 185.

[55] Trimberger (fn. 39); Trimberger and Irving Louis Horowitz, "State Power and Military Nationalism in Latin America," *Comparative Politics*, VIII (January 1976).

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> Significant capitalist industrialization may be initiated and directed by a variety of ruling classes and combinations of such classes or their representatives, ranging from semi-feudal ruling groups (northern Nigeria) and including large landowners (Ethiopia, Brazil, Thailand), to bureaucratic-military elites, petty bourgeoisies and professional and state functionaries (especially in Africa and the Middle East). These "industrializers" may themselves become industrial bourgeoisies or may be displaced by the industrial Frankensteins they have erected. . . . the crucial point is this—that it is the characteristic of the post-war period throughout the underdeveloped world that the social forces compelling industrialization have developed with more massive impetus and greater rapidity than ever before in history. . . . This partly explains the importance of the state in most underdeveloped countries where it often assumes the role of a bourgeois ruling class prior to the substantial development of that class.[56]

The style of state action will thus vary with time and place. Alexander Gerschenkron has described not only what is common to "late industrializers"—the speed of industrial growth and its concentration in large enterprises favoring capital goods production, for example—but also how different countries use different structures to further the same functional end of growth—England used accumulated capital, Germany the investment banks, and Russia the state budget.[57] Barrington Moore makes the same general point when he insists that historical timing is a crucial factor in the style of state action:

> To a very limited extent these three types—bourgeois revolutions culminating in the Western form of democracy, conservative revolutions from above ending in fascism, and peasant revolutions leading to communism—may constitute alternative routes and choices. They are much more clearly successive historical stages. . . . The methods of modernization chosen in one country change the dimensions of the problem for the next countries who take the step, as Veblen recognized when he coined the now fashionable term "the advantages of backwardness." Without the prior democratic modernization of England, the reactionary methods adopted in Germany and Japan would scarcely have been possible. Without both the capitalist and reactionary experiences, the communist method would have been something entirely different, if it had come into existence at all. . . . Although there have been certain common problems in the construction of industrial society, the task remains a continually changing one.[58]

[56] Warren, "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization," *New Left Review*, Vol. 81 (September-October 1973), 42-43.

[57] Gerschenkron, *Europe in the Russian Mirror: Four Lectures in Economic History* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1970), 99, 102-3. See also Rondo Cameron, ed., *Banking and Economic Development: Some Lessons of History* (New York: Oxford University Press 1972).

[58] Moore (fn. 17), 113-14. See also David Collier, "Timing of Economic Growth and Regime Characteristics in Latin America," *Comparative Politics*, VII (April 1975);

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Whether industrializing countries today will imitate any of the historical models of growth, or will find new forms of development, or indeed will succeed at all in their ambition to become autonomous centers of technological advance is a key question. Albert O. Hirschman notes that "late, late industrializers" seem unable to move as decisively as their historical predecessors.[59] Dependency theorists would link this to the role that external forces have played in the growth of southern countries, and insist that the impetus for forward movement does not yet come from inside. A strong state would seem to be an indispensable prerequisite for success. And few of the states of the Third World today have developed governing institutions appropriate to the social forces they must integrate and control. Regional, ethnic, and class demands are not effectively aggregated through party structures (if, indeed, they are capably articulated at all), while bureaucracies, which determine the ability of governments to act, are frequently incompetent and corrupt. In a strong polity, party and bureaucratic structures parallel and reinforce one another. But in a weak state, the shortcomings of each system feed the vices of the other.[60] Some governments are obviously stronger than others on the same continent—India in Asia, Tanzania in Africa, Mexico in Latin America; meanwhile, military regimes converting themselves into civilian governments, or popular parties with roots in a variety of social groups may yet succeed in institutionalizing political authority. Few are as weak as some of the former French territories of Black Africa, where Europeans continue to staff many of the important government positions and the presence (or absence) of a metropolitan paratrooper company or two determines political stability. And few are as corrupt as Zaire, where one apparently informed source reports the disappearance in 1971 of 60 percent of the state's revenues (not counting under-the-table transfers).[61]

Peter A. Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," paper for the American Political Science Association, Annual Meeting 1977.

[59] Hirschman, "The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrializing in Latin America," in *A Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1971).

[60] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1968); Fred W. Riggs, *Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage 1970).

[61] J. P. Peemans, "The Social and Economic Development of Zaire since Independence," *African Affairs*, Vol. 74 (April 1975), 102.

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For most southern countries, the Algerian dilemma seems familiar: the failure of the party system engenders the failure of the bureaucracy —which in turn makes the eventual success of the party all the more difficult. Thus the present attempt in Algeria to bring about wide-scale land reform is every bit as much a political as an economic effort. What the Boumédienne regime requires to achieve modern stability is power dispersion; that is, the creation of institutional linkages throughout the country by means of a party structure and organized interest groups. Of course a risk is involved. An increasingly participant peasantry may challenge well-designed programs as well as inefficiency and corruption in government. Thus, increased mass participation is at once a possible salvation for the regime and a real threat to it. The result has been to temporize. Now the Peasant Unions, like the Communal Assemblies, will be participatory in form but carefully controlled in practice. The attempt may succeed; or again, it may not. Since the summer of 1972, the idea of the Agrarian Revolution has been broadcast to every corner of Algeria in an official campaign quite without precedent in the country's history. The media have long and actively promoted it, thousands of students have been mobilized to come to its assistance, and religious as well as military and political authorities have pronounced favorably on its ambitions. One thing is becoming evident: Algeria must somehow institutionalize the participation of its peasantry if its political order is to find strength and stability and its economic order is to create prosperity. The peasantry has a genuine interest in participation. The overriding question is whether the state, through its party and bureaucratic structures, can acquire a mature form in the process.[62] The task is not unique to Algeria. Throughout the Third World, similar problems of political development are being confronted by equally bold programs of reform.

The job of the modernizing state in contemporary domestic terms therefore appears paradoxical: it must have autonomy, yet it must sink roots. It must have the autonomy of a unitary actor if it is to make long-term plans and to implement them despite some opposition (and on occasion those who object will eventually benefit more than those who truly pay the price). Particularistic interests of every variety must be weaker than the state, which is competent to act on behalf of what it will call the collective good. At the same time, the state must sink roots, both as a precondition and as a result of this very effort at change. If some interests must be checked or broken, others must be mobilized

[62] Tony Smith, "The Political and Economic Ambitions of Algerian Land Reform, 1962–1974," *Middle East Journal*, XXIX (Summer 1975).

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and controlled if the state is to attain its ends. In Samuel Huntington's terms, state power must be both concentrated and expanded in a complex process that will depend in each case on specific configurations of social forces.[63] Different regimes will choose to promote different sectors of their populations, and a variety of political structures may be used to the same functional end. But the final product must be a state apparatus that can effectively knit together the social forces under its jurisdiction, and provide for future growth.

Is a state that is strong domestically also a state that is strong internationally? No obvious direct relationship holds. For a society may be possessed of a strong state in the sense that governmental structures have a demonstrated capacity to integrate the social forces of the land, while at the same time it may lack military strength and hence be weak on the world scale. Or else, a state may be strong internally while its economic system is highly dependent on world trade over whose rules it has no power. As a result, this state is weak internationally, since the coalition of domestic forces on which it depends would be upset if the world economy failed to perform in certain necessary ways. On the other hand, internal strength would seem a precondition of strength internationally. For a globally powerful state must be possessed of an ability to extract resources from its citizenry and coordinate them in a fashion that suggests that its government is strong internally as well.

It is thus legitimate to say that an aspect of the growing international power of southern states is their ability to grow strong internally. As their economies become more diversified and their societies are better organized politically, the probability is that they will gain in international strength. It would be a mistake to think that this process is unidimensional, however: a society may over time vary in its dependence on outside influences. In Mexico, for example, the Porfiriato (1876–1910) signified one type of incorporation to the hegemony of the United States, only to be ended when Mexico in effect "decolonized" by the Revolution of 1910–1917, and by the subsequent economic Mexicanization of the country until 1945. Subsequently, however, Mexico once again became more closely involved with the United States, although in ways significantly different from the pattern that ended nearly seventy years ago. The complexity of the modern Mexican economy and the demonstrated ability of the state to control the social forces under its jurisdiction make the Mexican state today stronger

[63] Huntington (fn. 60), chap. 2.

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domestically than it was before the Revolution; but how do we describe its international position?

One recent event confirms the growing power of the South in striking fashion. More clearly than the defeat of the Italians at Adua in 1896 and the Japanese victory over Russia in 1904, the ultimate triumph of nationalist communism in Vietnam stands as an historical benchmark of the first order in the process of reversing nearly five hundred years of European overseas expansion. Direct leverage over the political and bureaucratic institutions in the South may have ended with colonialism, but the North could retain the belief that if a southern state failed to respect basic northern interests (defined not only economically and strategically, but in some cases ideologically or symbolically), it ran the risk of military intervention. So at least it had been in Asia and the Middle East since the time of the First Opium War in 1840. We are witness to the failure of the United States to continue the tradition, as called for by George Liska in a widely read book that appeared in 1967:

> The Vietnamese War . . . may well come to rank on a par with the two world wars as a conflict that marked an epoch in America's progress toward definition of her role as a world power. . . . This role implies the necessity to define—by force if necessary—the terms on which regional balances of power are evolved and American access to individual regions is secured. . . . Had it been less dramatized, the Vietnamese War would have been an ideal ground for evolving, training, and breaking in . . . a combined political-military establishment as well as for educating the American people to changing facts of life. It may still prove retrospectively to have been such. . . .[64]

It was under the shadow of America's military reversal in Vietnam that the rise in petroleum prices occurred. In 1972, the OPEC states received $29.2 billion for their exports, which constituted 7 percent of world trade by value; by 1975, the value of their exports reached $114 billion and represented some 13 percent of world commerce (down from 16 percent in 1974).[65] Nor is the success of OPEC the only sign of strength in southern economic development. Statistics on manufacturing output in the Third World show this sector to have been the pacesetter in most Third-World economies for approximately the past two decades. Even during the recession of 1974, so called "middle income" countries, those with per capita incomes of $200 to $700 a year,

[64] Liska, *Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press 1967), Preface (unpaginated), and 180.
[65] United Nations, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, June 1976.

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managed to expand their manufacturing output by 8 percent, while the OECD countries registered a zero growth rate. The following index numbers of industrial production for all southern countries are striking evidence of this development.[66]

TABLE I

INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT AS A PERCENTAGE OF 1970 PRODUCTION

	Year	*Heavy Industry*	*Light Industry*	*Total*
Developed Market Countries	1960	53	66	57
	1970	100	100	100
	1974	122	114	119
	1975	112	110	111
	1976	123	120	122
Developing Market Countries	1960	43	64	54
	1970	100	100	100
	1974	148	127	137
	1975	150	132	141
	1976	165	141	152

One must be careful not to push this point too far and thereby fail to recognize the substantial power that the North still retains over the South. In my opinion, dependency theory is certainly correct when it maintains that northern power is not only preponderant, but that its effects significantly influence the course of economic, social, and political development in southern countries. Nor would I dispute the use of the word "imperialism" to characterize this relationship.[67] But I would repeat that it is essential not to assume that the power of this interaction between North and South is so great as to mold single-handedly all aspects of social life in the South. Not for a moment should the strength and independence of local factors be forgotten. In the case of Mexican industrialization, to take but one example, the role of northern multinational investment is indisputable in providing capital and technology for development. But much more important were changes within Mexico itself, chief of which was the Revolution of 1910. Here the groundwork was laid, as William Glade recounts it, for the economic, social, and political infrastructure basic to industrialization.

[66] United Nations, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, August 1977.

[67] For a fuller discussion, see Tony Smith, "Changing Configurations of Power in North-South Relations since 1945," *International Organization*, XXXI (Winter 1977).

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And the Revolution was achieved not *because* of the international system, but *against* it and its local allies.[68] Nor should it be assumed that southern leaders, even when heavily dependent on the North, are mere puppets of the international system. It was Porfirio Díaz, after all, who not only opened Mexico to American economic penetration on an enormous scale at the close of the nineteenth century, but who also coined the phrase still dear to Mexicans, "Pobre México, tan lejos de Dios, tan cerca de los Estados Unidos" (Poor Mexico, so far from God, so close to the United States). In short, the system is far more fluid than dependency theory allows. It is fluid in the sense that it has weaknesses permitting important actors to escape its direct influence, in the sense that it contains contradictory movements within it (American support for Israel has been no way to run an imperial system, for example), and in the sense that in many respects the very success of the system prepares the ground for its own displacement.

Let us look at this last point more closely. Even if the North were to advance a blueprint for North-South economic relations more comprehensive than anything suggested to date, are we to suppose that it would unquestionably succeed in perpetuating the present international distribution of power? Such might be the short-term consequences, which for a generation or two might perhaps be able to improve the mechanisms of northern control; but what about the longer term? Marxist and southern nationalist rhetoric notwithstanding, where is the evidence that the system is operating to make the Third World perpetual "hewers of wood and drawers of water" as the now standard cliché has it? If that were the northern intention—and I have never seen it seriously alleged that the countries of the OECD or the United States alone have the cunning or the organization to be able to draw up such a scheme—then the attempt would be a notable failure. Where is the whole-hearted effort to prevent southern industrialization, monopolize southern raw materials, break up domestically integrated southern markets, oppose southern regional integration schemes, and develop a greater degree of international specialization that would heighten southern reliance on northern goods and markets? Neither the OECD nor the United States gets high marks for imperialist strategy: plans are neither clear nor resolute in purpose; the means whereby to gain the ends have not been specified; interests at home

[68] Glade, "Revolution and Economic Development: A Mexican Reprise," in William Glade and Charles W. Anderson, eds., *The Political Economy of Mexico* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1963).

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have not been harmonized so that such a strategy would seem enticing. Unlike the influence of Britain in Egypt, India, and Latin America at the end of the nineteenth century, and unlike Nazi policy toward Southeastern Europe, the impact of the North today would seem to accelerate rather than retard southern industrialization.[69]

The standard reply in the dependency literature is to maintain that foreign enterprise holds the commanding heights in Third World industrialization, thereby "decapitalizing" and "denationalizing" southern industry. It is held that whatever gains are being made would be greater and less vulnerable without this presence. The favored way to document the alleged decapitalization is to present figures of capital inflow and outflow over time to show that foreign investment is taking more out of southern countries than it is bringing in. For instance, in the case of Latin America, Dale Johnson repeats the standard charge, declaring that "between 1950 and 1961, 2,962 million dollars of U.S. private capital flowed into the seven principal countries of Latin America, while the return flow was 6,875 million dollars."[70] Although this state of affairs might suggest that northern investment is no assistance in terms of southern balance-of-payments problems, it is obvious that these figures, cited by themselves, cannot establish the case for southern exploitation. For unless we know what this surplus in favor of the United States amounting to $4 billion means in relation either to American investment in Latin America or to the output of American firms there, the sum says very little. The available statistics suggest that "decapitalization" is a nationalist/Marxist myth, at least in the terms in which it is usually presented. For example, in 1975, Latin America received $178 million from the United States to be invested in private manufacturing there. At the same time, American corporations remitted $359 million in profits and $211 million in fees and royalties from this sector to the United States. Apparently, therefore, United States private investments "decapitalized" Latin America of $392 million that year in terms of manufacturing alone. Yet, if we compare this to United States manufacturing investments in Latin America of $8.6 *billion*, the sum repatriated to the North amounted to a mere 4.6 percent, hardly an extortionist outflow. The sum of $392 million is all the more insignificant when we compare it to the total sales of United States manufacturing affiliates in Latin America in 1974, which amounted to $20.9

[69] Smith (fn. 67), 21ff.

[70] Johnson, "Dependence and the International System," in Cockroft (fn. 6), 75n.; repeated with other dates, 94n.

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billion. In other words, if we consider the $392 million as return either on investment or on volume of business generated, it can scarcely be maintained that Latin America is being "decapitalized."[71]

It is more difficult to refute unambiguously the charge that Third-World economies are being "denationalized"—a term that refers to the tendency of northern industries to buy out successful local businesses and to control local capital through encouraging its minority participation in northern ventures there. For example, the Department of Commerce provides figures showing that from 1968 to 1972, Latin Americans provided from 33 to 54 percent of the capital called for by United States companies in the region.[72] Should that be interpreted as southerners financing the takeover of their own countries? Similarly, Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Müller cite a study by the Harvard Business School for the years 1958–1967 to underscore the familiar allegation of *dependencistas* that Americans are buying up able southern firms and are thereby stifling southern entrepreneurs: "About 46 percent of all manufacturing operations established in the period were takeovers of existing domestic industry."[73] A closer inspection of this argument suggests that once again the dependency school is presenting its statistics selectively. For if we look more thoroughly through the material assembled by the Harvard Business School survey, it appears that through liquidations or expropriations, or sales of an entire affiliate or a substantial part thereof, American interests had divested themselves of nearly as many manufacturing concerns as they had acquired: 332 lost as compared with 337 gained.[74] Nor do sheer numbers of firms present the most interesting statistics; it is the *value* of affiliates bought or sold that may be more important. And, so far as the figures for 1975 and 1976 are concerned, Department of Commerce statistics show that United States firms sold off about as much in value of their manufacturing affiliates in the South as they acquired through takeovers.[75]

[71] See Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business*, "U.S. Direct Investment Abroad in 1976" (August 1977), for all figures except those on sales; for sales, see *ibid.*, "Sales by Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Companies, 1974" (May 1976). Other years could be cited where American profits were far *less*.

[72] Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business*, "Sources and Uses of Funds for a Sample of Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Companies, 1966–1972" (July 1975).

[73] Barnet and Müller, *Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations* (New York: Simon and Schuster 1974), 154-55.

[74] James W. Vaupel and Joan P. Curhan, *The Making of Multinational Enterprise* (Cambridge: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University 1969), 240-41 for expansion; 376-77, 505 for losses.

[75] Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business*, "U.S. Direct Investment Abroad in 1976" (August 1977), Table 4, p. 35 and Table 5, pp. 36-37.

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Moreover, there seems to be unanimous agreement that as a percentage of gross business volume, the multinational corporations are declining in importance in the South: it is only in terms of their control over certain of the leading sectors of the economy that their presence is dominant. Even in these sectors, the emerging pattern seems to be for the southern governments to restrict foreign investment to those areas of the economy where local abilities cannot yet provide adequate capital or skills, and to push the foreigners out once conditions warrant it. To be sure, in many instances foreigners continue to operate behind the scenes: the custom of *prestanombres* (borrowed names), whereby locals act as figurehead directors and owners of establishments that are actually controlled from abroad is by no means restricted to Latin America, as the Spanish term might suggest. However, as the state and domestic interests gain in strength, there is little reason to think the letter of the law will not be increasingly applied.[76] In the process of the "nationalization" of these foreign concerns, might not the investors in such enterprises, those who hold minority shares as reflected in the Commerce Department survey cited above, be considered the logical next majority owners? "Denationalization" of southern industry has as little substance to it as "decapitalization."

The moral of these considerations is that the system of North-South relations is not only too weak to determine all aspects of change in the South—a fundamental point bearing reiteration—but that even in those areas where its influence is real, its long-run effect may well be to hasten the end of the international predominance of the North. For example, Algeria had managed to run up an external public debt of over $9 billion as of the end of 1975, and the United States had moved into position as the country's largest trading partner and substantial creditor.[77] Yet, one would mistake this involvement with the outside world if one were to see it as anything other than an Algerian effort to practice that skill of the martial arts whereby the strength of the opponent

[76] For a particularly strong essay stressing the growing role of the South relative to the North, see Theodore H. Moran, "Multinational Corporations and Dependency: A Dialogue for Dependentistas and Non-Dependentistas," *International Organization*, XXXII (Winter 1978); on Nigeria, see editorial notes in *African Development*, X (December 1975); on Mexico, Richard Weinert, "The State and Foreign Capital," in Reyna and Weinert (fn. 35); and on Southeast Asia, Franklin Weinstein, "Multinational Corporations and the Third World: The Case of Japan and Southeast Asia," *International Organization*, XXX (Summer 1976).

[77] World Bank, *Annual Report* (1977), Table 5, p. 111; Department of Commerce, *Overseas Business Report*, "World Trade Outlook for Near East and North Africa," OBR 77-45 (September 1977); Department of State, *Foreign Economic Trends and their Implications for the U.S.*, "Algeria," 77-033 (March 1977).

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is used against himself. The same point of view has predominated in the Soviet Union since 1920, when Lenin actively sought to recruit capitalist trade and investment in his effort to build up his country's economic base. It is the unhistorical dogmatist, a familiar fellow in dependency literature, who asserts solely on the basis of certain grand ideas that, whatever the situation, the international system is a "trap," and that "self-reliance" through socialism is the only road to economic development.[78]

In this essay I have attempted to deal only with a major historiographic shortcoming common to most of dependency theory. I have made no claim to review the literature in full, to deny its genuine insights, or to analyze the ideological "united front" the theory is sponsoring between southern nationalists and Marxists. Instead, I have tried to encourage skepticism about propositions alleging the all-pervasive and self-perpetuating character of northern power with respect to the South, and to establish some measure of the relative autonomy of the various Third-World countries which comes from the real strength of local traditions and institutions.

[78] Johan Galtung, "The Lomé Convention and Neo-Capitalism," *African Review*, VI (No. 1, 1976).

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Review Article

DETERRENCE THEORY REVISITED

By ROBERT JERVIS*

Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, 666 pp., $20.00; $7.50 paper.

The Popularity of Deterrence Theory

DETERRENCE theory,[1] which appeared in three waves, is probably the most influential school of thought in the American study of international relations. Although the first wave, which came and went in the early years of the nuclear era, had little impact, the ideas of the second wave, which crested in the late 1950's, soon became conventional wisdom even though there was little evidence for the validity of the propositions. Indeed, until the third wave,[2] in the 1970's, there were few calls for verification. For this strange state of affairs we can credit the intellectual power and elegance of the framework (coupled with the articulateness of its proponents), the fit between the arguments and the prevailing views of current international politics, and the general links between deterrence and Realism.

Because most American scholars accepted Realism, it is not surprising that they found deterrence theory congenial. Indeed, by its speci-

* I would like to thank James King, Glenn Snyder, and the members of the UCLA Arms Control and International Security Arrowhead Working Group for their comments, and the UCLA Academic Senate for financial support. This paper was written while I was a Lady Davis Visiting Professor at the Department of International Relations of Hebrew University in Jerusalem. A preliminary version appeared as Working Paper No. 14, UCLA Program in Arms Control and International Security.

[1] As Schelling has noted in *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966), 2-18, the theory deals with the broader category of coercion, which includes compellence as well as deterrence. I have used the term "deterrence theory" because it has such wide currency.

[2] In addition to George and Smoke, the main writings I have in mind are Alexander George, David Hall, and William Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971); Bruce Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VII (June 1963), 97-109; Clinton Fink, "More Calculations About Deterrence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, IX (March 1965), 54-65; Patrick Morgan, *Deterrence* (Beverly Hills: Sage 1977); Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1977); Oran R. Young, *The Politics of Force* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1968); Richard Smoke, *War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1978).

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ficity and generation of counterintuitive propositions, deterrence theory met the main criticisms of Realism—i.e., that it was so vague as to accommodate almost all behavior and that it merely summarized what statesmen and even casual observers already knew. For all its attraction, Realism had provided few explanations for puzzling behavior and had produced few leads for further research. In meeting these shortcomings, deterrence theory may have given Realism a new impetus.

Even though Realism prepared the ground, it is hard to imagine that deterrence theory could have grown so rapidly if it had not been for the cold war. First, deterrence theory deals with the questions of military policy that loomed large in the postwar era. Thus, concepts such as first- and second-strike capability, reciprocal fear of surprise attack, and the threat that leaves something to chance offered answers to pressing policy questions. Second, although deterrence does not require nuclear weapons, their existence makes it easier to grasp the basic ideas. When weapons cannot be used for defense, the mind is quicker to search for their alternative uses, even though many earlier weapons had those uses as well.[3] Third, deterrence theory applies most easily, and perhaps applies only, when one side believes that the other is highly aggressive.

This relationship can also be reversed: deterrence theory supported many cold-war policies. But we cannot ascribe its success to the functions it served. Other doctrines could as easily have justified unremitting hostility toward the Soviet Union. In fact, a view that stressed the need to fight wars rather than prevent them would have appeased conservative critics and supported higher military spending and a more assertive foreign policy. Furthermore, the political explanation would lead one to expect that the first wave of deterrence theory would have had great impact, which it did not.

Much of the popularity of the theory must be credited to its formidable intellectual virtues. Deterrence not only deals with some of the central questions of international politics (How is force manipulated to achieve political ends? How can wars be avoided? Why do weaker states sometimes prevail over stronger ones?); it also is parsimonious. Once one grasps the basic concepts and first principles, many implications follow. Behavior that previously seemed puzzling—for example, commitment and the ways in which weakness can improve one's bargaining position—becomes comprehensible. Accounts of negotiations

[3] George Quester, *Deterrence Before Hiroshima* (New York: Wiley 1966).

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written before the development of deterrence theory remind us of how much we have learned. The theory also brings together many disparate phenomena that had been known before, but that had been explained only *ad hoc*. Scholars and statesmen had known of use of force for punishment rather than defense (e.g., the "air policing" of parts of the British Empire), seen the dangers resulting when each side could reap major advantages by attacking first, and noted the uses of irrationality. But it remained for deterrence theory to show how this and other behavior could be explained within a common framework—a framework, furthermore, that could also be used to account for aspects of bargaining behavior in areas far removed from international politics.

The First Wave

As already noted, the first wave of deterrence theory had relatively little impact.[4] In the years immediately after World War II, such scholars as Bernard Brodie, Arnold Wolfers, and Jacob Viner were amazingly quick to see the implications of nuclear weapons. Although their work lacked the systematization and broad reach of the second wave, it anticipated many insights that were later rediscovered and could have laid the foundations for future research. To analyze these works as thoroughly as they deserve would be to stray too far from our topic; part of the reason why they did not have more influence is that the general and long-run considerations being examined were too far removed from the pressing international problems of the day. Other considerations were purely intellectual: the scholarly community was not yet involved with questions of national security and it was not then apparent that many of the ways of thought applied to this area could also illuminate other topics.

The Second Wave and Its Critics

Whatever the reasons, many of the early ideas lay fallow for about ten years. The contributions of Brodie, Schelling, Snyder, Wohlstetter, and others of the second wave are so well known that little summary is needed here.[5] Much of this work uses the game of Chicken as an analogy in situations in which the first choice of both sides is to stand firm, but in which both prefer retreating and letting the other side win to a mutually disastrous confrontation. Each side therefore tries to

[4] The following summary draws heavily on James King's "The New Strategy" (unpublished ms.).

[5] King (fn. 4) again provides the best analysis.

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prevail by making the other think it is going to stand firm; this implication of the model enables scholars to understand many of the bargaining tactics actors adopt. Each side decides whether to stand firm by examining its payoffs and estimating the likelihood that the other will retreat; this implication of the model helps scholars understand why actors stand firm rather than retreat. Once this model is grasped, several tactics that are contrary to common sense—such as severing communication links, feigning anger, irrationality, or loss of control over militant factions in one's organization—all fall into place. This model also highlights the paradoxical nature of deterrence in which each side hopes to gain security, not by being able to protect itself, but by threatening to inflict unacceptable damage on the other. Indeed, the latter characteristic can, I think, provide a reasonable definition of deterrence theory—i.e., theory about the ways in which an actor manipulates threats to harm others in order to coerce them into doing what he desires.

INDUCING CHANGE IN THE OTHER

Although the second wave proved immensely popular, it also was subject to vigorous criticisms. Here I want to discuss only the most important ones. First is the argument that deterrence says little about how to change the other's motives. Of course, deterrence theorists are concerned with the danger that states will become *more* aggressive if their unreasonable demands are met. But much less is said about transforming hostile relations into peaceful ones. (This inattention also continues the Realist tradition. The origins of wars and courses of crises are much more frequently studied than the defusing of tensions and the diminution of conflict.) Although deterrence theory implicitly endorses the containment doctrine's claim that if the Soviet Union is prevented from expanding, it will eventually become peaceful, this position lacks grounding in the rest of the theory and must remain an *ad hoc* addition. Indeed, it is hard to see how the theory could be used either to explain how to change an adversary or to determine whether changes have taken place. Deterrence theory is so inadequate on this score partly because it takes the state's own goals as given. One does not have to agree with Anatol Rapoport's claim that the only exit from the current dilemma is for each power to change its perspective from a narrow national one to one that looks at the good of the entire system[6] in order

[6] Rapoport, "Systemic and Strategic Conflict," in Richard Falk and Saul Mendlovitz, eds., *The Strategy of World Order*, I (New York: World Law Fund 1966), 281-82.

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to suspect that successful accommodation usually requires at least some change in the values and goals of both sides.

It can be argued with a good deal of merit that explaining such basic changes in the relationship between states is beyond the boundaries of the theory—thus limiting the theory but not diminishing its validity within the realm to which it applies. But this argument is not entirely satisfactory. For even if the theory explains how actors behave when they are very hostile to each other, it does not tell us how or whether alternative policies could be employed to create a situation in which deterrence theory would *not* apply—a situation in which both sides would be much better off. The problems increase when we consider deterrence theory as a guide for statesmen. At best, it tells them how to maintain a hostile and dangerous relationship. It does not tell them how this situation might be changed, nor can they be sure whether deterrence is appropriate. And applying deterrence tactics to a state that is not a menace is likely to create a great deal of unnecessary conflict.

Deterrence theory is not alone in failing to address seriously the question of how, and how much, a state can change the intentions of an adversary. Probably nothing could have transformed Hitler into a statesman with whom the rest of Europe could have lived, but what about less extreme cases? Could Wilhelmine Germany have been appeased (in the pre-1939 sense of the term)? When can others' goals be changed? Under what conditions is it profitable to try to alter the means-ends relations that others see as operating in the world? When can others be persuaded to adopt a "problem solving" approach and to defer short-run competitive gains in order to seek larger, but less certain, benefits? There is little in the international relations literature to provide even a start to answering these questions. Even though recent Soviet-American relations may have become more peaceful, there have been few scholarly analyses of this transformation, and it is not clear what the best intellectual tools to study this subject would be.

A related problem is that, to an extent which has not been closely examined, deterrence theory deals only with relations characterized by high conflict. That is part of the reason why it provides a greater help in understanding crises than in understanding long-run disputes, and is least helpful in explaining peaceful relations (pp. 45-55).[7] George and Smoke stress, correctly in my view, that we need to seek bounded

[7] Also see the distinction between "immediate" and "general" deterrence in Morgan (fn. 2), 28-43.

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rather than unconditional generalizations (pp. 632-42). Our knowledge of the conditions under which deterrence theory applies is still very limited. The crucial factor in the framework of the Chicken game, which is central to so much of deterrence, is that mutual noncooperation is the worst outcome for both sides. But this can be true when, in addition to the desire to avoid catastrophe, there are many important common interests between the sides. What aspects of deterrence theory will apply to relations among allies when each state would rather make painful concessions than see the alliance ruptured? Will the theory help us understand the final phases of a crisis or bargaining situation when both sides are trying to flesh out the details of a settlement whose general outlines they have agreed upon? Would deterrence tactics be chosen and efficacious within a security community? The answers are probably in the negative, but we still lack evidence and well-grounded arguments about the bounds on the theory and the conditions under which it applies.

COMPROMISES AND REWARDS

If relations are to be transformed—and perhaps even if they are to be maintained—rewards and compromises may be more effective than threats. Alexander George is misleading when he says that the bargaining model based on Chicken "ignores the possibility (and, oftentimes, the necessity) of combining a carrot with the stick."[8] The structure of the game does permit consideration of acts that benefit the other side or move both sides toward a compromise solution that would be their second choice. But until recently, scholars have focused on war or relatively clear-cut victory. Yet our general knowledge of international politics indicates that such outcomes are the exception, not the rule. Even in cases which we tend to see as a complete victory, closer examination often reveals that the concessions were not all on one side. Thus, George argues that it was not only a display of American resolve but also a promise of American rewards that ended the Cuban missile crisis.[9] Much earlier, Paul Kecskemeti had shown that even a defeated state retains some bargaining power, and that even apparently unconditional surrenders are accompanied by some concessions by the victors.[10] These findings should not have surprised students of deterrence; their bargaining theories show how weakness can be turned into strength. But

[8] George, Hall, and Simons (fn. 2), 29. A better treatment is George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, pp. 80-81, 604-10.

[9] George, Hall, and Simons (fn. 2), 101-2.

[10] Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender* (New York: Athenaeum 1964).

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they did seem to have come as a surprise, and George's argument was contrary to the emphasis of previous thinking.

It could be argued that even if rewards are effective, they lie outside the scope of deterrence theory, which deals with punishment. But if this is so, then the theory may be ruling out consideration of an important tool of influence. Unless scholars know the conditions under which these tools cannot be used, they will sometimes apply deterrence theory to cases which it cannot explain. And decision makers who are guided by the theory and do not heed the qualification that the use of rewards lies outside its scope will rely too heavily on threats and force.

What explains the neglect of rewards and compromises in deterrence theory? First, it is simpler to ignore outcomes that are not clear-cut. When one can talk about one side standing firm and the other side retreating, one is spared many dilemmas of judgment and nuance. Second, when one thinks in terms of the Chicken model, compromise is unlikely except in the rare case in which both sides act simultaneously and choose to retreat. For if one side sees that the other is backing down, the logic of the game dictates that it should stand firm rather than offer any concessions. Third, the use of rewards has received little attention by Realists, who stress that states use their superior power to try to reach their goals.[11] The crucial question is whether this view is correct or whether the whole Realist tradition has missed a lot of what has been going on. (It is also possible that rewards would be effective if they were employed, but are rare because decision makers accept Realism. Those who describe the world in Realist terms would then be perpetuating that world. This argument, while interesting, exaggerates the influence of scholars and is untestable as long as most statesmen accept Realism.) The widespread acceptance of Realism leaves us unable to judge whether rewards are potent, since most scholars have assumed that they are not, and so have not explored this question. But until further research has been done, we should at least entertain the hypothesis which holds that Realism's emphasis is misplaced.

A final explanation is that deterrence deals with cases of high conflict, and in these situations rewards are not apt to play a major role. What rewards could the British have given Hitler that would not have endangered the values they sought to protect? There is a parallel reason why deterrence theory has neglected compromise: in situations of

[11] David A. Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," *World Politics*, XXIV (October 1974), 19-38; Richard Rosecrance, "Reward, Punishment, and the Future," in Richard Rosecrance, ed., *The Future of the International Strategic System* (San Francisco: Chandler 1972), 175-84; Ernst Haas, "Multilateral Incentives for Limiting International Violence," *ibid.*, 151-74.

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high conflict, the state defending the status quo believes that giving the other side anything is at best to postpone confrontation and at worst to strengthen the other and encourage it to raise new demands.

Even in cases of high conflict, however, the theory actually points to a possible role for rewards, although one that most deterrence theorists have largely ignored. The argument is that whether a state will attack is a function not only of the payoffs of such action, but also of the value of the status quo and the expected value of a peaceful future; therefore, increasing these values can persuade a state not to attack. Although most increases in the state's stake in the status quo are likely to come from internal increments in wealth—and President Eisenhower felt that U.S. military planners overestimated the difficulty of deterring Russia because they ignored her growing wealth[12]—observers should not neglect the contributions that other states can make.

ETHNOCENTRISM AND STATUS QUO BIASES

In analyzing the common argument that deterrence theory is ethnocentric, two kinds of ethnocentrism must be distinguished. First, we could see ourselves as stronger and better than others. Deterrence theory certainly does not commit this error. The theory is abstract and deals with states A and B, and it does not matter what national names fill these blanks. Second, is deterrence theory ethnocentric in the sense of seeing others as being like us? It probably is. Like most theories of international relations developed by Americans and West Europeans, it is grounded in the experience, culture, and values of the West; deterrence theorists usually assume that while countries differ in the goals they seek, they see the world in the same way.[13] Others may hold a strategic doctrine that lags behind that of the United States, but they will eventually come around to the "correct" way of seeing things. Although deterrence theory leads us to see that it is sometimes in a state's interest to pretend to reject a doctrine whose validity it actually accepts,[14] it does not consider that people from other cultures might develop quite different analyses. For example, both interest and tradition may lead the U.S.S.R. to view nuclear strategy more in terms of defense

[12] George Kistiakowsky, *A Scientist in the White House* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1976), 243.

[13] The most important exception to this generalization is Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1953).

[14] George Quester, "On the Identification of Real and Pretended Communist Military Doctrine," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, x (June 1966), 173-79; Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970), 232-36.

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than deterrence; to seek the capacity to fight and win wars; and to reject the axiom that neither side should try to endanger the other's second-strike capability. (It is important to note, however, that the Russians could seek to take their cities out of hostage even if they desired only increased security and did not intend to use this ability to make new political gains.) Deterrence theory may then explain American but not Soviet policy, and American actions would not have the impact expected by American leaders or predicted by the theory. The problems of living in a world in which the two main states hold very different views on how force and threats can be used have not received careful attention.

A related question is whether deterrence theory is biased in favor of status-quo powers. Most of the literature is written from the standpoint of the country resisting change, but the principles are more general; they are built not on the notion of deterrence as contrasted with defense, but rather on the broader category of coercion (getting the other to comply by threats of punishment), as contrasted with brute force (getting the other to comply by physically forcing him to do so).

Some standard game theory formulations assume that the players are risk-averse and would prefer the status quo to participating in the game at all. The resulting prescriptions are then not appropriate for actors with offensive orientations.[15] But these rules apply only in zero-sum situations and have not strongly influenced deterrence theory. Furthermore, although the deterrence theorists' discussions of the use of threats and punishment to alter the status quo are fairly brief, they not only show that any bias is a limited one, but also present reasonable arguments about why compellence is usually more difficult than deterrence. Paul Kecskemeti argues that the "aggressor's handicap" operates in situations in which "the 'attacker' and 'defender' are neatly separated so that only the attacker, not the defender, can always settle for the status quo, thereby avoiding the risks and costs of attack by abstaining."[16] The model of the Chicken game is misleading in its implication that both cars are in motion at the start. In those international cases where the status quo will be maintained unless either side tries to alter it, the expansionist must initiate dangerous action. And as long as the defender is willing to tolerate the risk that the aggressor has generated, the latter will not get what he seeks.

But if the aggressor does take the initiative, is there any reason to

[15] Daniel Ellsberg, "Theory of the Reluctant Duelist," *American Economic Review*, XLVI (December 1956), 909-23.

[16] Quoted in King (fn. 4).

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think that it is easier to deter than to compel? The argument that seems most convincing needs serious qualification. It has been said that the state trying to change the status quo is in a weaker bargaining position because it can drop its demand without running the danger that the status-quo power will raise new demands. But it is hard for the latter to retreat without damaging its ability to stand firm against demands for further changes; therefore, it should be able to prevail. There is a difficulty with this argument, however. One must also look at what each side will gain if it prevails. Here the very advantage just ascribed to the status-quo power turns out to be a disadvantage. What the aggressor can gain is not limited to the specific issue, but includes an increased chance of prevailing in future attempts to alter the status quo. The status-quo power, by contrast, gains only a temporary respite. And if, by resisting one demand, it has increased its chances of resisting others, then this is a counterbalancing loss to the expansionist, and undercuts the claim that the latter's losses are limited to the issue under dispute. To put this argument more generally, if all outcomes other than war are zero-sum, then we must look elsewhere for the advantage of the status-quo state.

There are three possibilities. First, the status-quo power will have an advantage if it, but not the adversary, expects a retreat to produce a "domino effect." In this case, what the status-quo power thinks it will lose by retreating is greater than what the expansionist power thinks it will gain by standing firm. But the bargaining advantage is not as great as it might be, because the status-quo power does not perceive the asymmetry, and so does not realize that the payoffs are favorable to it.

Second, the status-quo state would have an advantage if the long-run losses it expected to suffer were gains to a third party and not to its adversary in the initial conflict. The United States could increase its chances of prevailing in a conflict with the Soviet Union, for example, if it were able to convince the latter that an American retreat would lead to increased Chinese pressure on Japan, Formosa, and the states of Southeast Asia.

Third, the defending power is likely to have greater credibility because both sides have lived with the status quo for some time. The status-quo side can often make a convincing case that the expansionist's proposals are intolerable; but no matter how much the expansionist dislikes the status quo, he has shown that he can in fact tolerate it. Of course he can argue that circumstances have changed (e.g., he is now stronger, or the issue now matters more to him), and that what he was once willing to accept grudgingly, he will now go to war to

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change. That may be true and it may be convincing. But the onus is on the expansionist, and in most cases it cannot be overcome.

RATIONALITY

What is probably the most familiar criticism of the second wave of deterrence theory is that it overestimates the rationality of decision-makers, especially under high stress.[17] The question is two-fold: first, does the assumption that men are rational lead to the generation of interesting and valid propositions, and second, how rational do men have to be for deterrence theory to apply? Much less than total rationality is needed for the main lines of the theory to be valid. Deterrence theorists argue that the state should develop the forces and display the resolve that would lead even an emotional, short-sighted, and dim-witted opponent to see that to start a war would be the worst alternative.

Rationality may be neither necessary nor sufficient for deterrence. When critics talk of the impact of irrationality, they imply that all such deviations will be in the direction of emotional impulsiveness, of launching an attack, or of taking actions that are terribly risky. But irrationality could also lead a state to passive acquiescence, while a rational grasp of the situation could lead to belligerence. Furthermore, a potential aggressor is less likely to disturb the status quo if he fears that the defender will respond without taking proper account of the risks. Patrick Morgan makes a related argument which, although it represents a nice reversal of conventional wisdom, needs some qualification. He notes that if people were totally rational, deterrence in a world of mutual assured destruction would not work. To carry out your threat would mean the destruction of your own society; so, if the other side thinks you will retaliate, it assumes you are less than rational. Thus "anything which gives governments greater confidence in their ability to be cool and deliberate and to understand, control and manipulate deterrence situations is counterproductive. But this is precisely what classic deterrence theory sets out to do."[18] The paradox is not as great as Morgan thinks. There is an irreducible minimum of unpredictability that operates, especially in situations which engage a

[17] Ole Holsti, *Crisis, Escalation, War* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1972), 7-25; Holsti and Alexander George, "The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy-Makers," in Cornelius Cotter, ed., *Political Science Annual*, VI (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1975), 255-319; Holsti, "Theories of Crisis Decision-Making," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in Theory, History, and Policy* (New York: Free Press, forthcoming 1979).

[18] Morgan (fn. 2), 121. Of course Schelling (fn. 1) points out that it can be rational to pretend to be, or to be, irrational.

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state's highest values. Thus, even though there is no rational argument for a counter-city response to a Soviet attack on the United States or Western Europe, the mere possibility may be an effective deterrent. Indeed, it is questionable whether the U.S. could ever so reassure the Soviets that it would not retaliate that the Soviets would be tempted to attack.

Nevertheless, it is perhaps the central tension in deterrence, especially as practiced by a democracy, that its ultimate threat is to engage in a senseless act of total destruction. It is bizarre for a state to maintain its security by making its adversaries believe that it is prepared to bring about the end of its civilization. This policy makes more sense when we consider threats that leave something to chance: it can be rational to threaten, and carry out, a move that increases slightly the danger of an all-out war, while it would be completely irrational to launch an attack. Indeed, much of deterrence rests on the fact that both sides know that events are not entirely under their control, and that war could occur even though neither side sought it.

Not only can irrationality or the fear of it enhance deterrence, but rationality can lead to war. Of course the costs of all-out war are now so high as to make it irrational for any state to embark on a course of action which it thinks will lead to such a clash. But it can be rational to start a crisis or stand firm in the belief that the other is sure to retreat. If a state correctly calculates that the chance of the other's standing firm is only one in a hundred, and if standing firm is worthwhile under those conditions, one time out of a hundred the other will also stand firm—and there will be war.

Most discussions concentrate on the aggressor's rationality, but we must also ask whether the status-quo power has the intellectual and political resources to produce an appropriate deterrence policy. Again, a good deal less than total rationality will do, since the theory does not require the statesman to perform impossible calculations. As decision makers have become more aware of the means and problems of deterrence, the propagation of the theory has increased the chance that it will be applied properly. In earlier periods, the amount and quality of thought devoted to the question was often insufficient. Take American policy toward Japan before World War II: those policy makers who favored the oil embargo knew it to be a powerful weapon, since they knew Japan needed oil; they understood that Japan could not try to take the oil in the Dutch East Indies without also attacking the Philippines, which lay athwart the route between Japan and the Indies. Most of them did not expect Japan to comply with our demands, and

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yet they did not fully realize that the almost inevitable result would be a Japanese attack on the United States.[19] Even now this problem cannot be dismissed, but it is probably manageable in the context of a direct superpower attack.

Although the claim that irrationality undermines deterrence is not valid for the basic arguments about the utility of a second-strike capability, it has greater force against the more detailed and sophisticated bargaining tactics which, according to the theory, should be common and effective. Once we deal not with a gross threat that could be triggered only by the most extreme and obvious of provocations, but with much more subtle actions that are susceptible to multiple interpretations, then the "noise" in the international communications system, the inadequacies in the other's machinery for processing information, and cognitive limits on rationality may be sufficient to defeat the policies.

The Third Wave

Deterrence theory has three main difficulties that were not raised by the earlier critics, but are treated by the third-wave scholars. Perhaps the most startling fact about the development of the theory is the lack of search for supporting evidence. As George and Smoke stress, deterrence theory is largely deductive (pp. 61-71). There has been insufficient progress in two opposing, but complementary, directions. First, there have been few attempts to systematize and extend the theory. Scholars have not tried to tease new propositions from it, have not tried to extend the basic logic on such important questions as the relative ease of deterrence versus compellence, and have rarely used a deductive approach to group together and explore well-known bargaining tactics. There is much to be gained by doing so: greater precision, new insights, and testing the theory. By thinking through the theory's implications, we are led to understand the theory better—to see which elements are essential, which contradict each other, and which are in need of modification. Good theories do not spring full-blown from the minds of a few scholars. Rather, they develop as people test them and examine their internal dynamics and causal linkages. This process is sure to disclose ambiguities and inadequacies in the initial formulations. Unfortunately, the example I know best comes from my own work. Only by deducing the bargaining tactics that should be effective in the game of Chicken was I able to see that an actor had to take care

[19] This example does not fit deterrence theory narrowly conceived, since the Japanese were facing not the threat of punishment, but that of military defeat. But the problem of calculation still applies in this situation.

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to avoid the danger of symmetry—i.e., the danger that in altering the payoffs so as to increase his incentives to stand firm, he would also inadvertently increase the other's incentives to stand firm. Actions that will increase what the state (but not the other) will win, or that increase the costs of what the state (but not the other) will suffer in defeat, are what is called for.[20]

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

The theory has also relied too much on deduction. Until recently, we have had almost no evidence on whether decision makers behave as deterrence theory says they should, and whether their actions have the expected effects. Third-wave research has increased our knowledge, but it still falls far short of what is needed. For example, how often do statesmen increase their cost of retreating in order to convince others that they will stand firm? When do they seek to commit themselves to a course of action that would not be worth taking had they not staked their reputations on it? Do they often try to cut communication channels so that there is no way of convincing them to change their position? Herman Kahn repeats the story of the Russian chief of staff in 1914 who, after persuading the Tsar to mobilize, smashed his telephone so that he could not be reached if the Tsar changed his mind.[21] Is this a freakish exception? Do many decision makers feign irrationality, or is Hitler the only one who used this tactic which, according to the theory, is so potent? Are solutions that are reached usually salient ones? These are not minor points; they are some of the most discussed bargaining tactics that flow from the theory.

The dearth of evidence extends to the question of the effects of bargaining tactics as well as their frequency. Do others believe that signals of commitment significantly increase the chance that the state will stand firm? Are statesmen able to link a specific issue to a broader principle in which others agree they have a high stake? Do attempts to de-commit others have any effect? In practice, does it matter whether the United States stations troops in West Berlin? Did sending more of them in after the Wall was erected have a significant impact?

Two central questions are still without answers. First, under what

[20] Jervis, "Bargaining and Bargaining Tactics," in J. Roland Pennock and John Chapman, *Coercion*, NOMOS, XIV (Chicago: Aldine 1972), 272-88. Also see Glenn Snyder, "'Prisoner's Dilemma' and 'Chicken' Models in International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly*, XV (March 1971), 66-103.

[21] Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1960), 366. The source is Sidney Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, II (New York: Macmillan 1929), 472-73.

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conditions do threats and the use of force lead the other side to retreat and when do they lead it to reply with threats and force of its own? Second, when does a retreat or a concession lead others to expect, and the state to make, other retreats?[22] One of the most important implications of deterrence theory is that, because commitments are interdependent, one default will lead to others. But, as we will discuss below, there is little evidence for this proposition, and the argument needs closer scrutiny.

Risk-taking. On several important points the empirical research of third-wave scholars has shown us that deterrence theory needs modification. First, the theory points to the tension between the desire to increase risks in order to make the other side retreat and the desire to lower them in order to make the situation safer; between the incentive to let things get a bit out of hand and the need to maintain control; between the desire to foreclose one's own options and so leave to the other the "last clear chance" to avoid war and the desire to preserve flexibility. On all these dimensions, statesmen—or at least American statesmen—lean more toward caution and prudence than the flavor of the theory indicates. I say "flavor" because the theory is not precise enough to specify exactly how cautious statesmen should be. But it stresses the bargaining advantages accruing from generating risks and foreclosing options. Statesmen, however, seem to be impressed by the disadvantages of these measures. They almost never undertake commitments that are literally irrevocable—making it physically impossible for them to retreat—even though they would prevail by doing so (assuming the other side sees this and prefers retreating to fighting). Oran Young finds that in crises, American leaders do not rush to foreclose their options; instead, they choose to trade an increment in their chance of prevailing for an increment in the chances of maintaining peace.[23] Thus, deterrence seems easier than the theory implies. This observation is consistent with McGeorge Bundy's well-known remark that an enormous nuclear arsenal is not needed to dissuade another country from attacking—one Polaris submarine would be enough.[24] Bundy is referring to capabilities, not tolerance of risk; but the attitude he is describing fits nicely with Young's portrait.

Another interpretation would be to argue that decision makers seem

[22] For a preliminary discussion of these questions, see Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976), 58-102.
[23] Young (fn. 2), 217-20.
[24] Bundy, "To Cap the Volcano," *Foreign Affairs*, XLVIII (October 1969), 9-12.

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a bit more conservative (or more sensible, as Morgan would put it),[25] and care less about long-run considerations, than the theory implies. Deterrence theory stresses that not being tough enough in one situation may bring peace only at the expense of one's image of resolve, and so at the eventual cost of security. Decision makers are aware of this danger and seek to demonstrate their willingness to use force on occasions when the risks seem small or controllable (for instance, the American actions to re-take the *Mayaguez*). However, in direct superpower confrontations they are more willing to let the long run take care of itself than the theory leads us to expect. The danger is that an actor who is less conservative and less cooperative can exploit his adversary. Those who have noted the sensible caution of decision makers probably intended to commend them, but the chances of war would probably be increased if statesmen were aware of these findings and believed them.

Alternatively, one can argue that deterrence theory overestimates the competitive element in international politics and overlooks the interests that the two sides have in common beyond the desire to avoid mutual destruction. Such interests could provide each with an incentive to be moderate, to sacrifice some chance of a short-run victory, and to seek agreements that benefit both sides.

Rewards. Until recently, deterrence theorists paid little attention to rewards; even those who asserted that rewards were important did little empirical research to support their argument. George, Hall, and Simons, as well as Snyder and Diesing, have made a major advance by stressing the role of timing. In many crises, they argue, the status-quo power must initially stand firm and use threats in order to convince the other side that the general thrust of its demands is unacceptable. An aggressor often initiates a conflict in the mistaken belief that the status-quo state will not resist strongly. If the latter's initial response is conciliatory, the aggressor—confirmed in his view—will respond by hardening his stand. The status-quo state, finding that its policy of reasonableness is failing, may want to turn to a policy of firmness to show that its concessions should not be taken for weakness. Indeed, "doves" often argue that conciliation should be tried first because if it fails, a tougher policy can always be substituted. But this strategy may not be possible. If the initial conciliation convinces the aggressor that his policy is working, he will either ignore the new signs of firmness or believe that they indicate a bluff. The result will be a crisis that has

[25] Morgan (fn. 2), 101-24.

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a high probability of ending in war, or in defeat for the status-quo power.

So it is important, as the second-wave theorists said, for the status-quo power to start by displaying its willingness to use force if the other side does not change its behavior or demands. But this demonstration is rarely sufficient to end the crisis, because it is hard for the aggressor to admit total defeat. Once the status-quo state has convinced the other that its basic demands are not going to be granted, it can and must offer some concessions, often of a procedural nature. By not humiliating the defeated party and by giving some heed to the norms of reciprocity, the status-quo state will be able to indicate that its own aims are limited and that it will not use its current victory as a platform from which to threaten the other. Successful deterrence may thus be less than total. The status-quo power will have to give up at least a token. But the other side will not be encouraged to press for new demands, and the concessions will not cumulate dangerously because the state has protected the essentials and made its resolve clear.[26]

In other cases, the status-quo state may find that its original goals are unattainable and that a retreat is unavoidable. In order to convince the other that, having given up some values, the state is more likely to stand behind the remaining ones, it can combine a concession with an increase in the pressure it is exerting, even though this pressure is now being applied toward a reduced goal. This strategy was used by President Kennedy in Laos—where it met with some success—and the pattern probably is a common one.[27]

Things that can go wrong. A third modification of deterrence theory to come out of the recent empirical work is a general appreciation of how easy it is for things to go wrong, and for the innumerable points at which errors can occur. The analysis of decision making reveals in full detail the problems that were glossed over by earlier deterrence theorists.[28]

First, the state's attempts at deterrence can fail because it misunder-

[26] Snyder and Diesing (fn. 2), 489-93; George, Hall, and Simons (fn. 2), 100-103, 238-44. Also see Eugenia Nomikos and Robert North, *International Crisis* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1976), 270-71.

[27] George, Hall, and Simons (fn. 2), 56, 64-65, 74-75, 217.

[28] For related arguments, see Morgan (fn. 2), 54-57; Trevor Salmon, "Rationality and Politics: The Case of Strategic Theory," *British Journal of International Studies*, II (October 1976), 298-304; Robert Mandel, "Political Gaming and Foreign Policy Making during Crises," *World Politics*, XXIX (July 1977), 610-25; Wallace Thies, "Coercion and Diplomacy: Force and Foreign Policy in the Vietnam Conflict," Ph.D. diss. (Yale University 1977); Smoke (fn. 2).

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stands the other's values. In rare cases, what the state thinks of as a punishment will even be taken by the other as a reward. Thus, in 1906 Theodore Roosevelt tried to deter both sides in the Cuban civil strife from harming American property by warning them that he would be forced to intervene if they did. But both sides believed such intervention would help them, and so perceived not a threat but an invitation.[29] More frequently, a government will fail to understand how much the other values certain goals. In an extreme case, the state will not realize that the other is undeterrable and would rather fight than concede. That was one of the crucial errors in American strategy toward Japan before World War II: Henry Stimson supported the oil and scrap metal embargo by arguing that "the very last thing which the Japanese Government desires is a war with the United States."[30] Even if the other side is deterrable, underestimating the value it places on prevailing will lead the state to underestimate how much punishment and/or credibility of threat is needed to produce the desired effect. The North Vietnamese might have been deterred if the United States had been able to convince them that it would keep fighting for 50 years or use nuclear weapons. American leaders did not think such extreme threats were necessary. In a Chicken situation, this kind of misperception can lead to war. Even if the state has conveyed the desired impression of how likely it is that it will stand firm, if it underestimates the value the other places on prevailing, it may incorrectly expect the other to retreat.

Second, deterrence can fail because the state misunderstands the way the other sees the world, with the result that the other will not interpret the state's behavior as it is intended, and will not react as the state desires. Deterrence theory assumes that others receive and decode the state's signals although they do not always believe the messages conveyed. In fact, communication is often faulty and the resulting behavior is not expected by the theory. American statesmen did not give full consideration to the Chinese signals in the fall of 1950, nor did they notice the obvious indications that the Russians were preparing to blockade Berlin the spring of 1948.

Further difficulties are created because one element in the other's view of its situation is its view of the state, and this perception often differs radically from the state's self-image. Unless states are trying to

[29] Allan Millet, *The Politics of Intervention* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press 1968), 68-69, 73-75, 77-78.

[30] *New York Times*, January 11, 1940. I am grateful to Abraham Ben-Zvi for this citation.

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deceive, they usually believe that others see them as they see themselves. States that are planning to stand firm may think that others know what they will do. One reason why both sides agreed to open negotiations over Berlin in 1958 was that each incorrectly thought that the other realized it was committed to prevailing on the essentials of the issue.[31] Chamberlain's efforts to deter Hitler after March 1939 were hampered by his failure to see that Hitler did not understand him and his reasons for retreating at Munich. More frequently, the state fails to see that others view it as aggressive. The classic case is the misdesigned American policy toward China in the fall of 1950. The United States realized that the Chinese might worry about interruptions in the flow of electric power from the Yalu stations, and so made special efforts to reassure them on this score. But because the Americans knew they would not use Korea as a base for attacks, they never seriously considered the possibility that the Chinese would consider a re-unified, anti-Communist Korea a threat to their security.[32]

Third, deterrence can go wrong because of incorrect beliefs about the other's strength and options. The state may neglect to deter certain actions in the incorrect belief that the other lacks the capability to undertake them. Not only are underestimates of capabilities an important cause of surprise attack, but, as George and Smoke also show, deterrence often fails unexpectedly because the other can often "design around" the state's policy (pp. 520-22). Because a state usually tries to deter others from taking specific actions rather than to deter all actions aimed at a specified objective, the other can at its leisure develop plans for circumventing the roadblocks the state has erected. Case studies often reveal failure of imagination on the part of would-be deterrers: they cannot think of all the possible ways open to the other to change the status quo—even ways that in retrospect seem obvious. Even if Schelling is correct in arguing that "if deterrence fails it is usually because someone thought he saw an 'option' that the American government had failed to dispose of, a loophole that it hadn't closed,"[33] he understates the difficulty in imagining, let alone closing, all possible loopholes. George and Smoke show that deterrence is relatively ineffective in the face of limited probes that can weaken the status quo without raising tensions to the flash point (e.g., the Taiwan Straits

[31] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception* (fn. 22), 70-71, 354-55; Jack Schick, *The Berlin Crisis* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1971), 185-86.

[32] John Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (New York: Norton 1965), 97; Allen Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1960), 151.

[33] Schelling (fn. 1), 44.

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crises); in *faits accomplis* that present the defender with the unpalatable choice of increasing the level of risk or accepting the new status quo (as North Korea sought to do in attacking the South); and in exercises of controlled pressure in which the other side tries to extract concessions and yet retains the freedom to lower the level of tension if the situation becomes too dangerous—e.g., the Berlin crises of 1958 and 1961 (pp. 536-47).

Knowing what options the other side will contemplate requires that one see things from its perspective. It may consider as feasible actions that the state finds impractical or inconceivable. Thus, many American leaders thought that Japan would never attack the United States because it would lose an all-out war. They failed to see that Japan contemplated only a limited war. Similarly, one of the main reasons why the U.S. did not plan to respond to an attack on South Korea was the belief that such an attack would only come as part of a general war, and in that context Korea would have little value. These cases raise two general points. First, they again show the importance of the other's beliefs about the state and the difficulty that decision makers have in grasping them even if they are not disguised. (The Americans knew they would not fight a limited war against Japan and assumed no one could hold such a ludicrous view.) Second, these potential actions had not been analyzed and rejected as too unlikely to merit deterrent strategies; rather, American leaders had never thought of them at all.

Either overestimating or underestimating the other's perceived freedom of action can vitiate the state's deterrence policy. Committing oneself to stand firm works only if the other can retreat. But Holsti's study of the final weeks of peace in 1914 reveals that decision makers on both sides believed that, while they had no choice but to stand firm, the other side had more ability of maneuver and could concede.[34] The strategy of coercing the other into cooperating works only if one has correctly judged that he does not have a better alternative. Thus, the German policy toward England in the late 19th and early 20th centuries rested on the assumption that the differences between England and France and between England and Russia could not be resolved, and that England therefore would have to accept Germany's terms for cooperation if she was to avoid diplomatic isolation.

A fourth problem glossed over by deterrence theory is the difficulty in determining the other's basic intentions. Whether the other is an aggressor or a defender of the status quo is treated by the theory as a

[34] Holsti (fn. 17), 143-68.

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given and assumed to be obvious to the state. But it is not obvious; indeed, behind many of the criticisms of the second wave was the belief that the Russians were not aggressive.

Investigations of decision making have shown that images of the other, which strongly influence the perception of incoming information, are very resistant to change. If a statesman wrongly sees another country as a defender of the status quo, dramatic events will have to take place before he decides that the other has to be deterred. And if he thinks the other is aggressive, the image may never be corrected. Images of resolve are also hard to change—which can make deterrence easier if the state has acquired a reputation for running risks and standing firm. But if the state is believed to be weak, the tactics that according to the theory should lead others to expect it to stand firm are likely to be misinterpreted or ignored. Thus, by the late 1930's, even a carefully designed British policy probably could not have convinced Hitler that England would fight. In a crisis it is especially important to understand the other's intentions and to change incorrect images; but Snyder and Diesing have shown that only beliefs about the tactics the other is following, and nothing deeper, are likely to change in such a situation.[35]

George and Smoke argue that a further factor that inhibits accurate perception of the other side is one's own policy. Information will be interpreted to sustain the chosen course of action. For example, one reason why the United States was surprised by the Chinese entry into the Korean War was that it had developed a policy that would succeed only if China stayed out (pp. 206-12).[36] Both psychological and political mechanisms may be at work here. Bad news is screened out by wishful thinking and by conscious decisions to withhold or alter reports that could harm one's position. This argument is certainly plausible, and indeed the importance of wishful thinking is usually taken for granted. But upon closer examination, the evidence for this phenomenon is not strong.[37] It is especially difficult to establish the causal role of desires in a case like Korea because the policy was arrived at only *because* it was believed that the Chinese would stay out.

[35] Snyder and Diesing (fn. 2).

[36] Also see George Poteat, "The Intelligence Gap: Hypotheses on the Process of Surprise," *International Studies Notes*, III (Fall 1976). George and Smoke argue that this influence was also at work in the period preceding the Berlin blockade (pp. 128-30). For similar arguments in other cases, see Roberta Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight," *Foreign Affairs*, XLIII (July 1965), 691-707; Arthur Marder, *Operation Menace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1976), 44-45; and Richard Cottam, *Foreign Policy Motivation* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 1977).

[37] Jervis (fn. 22), 356-72.

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Finally, almost any case study will reveal instances in which attempts to show commitment, strength, or willingness to compromise were either ignored or misinterpreted in ways about which one cannot easily generalize. A minor but neat example is provided by what happened when negotiations between Turkey and Britain broke down in 1882. "In order to manifest his displeasure and to cool his angered brain, the British Ambassador proceeded to Prinkipo in his cutter. The officials at the Sublime Porte could watch from their windows the white sails of the *Lady Hermione* battling with the current round Oxeia and the Bulwer Island. . . . They could not understand how, if the situation were really as urgent as he represented, [the ambassador] could afford to bob about the Marmora in an open sailing boat."[38] Even if both sides have the same culture and background and have read the same deterrence literature, many actions that a statesman will expect to convey a clear message may be read very differently by his opposite number—if they are read at all.

Probabilities and calculations. Even when statesmen see others relatively accurately, deterrence may fail because of their inability to integrate information properly. First, in many cases people ignore probabilities and act as though events were either certain or impossible.[39] They do not try to make careful probability estimates or pay attention to changes in probability. Instead, they usually concentrate on the payoffs. For example, rationality dictates that one should stand firm if one is almost certain that the other will retreat, even if the gains from victory are slight and the costs of war enormous. But there does not appear to be a single case in which a state has been willing to risk a costly war for minor gain.

The failure of statesmen to utilize probabilities raises serious questions because much of deterrence theory rests on the notion of the manipulation of risk. But if decision makers are insensitive to all but the most obvious shifts in probabilities, then careful and detailed manipulations will be impossible. Troop maneuvers, demonstrations of resolve, and signals of commitment which are designed to increase the perceived danger of war slightly but noticeably, will be ignored. In many contexts this insensitivity will mean that a little credibility will be sufficient to deter, even though it would not be if decision makers properly

[38] Harold Nicolson, *Sir Arthur Nicolson, Bart., First Lord Carnock* (London: Constable 1930), 40.

[39] Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," *Econometrica* (forthcoming).

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employed probability-utility calculus. But it will also mean that many of the sophisticated tactics discussed by deterrence theorists will not have the predicted effects.

Second, even if their estimates of probability are accurate, statesmen do not calculate as precisely as the theory says they should. President Kennedy said that he thought the chances of war during the Cuban missile crisis were at least one in three.[40] If he believed this, he either placed an incredibly high value on prevailing or else he did not understand probability-utility calculus. It is hard to accept the notion that Kennedy thought that the costs of war combined with twice the gains that would accrue if he won (the payoff for standing firm when the odds were two-to-one that the Russians would back down) were anything like equal to the value of losing combined with twice the payoff of a compromise (the payoff for backing down when the odds are as stated).

Third, even if probabilities are properly utilized, rationality is reduced in a way that influences deterrence because of the propensity of people to fail to make explicit value trade-offs. Rather, they tend to believe that the policy they favor is better than the alternatives on all important value dimensions, even though those dimensions are logically independent of each other.[41] Thus, people who favor standing firm in a dispute usually believe both that the other side will retreat if their state follows the policy they advocate, and that concessions will be terribly costly; those who call for conciliation usually believe both that firmness is likely to lead to war, and that the other side will be satisfied if it receives reasonable concessions. It is rare for someone to say (or think) that his policy is likely to protect his country and its allies, but entails a greater risk of immediate war than would a more conciliatory course of action. Thus, statesmen often fail to weigh the costs of their decisions properly, continue to stand by an established policy even though it should be changed, and are unable to match and adjust their actions to the environment in a way that even bounded rationality requires.

These disabilities and complications have less impact in relatively unambiguous situations, such as those usually involved in the deterrence of attacks on the superpowers' homelands. But they create major

[40] Theodore Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper 1965), 705.

[41] Jervis (fn. 22), 128-43. Jack Snyder, in "Rationality at the Brink," *World Politics*, xxx (April 1978), 345-65, argues that statesmen avoid making tradeoffs during crises. Although generally successful, this line of reasoning is marred by the fact that several of the dimensions he considers are not actually independent of each other.

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difficulties for any strategy that calls for fine calculation and the consideration of a large number of factors. Propositions that are based on the assumption that decision makers' knowledge of their environment is detailed and accurate and that their calculations are precise will be incorrect. Bargaining tactics that assume that both sides have this capability will misfire. Thus, deterrence theory is not a sure guide to many complicated situations, and many of the sophisticated tactics that it leads us to expect either will not be employed or will not have the intended effects. (For a parallel argument, see George and Smoke, 38-55.)

Domestic and bureaucratic politics. Recent studies have also modified the arguments of the second wave by analyzing the role of domestic and bureaucratic politics. Since decision makers draw their political power from within their own states, they must often respond not only to foreign but also to domestic stimuli. If powerful domestic groups advocate conflicting policies or have beliefs that are "unsophisticated" and incompatible with deterrence, then policy will differ from that which the theory predicts.

The desire for consensus within most democracies hinders the state's freedom of action. Although this restriction will be of help in some bargaining situations, it will make it difficult for the state to take advantage of changes in its external environment. Whereas the theory would lead us to expect a clear strategy, internal disagreements often produce a "lowest common denominator" policy that is vague or postpones important decisions. In order to gain the necessary support for a policy, national leaders must—at least minimally—satisfy contradictory viewpoints. But any policy in which each faction finds something redeeming is likely to confuse other states or be self-defeating as its separate parts work against each other. Indeed, a policy that tries to combine incompatible elements instead of choosing among them is likely to be worse than a consistent policy that follows any one of the opposing views. But to make a sharp choice is to alienate important factions and incur an intolerable domestic cost.

Domestic and bureaucratic politics can also lead to outcomes that are incompatible with deterrence theory when policy is not implemented as intended and expected by the leaders. Standard operating procedures may not serve a special policy well, and yet they have to be employed, especially when large numbers of men and material have to be moved. The President might want to send a message by staging a certain kind of military maneuver, but the army may be unable to execute

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it if it is not in its repertoire. Even when subordinates can carry out what the leaders expect, they may not necessarily do so. In some cases, they misunderstand because their perspectives differ from those of their superiors. In other cases, they act according to their own wishes. Many of General MacArthur's actions in Korea fit into the latter category. (General Lavelle's bombing of North Vietnam contrary to the President's public position is ambiguous in this respect.) Whatever the cause, the effect is that actions are taken that contradict official policy. On occasion these discrepancies can aid deterrence—for example, if subordinates take a risky action that convinces the other side to back down. The unauthorized actions of the U.S. Navy during the Cuban missile crisis may have had this effect,[42] but the multiple opportunities for damaging a carefully calculated deterrence policy can be readily imagined.

An important but ambiguous case illustrates another way in which deterrence can be affected by the policy's implementation. The oil embargo against Japan in the summer of 1941 was not the result of a direct order from the President, but rather the product of a vague decision that was strictly implemented by the bureaucracy. Although much is unclear, it appears that President Roosevelt understood what was happening only after the *de facto* embargo had been in effect for a month.[43] He may have allowed it to continue because it was in accord with his earlier unexpressed desires. But it is at least as possible that, while Roosevelt had not intended to cut off U.S. oil entirely, he may have reasoned that to reopen the supply lines once they had been closed would have been interpreted by Britain, Japan, and domestic groups as showing that U.S. efforts to contain the Axis were slackening. This case presents only minor problems for deterrence theory as long as it merely involves shifting focus from the President to the bureaucracy. The latter's behavior—and the effective behavior of the government—can be seen in deterrence terms. But when the President is responsible for some actions, one group of bureaucrats is responsible for others, and a different group of officials is responsible for still others, then the whole set of the state's policies is likely to diverge from that predicted by the theory. Furthermore, a policy that requires the precise orchestration of a wide variety of behaviors—even if they all closely fit de-

[42] George, Hall, and Simons (fn. 2), 112-14.

[43] The best treatments are Irvine Anderson, Jr., *The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933-1941* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975), 168-92; and Jonathan Utley, "Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom: Oil Exports and Japan, 1940-41," *Prologue*, VIII (Spring 1978), 17-28.

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terrence theory—is likely to fail because it will be garbled in its implementation.[44]

Third-wave research has revealed important deficiencies in deterrence theory, but has not developed new theories. Nor has it shown exactly what can be retained from older views, what must be discarded, and what can be reformulated in bounded, conditional terms. Although George and his colleagues have made some progress on the latter problem, we still cannot answer questions such as: Under what conditions will the workings of domestic and bureaucratic politics prevent a deterrence strategy from being adopted or from succeeding? When do actors try to commit themselves? When does this tactic work? When do actors adopt a short-run perspective, and how does this influence the adoption and effect of deterrence tactics?

COMMITMENT AND INTEREST

All deterrence theorists agree that one determinant of whether a state stands firm is what it will lose if it retreats; but those of the third wave differ from those of the second in the aspect of the costs of retreating that they stress. Although the lines between them are often blurred, we can distinguish among intrinsic interest, strategic interest, and commitment as the values that will be sacrificed by retreats.[45] *Intrinsic interest* represents the inherent value that the actor places on the object or issue at stake. For example, if the United States had allowed the Soviet Union to occupy all of Berlin, two million people would have been forced to live under a regime that they abhor. *Strategic interest* in a conflict represents the degree to which a retreat would endanger the state's position on other issues, irrespective of its efforts to commit itself to a firm stand. Thus, even in the absence of a commitment, a retreat from Berlin could have led America's allies and adversaries to expect concessions on related issues and retreats under similar circumstances. Both intrinsic and strategic interests precede the bargaining process. *Commitment*, the third value sacrificed by a retreat, is manipulated by the state to increase its costs of retreating and thereby improve its bargaining position. Second-wave theorists stress

[44] This was the case with some aspects of American policy in Vietnam. See Thies (fn. 28). For a general statement, see George Kennan, *The Cloud of Danger* (Boston: Little, Brown 1977), 3-26.

[45] For a related distinction, see Glenn Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1961), 30-40. Also see Thomas Schelling's distinction between threats and warnings in *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1960), 123-24.

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commitment and, to a lesser extent, strategic interest,[46] but third-wave theorists argue that intrinsic interest is more important in most cases. We have been distracted by intriguing and dramatic tactics and have not focused enough on the underlying balance of motivation. As a result, we have overestimated the degree to which outcomes are manipulable and the extent to which the result of one conflict influences the course of others.

Begging the question of how it is established, we can say that the state that has a greater intrinsic interest in an issue is likely to prevail. Its costs of retreating will be higher than those of the other; it will win more by prevailing than will the other; thus, the incentives in the bargaining processes favor it, especially if the other side realizes that the "balance of interest" favors the state. Furthermore, intrinsic interest leads to strategic interest: if a state gives in on an issue which both sides know is more important to it than to its adversary, then others are likely to infer that the state is weak in military power or resolve and will retreat in a wide range of future issues. Thus, Young argues that "intensity of feeling" can be substituted "for deficiencies in numerical strength or physical capabilities"; Rosen stresses the importance of a state's willingness to suffer as a source of national power; and Snyder and Diesing maintain that the relative intensity of interests at stake is one of the two main determinants of bargaining power (the other being military strength). Of the eight conditions that George sees as necessary for the successful use of the strategy of coercive diplomacy, two directly tap this dimension (strength of U.S. motivation and asymmetry of motivation favoring the U.S.) and three others are linked to it indirectly (clarity of American objectives, sense of urgency to achieve the American objective, and adequate domestic political support). Russett finds that deterrence is most likely to succeed when there are strong ties between the threatened state and its defender.[47]

Commitment can only be built on a foundation of intrinsic and strategic interest. If Berlin had not mattered to the United States, the piling on of statements, symbols, and troops would not have made American

[46] Snyder (fn. 45) is one of the few second-wave theorists to recognize the importance of intrinsic interest.

[47] Young (fn. 2), 33-216, 387, 391; Steven Rosen, "A Model of War and Alliance," in Julian Freedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen, *Alliance in International Politics* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon 1970), 215-37, and Rosen, "War Power and Willingness to Suffer," in Bruce Russett, ed., *Peace, War, and Numbers* (Beverly Hills: Sage 1972), 167-83; Snyder and Diesing (fn. 2), 498; George, Hall, and Simons (fn. 2), 215-28; Russett (fn. 2), 103-5. Also see George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, 552-53, 558-61.

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threats credible. The other side of this coin is that, when interest is great enough, commitment is not necessary. The Soviets probably would not think they could safely attack Western Europe even if the reputation of the United States were not staked on responding. If commitment were as important as the second wave implies, there would be numerous examples of states going to war because they had committed themselves to standing firm—that is, situations in which the state would have retreated had it not staked its reputation on not doing so. But, with the possible exception of Vietnam, I cannot think of a single case that meets this criterion. Similarly, one should be able to find cases in which statesmen pledged themselves to undertake responses which they would not want to carry out had they not committed themselves. But this also does not seem to occur. (What is generally considered the best example —the threat to destroy the other's cities in the event of an all-out war —does not fit in this category because carrying out the threat would make no sense even if the state is committed. The purpose of responding when one is committed is to bolster one's ability to defend future values; fighting an all-out war would destroy what one is seeking to protect.) Scholars should also be able to find cases in which a state would have taken a certain action were it not for the belief that another state had pledged its reputation on retaliating if the state does so act. Of course it is hard to be sure why states do not act, but it is still striking that instances do not come readily to mind.

There are two problems with the argument that commitment is less important than second-wave deterrence theory implies. First, to test it we need an independent measure of each state's interest in the issue. The obvious danger is that we will unconsciously employ *post hoc* reasoning and conclude that the state that retreated was less interested and less strongly motivated than the state that prevailed. Second, judgments about an area's intrinsic, and, to an even greater extent, strategic, value may be influenced by the commitments the actors have made. After 1945, West Berlin's value to the West increased with the acceptance of the idea that the city was important and that its citizens were brave and loyal defenders of democracy.

Although it is not conclusive, some evidence for the validity of the argument is that statesmen often talk in terms that are consistent with it. Thus, during a dispute with France over Portugal, Palmerston instructed his ambassador to tell the French Government that "England and France stand in different situations in this matter. England is bound by treaties to Portugal. . . . France has not the same motive for being a party concerned. . . ." Twelve years later, in a dispute over Spain,

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the French ambassador used the same argument against Palmerston: "Les intérêts de la France sont plus grandes, plus légitimes en Espagne que les vôtres." In the diplomatic maneuvering after the Crimean War, the Austrian Prime Minister rejected a French proposal to unite the Danubian Principalities with the words: "Pour la France, c'est une politique chevaleresque et de sentiment, c'est une question de vie ou de mort pour notre Empire." Almost a hundred years later, Stalin's words to Churchill carry an echo: "The Prime Minister has said that for Great Britain the question of Poland is a question of honour. For Russia it is not only a question of honour but also of security . . . of life and death for the Soviet state."[48] In formal agreements, one state often recognizes the superior position of another by acknowledging the latter's "special interest" in an issue or area. The interests that statesmen refer to pre-date the bargaining situation and cannot easily be manipulated by signals. Decision makers are issuing warnings, not threats.

Legitimacy. One determinant of the participants' relative interest is the ill-defined quality of legitimacy. In some instances, both sides feel that a demand is illegitimate—that it is unjust, that it calls for something that is not normally accorded, that it solicits an unearned and undeserved reward, or that it involves a humiliating procedure that is inappropriate in relations between sovereign states. In such a case, the demand will be vigorously and vehemently resisted. If sufficient power is brought to bear, the state may be forced to accede—but overwhelming power will be required. Snyder and Diesing conclude that "perceptions of legitimacy are potent in determining bargaining power and outcomes. That is, the party that believes it is in the right and communicates this belief to an opponent who has some doubts about the legitimacy of his own position, nearly always wins." Of course such shared conceptions of legitimacy may be absent, and Snyder and Diesing note that "though other variables were operating, . . . the two cases [they examined] that ended in war were cases in which opposite legitimacy beliefs were held with about equal intensity."[49]

Implications. The influence of the balance of interest eases the problem of deterrence and contributes to diplomatic moderation. First, states

[48] Quotes from Roger Bullen, *Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale* (London: Athlone 1974), 13, 104; W. E. Mosse, *The Rise and Fall of the Crimean System, 1855–71* (London: Macmillan 1963), 51; *Foreign Relations of the U.S.: Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1955), 679-80.
[49] Snyder and Diesing (fn. 2), 498-500.

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generally place a greater value on keeping what they have than on making further gains. That is one reason why deterrence is usually easier than compellence.[50] There are, however, exceptions to this generalization, exceptions that deterrence theory has been slow to recognize. An expansionist can be more highly motivated to alter the status quo on a particular issue than the defender is to maintain it. This is likely to be the case when nationalism is involved for the former but not the latter state (e.g., the Vietnam war), or when a state tries to re-gain values that were taken from it after losing a war. More research is needed to establish other circumstances under which this relationship holds, and to examine the problems it creates, the methods the status-quo power uses to limit its losses if it retreats, and the strategies it employs if it decides to stand firm. But the main point is that the balance of interest usually favors the status quo.

Second, states often place different value on different objects, thereby facilitating accords that grant to each state what it values most. Settlements of this type are very much in the spirit of the forebear of deterrence theory, Realism, which stresses that intelligent diplomacy respects the interests of others. Such analysis is common among statesmen. For example, in 1910 former President Theodore Roosevelt, concerned that the current administration was mishandling Japanese-American relations, told President Taft,

> "Our vital interest is to keep the Japanese out of our country, and at the same time to preserve the goodwill of Japan. The vital interest of the Japanese, on the other hand, is in Manchuria and Korea. It is therefore peculiarly our interest not to take any steps as regards Manchuria which will give the Japanese cause to feel, with or without reason, that we are hostile to them, or a menace—in however slight a degree—to their interests. . . ."[51]

Similarly, conceptions of legitimacy provide guidelines for settling disputes because states are hesitant to retreat when they feel legitimacy is on their side, but are more apt to do so when they have doubts on this score. Indeed, a state may be inhibited from raising an issue on which it knows it lacks legitimacy or a favorable balance of interest by the knowledge that to do so is likely to lead others to see it as unreasonable and aggressive.

Third, moderation is encouraged because the balance of interest

[50] David Baldwin, "Bargaining with Airline Hijackers," in I. William Zartman, ed., *The 50% Solution* (Garden City: Anchor Books 1976), 416-21.

[51] Quoted in Michael Hunt, *Frontier Defense and the Open Door* (New Haven: Yale Universty Press 1973), 221.

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changes relatively slowly. Commitments can be made quickly, but interests must grow and cannot be easily manipulated. States therefore have little reason to fear that others can suddenly alter the strategic situation by commitments, and they have fewer incentives to rush preemptively to restrict their options. They can afford to retain their ability to maneuver, to wait and see how the situation changes, and so can take advantage of new opportunities and avoid new dangers. It is also possible that conflict is reduced because interest is more readily perceived than commitment, thus allowing states to coordinate their behavior and to avoid disputes they are not apt to win.

Fourth, and most important, because the second wave overestimates the importance of commitment and the extent to which outcomes are interdependent, it exaggerates the costs of retreats and the advantages of victories.[52] If commitment is all-important, a retreat damages the state's reputation for accurate signaling, thereby making it much harder to advance credible threats on other issues. In this view, the world is tightly interconnected. To abandon a commitment is to risk one's entire position. In the spring of 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger argued that "The United States cannot pursue a policy of selective reliability. We cannot abandon friends in one part of the world without jeopardizing the security of friends everywhere." He felt especially strongly that the U.S. had to aid Vietnam and Cambodia because at the time that these regimes were threatened by Communist offensives, it appeared that negotiations might start in the Middle East; and so it was imperative to show Egypt and Israel that America would fulfill its pledges. This position denies that behavior is highly context-bound. If it is, a default on one commitment will not call all others into question. If strategic and intrinsic interests are the major determinants of behavior, then the ramifications of one outcome are fewer, and the state can afford to take a more flexible stance. It is interesting to note that even in the 1930's, an era usually thought to exemplify domino effects, Hitler looked at the context in which Britain and France were acting rather than simply inferring that if they broke one commitment, they would break others. Thus "it was not automatically or generally concluded from [France's] refusal to march alone in defence of [the articles of the Treaty of Versailles prohibiting German remilitarization of the Rhineland] that Paris would not fulfil her obligations if Germany attacked

[52] Of course, if decision makers believe deterrence theory and overestimate the interconnectedness of outcomes, they will place excessive value on prevailing in disputes over issues of little intrinsic importance. This is a large part of the explanation for American policy in Vietnam.

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Czechoslovakia."[53] Alternatively, if decision makers believe that others expect one default to lead to further ones, they may consider it especially important to follow any retreats or concessions with firmness. Kennedy's resolve in the Cuban missile crisis was probably hardened by his previous defeats in Cuba, Laos, Berlin, and Vienna.

Stephen Maxwell has put the general point well:

> If "interest" is substituted for "commitment", the argument for interdependence immediately becomes less plausible. . . . The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the failure of a state to fulfil a commitment is simply that the commitment did not represent an interest worth defending, at the level of violence and risk estimated to be necessary.
>
> Thus, if the Americans backed down over Berlin, it is most unlikely that the Russians would conclude that they were free to attack Frankfurt, or anywhere else, without fear of American retaliation. The only conclusion the Russians could confidently draw was that Berlin was not a vital national interest to the Americans. Only if there were strong resemblances between America's position in Berlin and her position in other areas of commitment would they be justified in concluding that America would also renege on these commitments.[54]

Before returning to the last sentence of this quotation, which significantly modifies the sweeping nature of the argument, we should note that intrinsic interest can easily be incorporated into deterrence theory in one way, but in another way it undercuts one of the theory's essential elements. Looking at a single play of the Chicken game, we can see that the balance of interest will strongly influence the outcome. But there is more to deterrence than examining individual conflicts; much that is distinctive about the theory depends on conflicts being interrelated. Many of the tactics involve the state's mortgaging its future credibility. If the outcome of one conflict does not have a great influence on later ones, then this cannot be done, and a good deal of the theory is undermined.

Even if it is true that second-wave theorists exaggerated the importance of commitment and underestimated that of intrinsic interest, strategic interest can still create important interconnections among outcomes. Because a state tries to determine whether the other is likely to stand firm on a given issue by looking at its behavior on previous disputes, a retreat in one case can affect future outcomes—especially if

[53] John Snepp, *Decent Interval* (New York: Random House 1977), 143-44, 149, 175-76, quote at 237-38; J.T. Emerson, *The Rhineland Crisis* (London: Maurice Temple Smith 1977), 242. For a further discussion of the interconnectedness of the international system, see Jervis, "Systems Theories and Diplomatic History," in Lauren (fn. 17).

[54] Maxwell, *Rationality in Deterrence*, Adelphi Paper No. 50 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies 1968), 19.

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the issue is important to the state. Others may reason that, if a state backed down—or even compromised—on that issue, which had high intrinsic value, then it is very likely to retreat on other issues in which the balance of interest and other factors are no more favorable.[55] When Maxwell acknowledges that, if the United States retreated in Berlin, "only if there were strong resemblances between America's position in Berlin and her position in other areas of commitment would [others] be justified in concluding that America would also renege on those commitments," he is either conceding a great deal or he is misleading. He is misleading if he is arguing that the resemblances between Berlin and other issues have to involve many of the specific details (e.g., that the city is German and surrounded by a hostile state). He is conceding a great deal if he recognizes that the crucial dimension of resemblance is the degree to which the various parties care about the issue. Because others perceive Berlin as important to the U.S. (and recognize that the U.S. has stood firm on many issues on which the balance of interest was less favorable), a retreat there would cast doubt on its willingness to run risks on a wide range of disputes. In other words, a retreat by the U.S. would not only be a signal, but an index. Not only its reputation for living up to its pledges, but its reputation for protecting friends and allies would be damaged.

Unfortunately, we cannot specify exactly how tightly strategic interests interconnect the world because we do not know enough about the inferences that states draw when others retreat or stand firm. Do they see such behavior as highly context-bound? Under what conditions do they think that the actions predict behavior on a wide range of issues? If the behavior is unexpected, when do they revise their estimates of how much the other values the specific issue at stake, and when do they alter their estimates of the other's general resolve?

Our argument implies that states can, and must, differentiate among

[55] Although the effect resembles that following from defaulting on a commitment, there is an important difference. In defaulting on a commitment, the actor's reputation for fulfilling his pledges suffers. In the inference process described here, the outcome is less important than the price the actor has paid in trying to prevail. Others note this cost and the value they think the actor places on the issue at stake and expect a similar relationship to hold in the future. What may have impressed others about America's behavior in Vietnam was not that it reneged on a commitment but that it was willing to pay such a high price for an unimportant interest. (Of course, others may also believe that the American experience in Vietnam reduced its willingness to pay such a price in the future.) Interestingly enough, Kissinger once argued that "continued U.S. credibility, worldwide, hinges on whether we make an effort [in Vietnam] rather than on an actual success or failure" (Snepp, fn. 53, 306). But this remark was in service of an attempt to persuade Congress to provide aid for Vietnam in the last months of the war.

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interests according to their strategic and intrinsic value. It may be no accident that second-wave deterrence theory, which blurs these distinctions, has been especially popular in the United States—a country that is predisposed to see the world in all-or-nothing terms and that has rarely entered into international conflicts for issues of marginal significance. Americans have felt that if the most important matters are not at stake, the U.S. should not become involved in the contaminating international environment; but when the U.S. does become involved, it should be willing to go to the limit rather than retreat. Second-wave deterrence theory reinforces this view. If what matters in a conflict is not the specific issue at stake but rather each side's perception of the other's resolve, then seemingly minor issues are actually vital, because retreats will undermine a state's ability to protect itself and its closest allies. This weakness in the theory helps explain why, as George and Smoke argue (pp. 508-9, 589-90), the United States has too frequently employed deterrence as a substitute for foreign policy. It has often sought to deter all changes in the status quo instead of trying to decide which changes were innocuous, which ones were inevitable, and which trends could not be influenced by deterrence.

DETERRENCE AND POLITICS

A final problem with deterrence theory—only partly rectified by the third wave—is that it is apolitical. Although it is highly political in its discussion of means, it pays little attention to the goals of policy. Herman Kahn's list of the actors' objectives omits all mention of what the conflict is about.[56] At best, this question is left open. At worst, the theory implies that deterrence is a goal in itself. If the other side is committed to expansion and the world is tightly interconnected, then the question of goals and the ranking of interests need not be addressed. So it is not surprising that deterrence theory has a lot to say about how to act in a crisis, but much less about how to avoid crises. It explains and prescribes behavior once a conflict has been joined, but says little about "the prior question of whether the national interest is sufficiently engaged in a particular situation to warrant some form of . . . military intervention."[57] The theory takes the high interest of both sides for granted and goes on from there. But if the world is heterogeneous and

[56] Kahn (fn. 21), 532. The importance of keeping means and ends in proper alignment is stressed by Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan 1973); see esp. chap. 1. Also see George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, 556-57.

[57] George, Hall, and Simons (fn. 2), 15.

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each side places different values on different objectives, then states must consider their goals, employ deterrence only when it is both necessary and likely to succeed, and utilize a whole range of alternative and complementary diplomatic instruments.

The lack of attention to compromise is another facet of the theory's neglect of politics. Most conflicts end in compromise; compromise is one of the things politics is all about. It is central to behavior even when important interests are engaged.

Finally, deterrence is often apolitical in examining possible sequences of events, of moves and countermoves, without considering the context in which they may occur. The resulting analysis thus has an air of unreality about it. For example, the proponents of conventional defense in Europe show that without such a capability, Europe could be conquered by the U.S.S.R. without resort to nuclear weapons. But these arguments overlook the kind of decisions that the Russians would have to make to order such an attack: they would have to be confident that the United States would not only withhold a strategic response, but that it also would not use its tactical nuclear weapons against the inviting target of massed Soviet forces.[58] In setting policy, American statesmen should consider the political restraints on Soviet aggressiveness in order to estimate the magnitude of the threat with which they have to cope. Both the strength of Soviet motivation to expand and the obstacles that the Soviet leaders could expect to lie in their path need to be considered. For example, even if the U.S. did not fight in response to a Soviet attack on Europe, it would probably sever its cooperative relationships with the U.S.S.R., build up its forces to an unprecedented level, and develop closer ties with China. These factors would increase the Soviet's perceived cost of a successful war; if they were ignored, the requirements for deterrence would be unreasonably high. The United States must also consider the intentions of the Soviet Union, not in the vague sense of her desires, but in the sense of the price that she is willing to pay to attain her goals (supplemented by an analysis of the risks the Russians perceive in various courses of action). Washington must try to judge how great a perceived probability of war is sufficient to restrain them; how hard they are to deter. This question is more central to the current policy debate than are the more frequently discussed topics of the size of the Soviet arsenal and the vulnerability of Minuteman. Of course it is difficult to answer, but a useful theory cannot take this factor for granted. As Brodie notes, Wohlstetter's

[58] Bernard Brodie, *Escalation and the Nuclear Option* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1966), passim.

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"Delicate Balance of Terror," like "so many articles on military technological affairs, took no account whatever of the inhibitory political and psychological imponderable that might and in fact *must* affect the conditions implied by that word *delicate*. Many things are technologically feasible that we have quite good reason to believe will not happen." Rosecrance overstates the point a bit, but it is a useful corrective to the more common arguments: "Political patterns are prerequisite to military deterrent success. Unless political factors constrain the range of contingencies that actually would have to be faced, technical deterrence cannot succeed."[59]

As we move into a more complicated world in which the superpowers possess the capability and doctrine for war-fighting and limited nuclear strikes, even more attention will have to be paid to fitting military strategy to political goals. The problems of both the theory and the practice of deterrence are likely to become more intricate, and it will be easy to lose one's bearings in the sea of arguments about the multiple possibilities for the controlled use of nuclear weapons for purposes of bargaining and intimidation. Almost 35 years ago Bernard Brodie stated that "everything about the atomic bomb is overshadowed by the twin facts that it exists and that its destructive power is fantastically great."[60] For all the sophisticated theorizing of the second and third waves, the central point remains the paradox that it never makes sense to destroy the other side's cities—and invite retaliation in kind—but the ever-present chance of this outcome exercises a most powerful influence.

[59] Brodie (fn. 56), 380 (emphases in original); Richard Rosecrance, *Strategic Deterrence Reconsidered*, Adelphi Paper No. 116 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies 1975), 35-36.

[60] Bernard Brodie, ed., *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt Brace 1946), 52.

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

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